Neural activity when people solve verbal problems with insight.

Jung-Beeman M, Bowden EM, Haberman J, Frymiare JL, Arambel-Liu S, Greenblatt R, Reber PJ, Kounios J. · 2004

Read Neural activity when people solve verbal problems with insight. by Jung-Beeman M, Bowden EM, Haberman J, Frymiare JL, Arambel-Liu S, Greenblatt R, Reber PJ, Kounios J. (2004) in the Tower of Babel, a free online library of public-domain works preserved in clean, searchable text. No sign-up. The full text is served as a plain-text file at a predictable URL, where text is present: https://antarctic-labs.com/tower-of-babel/europmc-pmc387268.txt.

Introduction

Mark Jung-Beeman leads a team in a brain study of insight in PLoS Biology in 2004. People at times solve a problem in a sudden flash, with an Aha feeling. Whether that flash uses a distinct brain process, or just feels distinct, was long unclear.

Volunteers solved word problems and flagged each solve as insight or not. Brain scans showed a right-side temporal area, tied to linking far-apart ideas, more active for insight solves. Scalp records caught a sudden burst of fast waves in that same area a split second before insight answers. All solving shared a broad brain network, but the flash rode on this added right-side act. The work gives insight a real neural mark, not just a feeling.

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CREATORJung-Beeman M, Bowden EM, Haberman J, Frymiare JL, Arambel-Liu S, Greenblatt R, Reber PJ, Kounios J.
YEAR2004
COLLECTIONPAPERS
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE64 KB
LICENSECC BY 4.0
RIGHTSCC BY
SOURCEEurope PMC

