No. 849 The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State · 1945
Read No. 849 The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State by U.S. Department of State (1945) in the Tower of Babel, a free online library of public-domain works preserved in clean, searchable text. No sign-up. The full text is served as a plain-text file at a predictable URL, where text is present: https://antarctic-labs.com/tower-of-babel/frus-1945-potsdam-2-d849.txt.
Introduction
Henry Stimson wrote to the Secretary of State on July 17, 1945, in document 849. The Secretary of War addressed his cabinet colleague as the Potsdam Conference opened. Stimson's letters that summer carried the war's heaviest questions. This one entered the second Potsdam volume of the official record.
A Stimson letter to Byrnes joined the two departments that owned the peace's making. War and State had to move together or not at all. Readers see that partnership in formal, careful prose. The document opens the conference with the cabinet's senior voice. It reminds readers that Potsdam's table sat inside a government, not above one.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | U.S. Department of State |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 1945 |
| COLLECTION | DECLASSIFIED |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 9991 |
| LICENSE | Public Domain |
| RIGHTS | PUBLIC DOMAIN |
| SOURCE | U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian |
Source: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv02/d849
Browse the full library · About the Tower of Babel
Full text
The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:
No. 849 The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State top secret Dear Mr. Secretary[:] I am enclosing herewith the original and a copy for your files of a memorandum to the President relating to the problem of the administration of Germany. This is the memorandum referred to in my note[1] delivered to you yesterday evening. At your earliest convenience I would very much like to see the President with you about this memorandum and the memorandum on Japan[2] sent to you yesterday. Faithfully yours, Henry L Stimson Potsdam , 17 July 1945. [Enclosure] top secret [Babelsberg,] 16 July 1945. Memorandum for the President The matters with which I am primarily concerned, namely the administration of Germany and the conduct of the war with Japan, are, upon analysis, inextricably related to the general problem of post war rehabilitation and the achievement of the strategic aims for which we have been fighting. the condition of central europe We have occupied Germany following a devastating conquest which has laid waste wide areas of middle Europe, extending from France to well within the boundaries of Russia, and extending from the North Sea and the Baltic to the Mediterranean. Germany, which has been responsible for loosing the forces which resulted in the two World Wars, is herself laid waste and is in the geographical center of the area of devastation. This area in the main was a highly industrialized one, its industrialization being evidenced by the number of large and prosperous cities within it. All who have visited Germany and the portions of Poland and Russia overrun by the war, testify to the great destruction visited upon those cities. Almost without exception, cities large and small have been torn by explosives of greater power than have been developed in any previous wars. It may be true, as was stated before the Kilgore Committee of the Senate,[4] that many of the plants could, with industry, be restored or set in motion with relatively little or no repair. But there is a great difference between the mere physical existence of a plant and its capacity to operate as a going concern. That capacity has been destroyed, at least temporarily, by the destruction of the means of communication to and from the plant, and by the general collapse following defeat. A paralysis of commerce has set in due to the lack of transportation, raw materials, and the means of trade. This paralysis is not limited to Germany, but may grip all western Europe as well. As occupiers of portions of this area, we shall have many serious administrative problems to cope with, problems which will be greatly accentuated by lack of food and fuel. For this reason alone it should be our policy to make it possible for the people we control to work, and thus relieve us to the maximum possible extent of the burden of their idleness and want. I take it that all our objectives are included in one fundamental purpose—the achievement of security and peace under conditions which preserve to us our concepts of liberty. While it is our object to disarm Germany, it should not be our purpose to make it impossible for the German people to live and work. We should not remove their capacity for aiding in the restoration of stable conditions in Europe and the world. On the one hand it is clear that Germany has created, and twice misused, a swollen war industry—one substantially beyond her peaceful needs, and even though this capacity has been greatly impaired by defeat, certain physical steps can and should be taken to hamper the regrowth of her industrial capacity to more than reasonable peacetime needs. On the other hand from the point of view of general European recovery it seems even more important that the area again be made useful and productive. Considering Germany alone, the figures show that the commerce of Europe was very largely predicated upon her industry. There was a period, substantially before the war, when Germany became the largest source of supply to ten European countries—viz. Russia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Roumania and Bulgaria, and the second largest supplier of Great Britain, Belgium and France. At the same time she became the best customer of Russia, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, and Austria-Hungary, and the second best of Great Britain, Sweden and Denmark. Germany, according to estimates we now have, will continue to have about the same number of people she had before the war, and they will have to be fed, clothed, and housed in some manner. Of her approximately 70,000,000 people (including Austria), about 25,000,000 have been supported by industrial rather than agricultural activity. England and France, at the moment, do not have sufficient production to take care of their own needs by a long measure. There will be a scarcity of products which will plague all Europe for a substantial period to come, and the effects of it are bound to be felt by the other countries of the world. The problem which presents itself therefore is how to render Germany harmless as a potential aggressor, and at the same time enable her to play her part in the necessary rehabilitation of Europe. the impracticability of destroying german industry It is my view that it would be foolish, dangerous and provocative of future wars to adopt a program calling for the major destruction of Germany’s industry and resources. Not only would any reasonable prospect for the reestablishment of European industry be dissipated by such action, but such destruction would be bound to leave a focus of economic and political infection which might well destroy all hope we have of encouraging democratic thinking and practices in Europe. What elements of German industry can be destroyed or removed as unnecessary for peacetime needs is a matter of [for?] expert determination. The balance must be put to work as soon as practicable and subjected to some system of security control. It is a task requiring perseverance, application and intelligence over a long period of time, but I am certain that mere destruction is neither effective as a security measure, nor, in the light of European, including German needs, possible as an economic one. The need of all Europe includes the prompt stimulation of production within Germany, of food, coal, clothing, and housing. Production of these items is not capable of independent development. It must be based on other items and services, in short, general industry and trade. Without freedom of internal trade and communication, no one of these items can be produced on the scale which will be required. It follows that we cannot afford to operate Germany as if she were four separate water tight compartments. recommendations Accordingly, as a first step, I would urge the adoption by the Great Powers at the Conference of a policy which would treat Germany as an economic unit so as to permit her to contribute to her own and to general European rehabilitation. To this end I would urge that the three Powers instruct their representatives in the Control Council to adopt a uniform policy in respect to such matters of nation-wide importance as transportation