No. 643 The Minister in Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Acting Secretary of State

U.S. Department of State · 1945

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Introduction

From Beirut on July 9, 1945, Minister Wadsworth reported a talk with General Pilleau on the Levant transfer. His confidential wire is document 643 in volume one of the Foreign Relations papers on Potsdam. Pilleau was the British officer dealing with the handover of the Troupes Speciales.

Pilleau urged prompt study of a Ninth Army memo on the practical side of the transfer. Absent higher political reasons, he saw a security gain in finishing the transfer before any troop withdrawal. French forces, he noted, could hardly be asked to leave except alongside the British. Wadsworth asks Washington for its views on who should propose a joint withdrawal. Without some move, he warns, Syria will press its demand again and the security picture will suffer.

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CREATORU.S. Department of State
YEAR1945
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE2245
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEU.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian

Source: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv01/d643

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No. 643 The Minister in Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Acting Secretary of State

confidential

Beirut, July 9, 1945—7 p.m.

213. In informal conversation with Gen Pilleau re transfer of Troupes Spéciales (ReLegtels 208, July 7[1] and 211, July 9[2]) he stressed desirability of prompt consideration of Ninth Army memorandum of Feb 26 dealing with “administrative considerations” (see my despatch 677, March 1[3]).

Unless higher political considerations (e. g. in connection with holding of international conference) dictated otherwise he could see advantage from local security angle of completing such transfer prior to undertaking withdrawal of Brit forces and consequently French forces as well; for latter, altho potentially source of further disorder, could hardly be asked to withdraw except simultaneously with Brit.

He took particular note of Ostrorog’s comment to me that any specific proposal for joint withdrawal might best be made by Brit. He did not, however, venture any opinion thereon.

I should welcome brief indication of Dept’s views on this latter point for I envisage possibility that unless French and Brit make some move Syrian Govt will reiterate this second of its chief desiderata and that if some satisfaction thereof not be assured security situation will remain troubled and build up to new crisis.

Pilleau repeated Paget’s comment that withdrawal of combatant troops could be effected in few weeks as they are largely self-contained. For liquidation of other military commitments (including installations, supplies and contracts) very considerable administrative work would be required.

(Sent Dept as 213, rptd to Paris as 78 with request to rpt to London, paraphrases to Arab caps.)

He suggested desirability of early careful administrative analysis of latter problem which could probably best be solved in two phases; first general disposals and withdrawal of “service” troops under direct supervision of present Brit and French commands and second, final liquidation of installations and contracts by special military commissions under general supervision of diplomatic mission.

Wadsworth

Source: 890d.01/7–945: Telegram

Notes
[1] Document No. 641.
[2] Document No. 642.

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