Source: https://europepmc.org/articles/PMC387268

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Neural Activity When People Solve Verbal Problems with Insight By Mark Jung-Beeman, Edward M Bowden, Jason Haberman, Jennifer L Frymiare, Stella Arambel-Liu, Richard Greenblatt, Paul J Reber, John Kounios Published in: PLoS Biology DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0020097 ABSTRACT People sometimes solve problems with a unique process called insight, accompanied by an “Aha!” experience. It has long been unclear whether different cognitive and neural processes lead to insight versus noninsight solutions, or if solutions differ only in subsequent subjective feeling. Recent behavioral studies indicate distinct patterns of performance and suggest differential hemispheric involvement for insight and noninsight solutions. Subjects solved verbal problems, and after each correct solution indicated whether they solved with or without insight. We observed two objective neural correlates of insight. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (Experiment 1) revealed increased activity in the right hemisphere anterior superior temporal gyrus for insight relative to noninsight solutions. The same region was active during initial solving efforts. Scalp electroencephalogram recordings (Experiment 2) revealed a sudden burst of high-frequency (gamma-band) neural activity in the same area beginning 0.3 s prior to insight solutions. This right anterior temporal area is associated with making connections across distantly related information during comprehension. Although all problem solving relies on a largely shared cortical network, the sudden flash of insight occurs when solvers engage distinct neural and cognitive processes that allow them to see connections that previously eluded them. INTRODUCTION According to legend, Archimedes shouted “Eureka!” (“I have found it!”) when he suddenly discovered that water displacement could be used to calculate density. Since then, “Eureka!,” or “Aha!,” has often been used to express the feeling one gets when solving a problem with insight. Insight is pervasive in human (and possibly animal [Epstein et al. 1984]) cognition, occurring in perception, memory retrieval, language comprehension, problem solving, and various forms of practical, artistic, and scientific creativity (Sternberg and Davidson 1995). The Archimedes legend has persisted over two millennia in part because it illustrates some of the key ways in which insight solutions differ from solutions achieved through more straightforward problem solving. We examine the neural bases of these different problem-solving methods. Although many processes are shared by most types of problem solving, insight solutions appear to differ from noninsight solutions in several important ways. The clearest defining characteristic of insight problem solving is the subjective “Aha!” or “Eureka!” experience that follows insight solutions (Schooler et al. 1993). This subjective experience can lead to a strong emotional response—according to legend, Archimedes ran home from the baths shouting “Eureka!” without donning his clothes first. In addition, problem solving with insight is characterized by the following features. (1) Solvers first come to an impasse, no longer progressing toward a solution (Duncker 1945). Archimedes, for example, was stymied by King Hiero's challenge to determine whether his new crown was pure gold without damaging the crown. (2) Solvers usually cannot report the processing that enables them to reinterpret the problem and overcome the impasse (Maier 1931). Insight often occurs when people are not even aware they are thinking of the problem, as reportedly happened to Archimedes while in the baths. (3) Solvers experience their solutions as arising suddenly (Metcalfe and Wiebe 1987; Smith and Kounios 1996) and immediately recognize the correctness of the solution (or solution path). (4) Performance on insight problems is associated with creative thinking and other cognitive abilities different from those associated with performance on noninsight problems (Schooler and Melcher 1997). Some researchers have argued that all these characteristics of insight solutions are essentially epiphenomenal, that insight and noninsight solutions vary only in emotional intensity, and that they are attained with precisely the same cognitive (hence neural) mechanisms (Weisberg and Alba 1981; Weisberg 1986; Perkins 2000). Persistent questions about insight concern whether unconscious processing precedes reinterpretation and solution, whether distinct cognitive and neural mechanisms beyond a common problem-solving network are involved in insight, and whether the apparent suddenness of insight solutions reflects truly sudden changes in cognitive processing and neural activity. Recent work suggests that people are thinking—at an unconscious level—about the solution prior to solving problems with insight. Specifically, while working on a verbal problem they have yet to solve, people presented with a potential solution word read the actual solution word faster than they read an unrelated word (Bowden and Beeman 1998). This “solution priming” effect is greater—and in fact people make solution decisions about presented words more quickly—when words are presented to the left visual hemifield, which projects directly to the right hemisphere (RH), than when words are presented to the right visual hemifield, which projects to the left hemisphere (LH). This suggests that RH semantic processing is more likely than LH semantic processing to produce lexical or semantic information that leads to the solution. These RH advantages occur only when solvers experience insight—the “Aha!” or “Eureka!” feeling that comes with insight solutions (Bowden and Jung-Beeman 2003a). Moreover, when subjects try to solve classic insight problems, they benefit more from hints presented to the left visual field (i.e., the RH) than from hints presented to the right visual field (i.e., the LH) (Fiore and Schooler 1998). Problem solving is a complex behavior that requires a network of cortical areas for all types of solving strategies and solutions, so solving problems with and without insight likely invokes many shared cognitive processes and neural mechanisms. One critical cognitive process distinguishing insight solutions from noninsight solutions is that solving with insight requires solvers to recognize distant or novel semantic (or associative) relations; hence, insight-specific neural activity should reflect that process. The most likely area to contribute to this component of insight problem solving is the anterior superior temporal gyrus (aSTG) of the RH. Language comprehension studies demonstrate that the RH is particularly important for recognizing distant semantic relations (Chiarello et al. 1990; Beeman 1998), and bilateral aSTG is involved in semantic integration. For example, sentences and complex discourse increase neural activity in aSTG bilaterally (Mazoyer et al. 1993; Stowe et al. 1999), and discourse that places particular demands on recognizing or computing distant semantic relations specifically increases neural activity in RH temporal areas (St. George et al. 1999; Mason and Just 2004), especially aSTG (Meyer et al. 2000; Kircher et al. 2001). If this prediction of RH aSTG involvement is confirmed, it will help constrain neurocognitive theories of insight. Other cortical areas, such as prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate (AC) may also be differentially involved in producing insight and noninsight solutions. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (FMRI) in Experiment 1 and electroencephalogram (EEG) measurement in Experiment 2 to test the empirically and theoretically derived hypothesis that solving problems with insight requires engagement of (or increased emphasis on) distinct neural mechanisms, particularly in the RH anterior temporal lobe. Event-related experimental designs compared neural activity when people solved verbal problems with insight to neural activity when they solved problems (from the same problem set) without insight. As in earlier behavioral work, we used a set of compound remote associate problems (Bowden and Jung-Beeman 2003b) adapted from a test of creative cognition (Mednick 1962). Figure 1 illustrates the sequence for each trial. Subjects saw three problem words (pine, crab, sauce) and attempted to produce a single solution word (apple) that can form a familiar compound

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