Assessment of SARS-CoV-2 Screening Strategies to Permit the Safe Reopening of College Campuses in the United States.

Paltiel AD, Zheng A, Walensky RP. · 2020

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Introduction

Paltiel and co-authors model how United States colleges could reopen safely in fall 2020, in JAMA Network Open. Residential campuses pack young adults into dorms and dining halls, a recipe for outbreaks. Their model follows a hypothetical campus of 4,990 uninfected students plus 10 with undetected silent infections.

Symptom-based screening alone could not contain spread, since silent cases seed chains before anyone feels ill. Screening every student every 2 days, even with a test of modest sensitivity but high accuracy on negatives, kept outbreaks manageable at a defensible cost. Isolation dorm space and constant prevention discipline were also required. The paper gave administrators a concrete, if demanding, price for reopening.

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CREATORPaltiel AD, Zheng A, Walensky RP.
YEAR2020
COLLECTIONPAPERS
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE29 KB
LICENSECC BY 4.0
RIGHTSCC BY
SOURCEEurope PMC

Source: https://europepmc.org/articles/PMC7395236

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Assessment of SARS-CoV-2 Screening Strategies to Permit the Safe Reopening of College Campuses in the United States By A. David Paltiel, Amy Zheng, Rochelle P. Walensky Published in: JAMA Network Open DOI: 10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.16818 ABSTRACT Key Points Question What screening and isolation programs for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) will keep students at US residential colleges safe and permit the reopening of campuses? Findings This analytic modeling study of a hypothetical cohort of 4990 college-age students without SARS-CoV-2 infection and 10 students with undetected asymptomatic cases of SARS-CoV-2 infection suggested that frequent screening (every 2 days) of all students with a low-sensitivity, high-specificity test might be required to control outbreaks with manageable isolation dormitory utilization at a justifiable cost. Meaning In this modeling study, symptom-based screening alone was not sufficient to contain an outbreak, and the safe reopening of campuses in fall 2020 may require screening every 2 days, uncompromising vigilance, and continuous attention to good prevention practices. INTRODUCTION Universities across the United States are struggling with the question of whether and how to reopen for the fall 2020 semester.1,2 Residential colleges, with communal living arrangements, shared dining spaces, intimate classrooms, and a population of young adults anxious to socialize, pose a particular challenge. In the absence of an effective vaccine, a proven therapy, and/or sufficient herd immunity, the best hope for reopening campuses in the fall is likely to be a robust strategy of behavior-based prevention combined with regular monitoring to rapidly detect, isolate, and contain new severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infections when they occur.3 Evidence on the available monitoring technologies and their performance is limited and rapidly evolving. The US Food and Drug Administration is currently evaluating more than 100 candidate tests that screen for the presence of SARS-CoV-2 infection or antibodies.4 There are many uncertainties, including the logistics of deployment; the ease and comfort of sample collection; and the accuracy, scalability, turnaround time, and cost of test kits. After a new coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) case is detected, further questions emerge regarding how to conduct subsequent tracing; how to isolate detected cases in the context of congregate housing arrangements; and how to protect other at-risk populations, including faculty, staff, and members of the surrounding community.5 These uncertainties underscore the pressing need for both a generalized assessment of population-wide screening for SARS-CoV-2 and a comprehensive plan for reopening universities. For many US colleges, COVID-19 poses an existential threat: either they open their doors to students in September or they suffer severe financial consequences.6 University administrators struggling with this dilemma must nevertheless keep in mind that their first priority is the safety of the students in their care. We offer specific recommendations on the design of a virologic monitoring program that will keep students safe at an affordable cost. Our specific research objectives were, first, to define the minimum performance attributes of a SARS-CoV-2 monitoring program (eg, frequency, sensitivity, specificity, and cost) that could ensure that college students are kept safe; second, to understand how those minimum performance standards might change under varying assumptions about the severity of the epidemic and the success of behavioral and social distancing interventions; third, to suggest what isolation and treatment capacity would need to be in place; and fourth, to forecast what testing might cost and to help decision-makers understand that information to address the question of a screening and monitoring program’s value. METHODS Study Design We adapted a simple compartmental epidemic model to capture the essential features of the situation facing university decision-makers that included the epidemiology of SARS-CoV-2; the natural history of COVID-19 illness; and regular mass screening to detect, isolate, and contain the presence of SARS-CoV-2 in a residential college setting (eFigure 1 in the Supplement). A spreadsheet implementation of the model permitted us to vary critical epidemic parameters and to examine how different test performance attributes (ie, frequency, sensitivity, specificity, and cost) would translate to outcomes. Model input data (Table 1)7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 were obtained from a variety of published sources, adhering whenever possible to the data guidance for modelers recently issued by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response. We defined 3 increasingly pessimistic epidemic scenarios and estimated both cumulative outcomes (eg, tests administered, number of true-positive and false-positive results, number of new infections, and person-days requiring isolation) and economic performance (eg, cost, incremental cost-effectiveness, and budget impact) during an abbreviated 80-day semester, running from Labor Day through Thanksgiving.2 We assumed a medium-sized college setting with a target population of 5000 students, all of them younger than 30 years and nonimmune, living in a congregate setting.19,20 We seeded this population with 10 undetected, asymptomatic cases of SARS-CoV-2 infection. A publicly accessible version of the model implementation is available online. [Table: Model Input Parameters and Scenarios] This analysis adheres to the Consolidated Health Economic Evaluation Reporting Standards (CHEERS) reporting guideline, where applicable. Because this study used only aggregate, published data, the institutional review boards of both the Massachusetts General Hospital and the Yale School of Medicine determined that this research did not involve human participants and did not require their review or approval. Compartmental Model To the basic susceptible-exposed-infected-removed compartmental modeling framework, we added the following: the availability of regular, repeated screening with a test of imperfect sensitivity and specificity; the creation of a new compartment for uninfected persons receiving a false-positive test result; separation of the infected compartment to distinguish between asymptomatic patients with undetected infection, asymptomatic patients with detected infection (ie, true-positives), and observed symptomatic patients; and the importation of additional new infections via exogenous shocks (eg, infections transmitted to students by university employees or members of the surrounding community or during superspreader events, such as parties). We defined 3 epidemic severity scenarios: a base case with a reproduction number (Rt) of 2.5, test specificity of 98%, and the exogenous introduction of 10 new, undetected infections to the susceptible population each week; a worst case with an Rt of 3.5, test specificity of 98%, and 25 exogenous new infections every week; and a best case with an Rt of 1.5, test specificity of 99.7%, and 5 exogenous new infections each week. Isolation We assumed that after a lag of 8 hours, individuals receiving a positive test result (true or false) and those exhibiting COVID-19 symptoms would be moved from the general population to an isolation dormitory, where their infection would be confirmed, where they would receive supportive care, and from which no further transmissions would occur. The lag reflected both test turnaround delays and the time required to locate and isolate identified cases. Students with confirmed (ie, true-positive) results would remain in the isolation dormitory a mean of 14 days to ensure they were not infectious before proceeding to a recovered or immune state.10,11 Students with false-positive results would remain isolated for 24 hours, reflecting our assumption that a highly specific confirmatory test could overturn the original diagnosis, permitting them to return to the campus population. We assumed a mean time from exposure to both infectiousness and screening detectability of 3 days, a symptomatic case fatality risk of 0.05%, and a 30% probability that infection would eventually lead to observable COVID-19–defining symptoms in

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