FRUS: 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath — 45. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan, October 22, 1962
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian · 1962
Read FRUS: 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath — 45. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan, October 22, 1962 by U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian (1962) in the Tower of Babel, a free online library of public-domain works preserved in clean, searchable text. No sign-up. The full text is served as a plain-text file at a predictable URL, where text is present: https://antarctic-labs.com/tower-of-babel/frus-1961-63v11-d45.txt.
Introduction
A telephone talk of October 22, 1962, between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan lays out the quarantine choice. A secret build-up allowed to stand would unhinge Washington across Latin America, Kennedy argues. It would also cast doubt on every word said about Berlin.
An air strike or invasion could still come, but each invites a move on Berlin. Invasion needs seven days to mount. The blockade starts the climb slowly, to bar a third world war. Kennedy notes the Cuba missiles would double Soviet strike power. He promises to speak again before any landing.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 1962 |
| COLLECTION | DECLASSIFIED |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 2651 |
| LICENSE | Public Domain |
| RIGHTS | PUBLIC DOMAIN |
| SOURCE | Foreign Relations of the United States (history.state.gov) |
Source: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d45
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Full text
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45. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan October 22, 1962. The clandestine way that the Soviets have made their build-up in Cuba would have unhinged us in all of Latin America. To allow it to continue would have thrown into question all our statements about Berlin. PM spoke. We have the potential to occupy Cuba but we didn't start that way. There would be a gap of some days before invasion could be mounted. Preparations for invasion would have public notice. This way provides action without immediate escalation to war. Action is limited now. Greater force would give him the same excuse in Berlin. It may be necessary to expand blockade to include fuel, lubricants and so forth. PM spoke. (about possible Russian actions) He may require us to seize their ships by force. There is no telling what he will do—probably it will be something in Berlin. PM spoke. We have had no plan to invade Cuba. We must get their missiles out. What exchange possible is not known. But getting the missiles out is the object of our policy. We are aware that this action is not complete application of force—does not immediately solve the problem. The alternatives were air strike or invasion. These may be necessary but going completely into Cuba now invites him into Berlin. PM spoke. If we had the force on hand to take Cuba tonight that would be okay, but it would take a week to build up. Prime Minister spoke. We are attempting to begin the escalation in a way to prevent WW III. Maybe this will result anyway, but we cannot accept his actions. PM spoke. (about talking to K on phone) No, but I sent a letter to him one hour ago. Khrushchev is playing a double game. He said he wasn't going to do anything until after the election. He said weapons in Cuba were not offensive. It is obvious that he was attempting to face us in November with a bad situation. PM answered. Mr. Bundy suggested the following point which the President made. The build-up in Cuba, if completed, would double the number of missiles the Soviets could bring to bear on the U.S. They would also overcome our warning system which does not face south. Furthermore, the short distance involving short times of flight would tempt them to make a first strike. PM spoke. Some action was necessary. It could result in WW III; we could lose Berlin. PM spoke. Invasion may yet be required. It requires seven days for mobilization of the necessary forces. In any event we won't invade until I speak again with you. PM spoke.