Measuring individual differences in generic beliefs in conspiracy theories across cultures: conspiracy mentality questionnaire.

Bruder M, Haffke P, Neave N, Nouripanah N, Imhoff R. · 2013

Read Measuring individual differences in generic beliefs in conspiracy theories across cultures: conspiracy mentality questionnaire. by Bruder M, Haffke P, Neave N, Nouripanah N, Imhoff R. (2013) in the Tower of Babel, a free online library of public-domain works preserved in clean, searchable text. No sign-up. The full text is served as a plain-text file at a predictable URL, where text is present: https://antarctic-labs.com/tower-of-babel/europmc-pmc3639408.txt.

Introduction

Some people see plots behind many events, and Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah and Imhoff set out to measure that bent of mind in a 2013 Frontiers in Psychology article. Their tool is a short survey, the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire, made in English, German and Turkish forms. It aims at the broad bent to trust plot-based accounts, not belief in any one plot.

Four studies checked the tool's build, its steadiness over time, and whether its items mean the same thing across the three language groups. A cross-cultural sample of 7,766 people backed a single scale that held its sense in each culture. Later checks linked scores to traits such as views on power and rank, and to belief in the paranormal. High scores also foretold belief in set plots, above what other trait scores could foretell.

Catalog record

CREATORBruder M, Haffke P, Neave N, Nouripanah N, Imhoff R.
YEAR2013
COLLECTIONPAPERS
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE76 KB
LICENSECC BY 4.0
RIGHTSCC BY
SOURCEEurope PMC

Source: https://europepmc.org/articles/PMC3639408

Browse the full library · About the Tower of Babel

Full text

The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:

