Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams.

U.S. Department of State · 1862

Read Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams. by U.S. Department of State (1862) in the Tower of Babel, a free online library of public-domain works preserved in clean, searchable text. No sign-up. The full text is served as a plain-text file at a predictable URL, where text is present: https://antarctic-labs.com/tower-of-babel/frus-1862-d118.txt.

Introduction

One more Washington letter went abroad on 2 August 1862, addressed to Charles Francis Adams, the American minister in London. It was printed as Document 118 in Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs for 1862. The date falls in the summer of 1862, the war's second year, when the Union fought to keep foreign powers from backing the South.

Readers see the home office side of the exchange, where policy was set before talks began. Its worth grows in context, as one link in a chain of letters that kept the peace with Europe. The State Department's Office of the Historian keeps the series, called Foreign Relations of the United States.

Catalog record

CREATORU.S. Department of State
YEAR1862
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE12825
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEU.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian

Source: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1862/d118

Browse the full library · About the Tower of Babel

Full text

The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:

Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams. [Extracts.] No. 314.] Department of State, Washington, August 2, 1862. Sir: * * * * * * * * * * It is indeed manifest in the tone of the speeches, as well as in the general tenor of popular discussions, that neither the responsible ministers, nor the House of Commons, nor the active portion of the people of Great Britain sympathize with this government, and hope, or even wish for its success in suppressing the insurrection; and that, on the contrary, the whole British nation, speaking practically, desire and expect the dismemberment of the republic. I cannot deny that these sentiments must insensibly influence the administration, and give its policy a hostile direction. But these sentiments are, after all, in a great measure speculations; and they may very well exist, and yet the government, and certainly the people of Great Britain, may be entirely unprepared by any responsible action to attempt to precipitate a change here whose consequences may be momentous, even to themselves. I well recollect that with what seemed to us far better motives, Great Britain recently wished and expected the separation of Hungary and of Venice from Austria; and yet the government passively looked on, and saw the revolutions designed to effect those ends languish and perish. It is a proverb that the earth is full of good but unexecuted intentions. Happily for human society, the proportion of evil intentions unfulfilled is equally great. Indeed, we can hardly be surprised at the disposition and the tendencies upon which I am dwelling, unless we shall persist, after so much opposing evidence, in our early error of conceding to Great Britain a degree of magnanimity which she herself does not even affect to claim, and which, perhaps, has never yet been exhibited by any nation. We cannot forget that we are a younger branch of the British family; that we have not been especially reverential of the senior branch, and have even been ambitious to surpass it in wealth, power, and influence among the nations. To these facts it is to be added that, in the very heat of competition, we have broken, have abandoned the course, and have divided ourselves into suicidal factions. The success of the insurgents would make it sure that the race could never be resumed, while the triumph of the government would probably reanimate the national ambition once more. At this moment we have encountered an unexpected reverse, which encourages our eager enemies, wherever they may be, to hope for our signal and complete overthrow. Did ever any nation, at once so presumptuous, yet so unwise, and so apparently unfortunate, secure the absolute forbearance of a rival it had boldly challenged? Certainly not, and therefore I reckon not upon any sentimental forbearance of the British government. The American people understand, as well as their government does, that none is to be expected or even desired. Still the disfavor of Great Britain is inherently illiberal, and happily the unwarrantable and too unreserved exhibition of it naturally rouses the American people to a sense of their danger, and tends to recall them from unworthy domestic strife to the necessity of regaining the national prestige they have so unwisely lost. Allowing now British prejudice and passion their full effect, the government of Great Britain must, nevertheless, be expected to act with a due regard to the safety, honor, and welfare of the British empire. Great Britain is at peace with the whole United States, and practically with the whole world. Manufactures and commerce do, indeed, suffer derangement and abatement in consequence of our civil war. This war, however, like every other, must come to an end in some way, and at some not distant time, if she continue to stand aloof; and when that end shall have come, whatever its nature may be, she will enjoy, at least, all the benefits that she could in any event obtain by intervention to compel a peace. Is it probable that her intervention would mitigate the war, or alleviate the embarrassment she is suffering from it? The question seems to involve a preliminary one, namely: what is to be the character of her intervention? Is it to be merely a moral one, or an act of recognition, with a declaration of neutrality, but not respecting our blockade, and not refraining and restraining her subjects from violating it? Shall we not, in that case, be justified in withdrawing the relaxation of the blockade we have already made, and in closing the ports we have opened to her commerce? If we should do this, would her recognition of the insurgents shorten the war, or would it alleviate the embarrassment she suffers from it? But it may be answered that she would not consent to surrender these concessions, and would resort to force to save them. Then Great Britain would violate belligerent rights allowed us by the law of nations, and would become an ally of our domestic enemies; and then she would be at war with us while, at least, some other commercial state would be maintaining towards us relations of neutrality and peace. Would Great Britain profit by a war with us? Certainly neither nation could profit by the war while it should be in actual operation. But it is said she might divide and conquer us. What would she gain by that? Would the whole or any part of the United States accept her sovereignty and submit to her authority? The United States, under their present organization and Constitution, must always be a peaceful nation, practically friendly to Great Britain, as well as to all foreign states, and so they must always be conservative of the peace of nations. Let this organization be struck down by any foreign combinations, what guarantee could Great Britain then have of influence or favor, or even commercial advantage to be derived from this country? Even if this nation, after having lost its liberties and its independence, should remain practically passive, who is to restrain the ambitions of European states for influence and dominion on this side of the Atlantic; and how long, under the agitation of such ambitions, could Europe expect to remain in peace with itself? But what warrant have the British government for expecting to conquer the United States, and to subjugate and desolate them, or to dictate to them terms of peace. A war urged against us by Great Britain could not fail to reunite our people. Every sacrifice that their independence could require would be cheerfully and instantly made, and every force and every resource which has hitherto been held in reserve in a civil war, because the necessity for immediately using it has not been felt, would be brought into requisition. I shall not willingly believe that Great Britain deliberately desires such a war, as I am sure that every honorable and generous effort will be made by the United States to avoid it. In the second place, I observe that apprehensions of a change of attitude by Great Britain are built in some degree upon the supposed probability that very serious reverses to the national cause may occur. None such, however, have

Read the complete text