Measuring Individual Differences in Generic Beliefs in Conspiracy Theories Across Cultures: Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire By Martin Bruder, Peter Haffke, Nick Neave, Nina Nouripanah, Roland Imhoff Published in: Frontiers in Psychology DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00225 ABSTRACT Conspiracy theories are ubiquitous when it comes to explaining political events and societal phenomena. Individuals differ not only in the degree to which they believe in specific conspiracy theories, but also in their general susceptibility to explanations based on such theories, that is, their conspiracy mentality. We present the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ), an instrument designed to efficiently assess differences in the generic tendency to engage in conspiracist ideation within and across cultures. The CMQ is available in English, German, and Turkish. In four studies, we examined the CMQ’s factorial structure, reliability, measurement equivalence across cultures, and its convergent, discriminant, and predictive validity. Analyses based on a cross-cultural sample (Study 1a; N = 7,766) supported the conceptualization of conspiracy mentality as a one-dimensional construct across the three language versions of the CMQ that is stable across time (Study 1b; N = 141). Multi-group confirmatory factor analysis demonstrated cross-cultural measurement equivalence of the CMQ items. The instrument could therefore be used to examine differences in conspiracy mentality between European, North American, and Middle Eastern cultures. In Studies 2–4 (total N = 476), we report (re-)analyses of three datasets demonstrating the validity of the CMQ in student and working population samples in the UK and Germany. First, attesting to its convergent validity, the CMQ was highly correlated with another measure of generic conspiracy belief. Second, the CMQ showed patterns of meaningful associations with personality measures (e.g., Big Five dimensions, schizotypy), other generalized political attitudes (e.g., social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism), and further individual differences (e.g., paranormal belief, lack of socio-political control). Finally, the CMQ predicted beliefs in specific conspiracy theories over and above other individual difference measures. "“Other centuries have only dabbled in conspiracy like amateurs. It is our (the Twentieth) century which has established conspiracy as a system of thought and a method of action” (Moscovici, 1987, p. 153)." INTRODUCTION Belief in conspiracy theories continues to thrive in the twenty-first century. In Western cultures, recent popular conspiracy theories have revolved – among other themes – around the perpetrators (and possible knowing bystanders) of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York (Stempel et al., 2007; Swami et al., 2010), the deaths of Princess Diana (Douglas and Sutton, 2008), and Osama bin Laden (Wood et al., 2012), and the scientific evidence for climate change (Leiserowitz, 2006). These new conspiracy theories take their place next to “classics” such as alleged plots concerning the assassination of John F. Kennedy (McHoskey, 1995), the cover-up of alien contact (Harrison and Thomas, 1997), or the origins of diseases such as HIV (Ross et al., 2006). There is increasing evidence that there are stable individual differences in people’s tendency to believe in such conspiracy theories; if a person believes in one conspiracy theory, he or she will also be more likely to believe in other conspiracy theories (Swami et al., 2010). In fact, this tendency even extends to beliefs in mutually contradictory conspiracy theories, and to beliefs in fully fictitious conspiracy theories. Thus, those who believe that Princess Diana faked her own death are also more likely to believe that she was murdered (Wood et al., 2012); those who believe in “real-world conspiracy theories” (i.e., that John F. Kennedy fell victim to an organized conspiracy) are more likely to believe that there was a conspiracy behind the success of the Red Bull energy drink – a conspiracy theory that was purposely developed for a social psychology study (Swami et al., 2011). This has led some researchers to propose that the endorsement of specific conspiracy theories depends to a large extent on individual differences in the general tendency to adopt such beliefs, that is, a general conspiracy mentality (Imhoff and Bruder, in press). This term was originally phrased by Moscovici (1987) who understood the notion of conspiracy as implying “that members of a confession, party, or ethnicity […] are united by an indissoluble secret bond. The object of such an alliance is to foment upheaval in society, pervert societal values, aggravate crises, promote defeat, and so on.” (p. 154). As such, a conspiracy mentality then describes the general propensity to subscribe to theories blaming a conspiracy of ill-intending individuals or groups for important societal phenomena or, in more abstract terms, the tendency to subscribe to “general conspiracist beliefs” (Swami et al., 2010). Usually, such theories contradict common explanations and allege that these events are caused by secret plots by groups of powerful individuals. Individual differences in conspiracy mentality have important consequences as they predict prejudice against powerful societal groups (Imhoff and Bruder, in press). Consequences of this may either be intentions to engage in political action designed to undermine the perceived conspiracy (Imhoff and Bruder, in press) or – if the conspiracy is perceived to be overpowering – political disengagement (Butler et al., 1995). Further, conspiracy beliefs are powerful predictors of critical health behaviors such as adherence to medication regimens (Bogart et al., 2010) and vaccination uptake (Kata, 2010). There have been a number of initial efforts to measure individual differences in conspiracy mentality (sometimes called “conspiracist ideation”; Swami et al., 2011), the most prominent of which is Swami and colleagues’ Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory (BCTI; Swami et al., 2010, 2011). This consists of 15 items measuring beliefs in specific conspiracy theories (e.g., “A powerful and secretive group, known as the New World Order, are planning to eventually rule the world through an autonomous world government, which would replace sovereign governments.”) and has been used in the UK and continental Europe (Swami et al., 2011) as well as East Asia (Swami, 2012). The internal reliability of this scale has consistently been very good and it relates in meaningful ways to other individual difference variables such as: support for democratic principles, political cynicism, negative attitudes to authority, and low agreeableness (Swami et al., 2011). However, scales measuring beliefs in specific conspiracy theories are closely bound to specific temporal and geographical contexts. In response to these limitations, it has been suggested that there is a need to assess the general tendency to believe in conspiracies in a way that is not dependent on the cultural familiarity of selected theories (Brotherton, French, and Pickering; in press) and also independent of knowledge about specific conspiracy theories which may vary between cultures. For example, it is unlikely that the BCTI item concerning the New World Order is equally familiar in all countries around the world. Hitherto, there have been two attempts to address this challenge, however, neither explicitly address the cross-cultural validity of the measurement instruments. First, Brotherton et al. (in press) have developed a 15-item Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale on the basis of an exploratory factor analysis of 75 items. They were able to differentiate between five major components of generic conspiracy beliefs: governmental conspiracies, extraterrestrial conspiracies, informational control conspiracies, personal well-being conspiracies, and malevolent global conspiracies. These dimensions are also reflected in the final scale. Second, Imhoff and Bruder (in press) developed a 12-item Conspiracy Mentality Scale. The items of this instrument not only

Read the complete text