The SAIL Databank: building a national architecture for e-health research and evaluation.

Ford DV, Jones KH, Verplancke JP, Lyons RA, John G, Brown G, Brooks CJ, Thompson S, Bodger O, Couch T, Leake K. · 2009

Read The SAIL Databank: building a national architecture for e-health research and evaluation. by Ford DV, Jones KH, Verplancke JP, Lyons RA, John G, Brown G, Brooks CJ, Thompson S, Bodger O, Couch T, Leake K. (2009) in the Tower of Babel, a free online library of public-domain works preserved in clean, searchable text. No sign-up. The full text is served as a plain-text file at a predictable URL, where text is present: https://antarctic-labs.com/tower-of-babel/europmc-pmc2744675.txt.

Introduction

Ford and co-authors built the SAIL Databank in 2009, a Welsh system that links anonymized health and public-sector records for research and policy evaluation. Routine electronic records hold huge research value, but privacy law demands strong safeguards before person-level data can be shared. Their unit set seven objectives covering secure transport, record matching, anonymization, disclosure control, and approved access.

The databank runs on a supercomputer platform and passed an independent audit for information governance compliance. By launch it already held over five hundred million anonymized, encrypted records covering the whole of Wales, about three million people, plus local provider data sets. Rising use by high-quality studies was presented as proof of its utility.

Catalog record

CREATORFord DV, Jones KH, Verplancke JP, Lyons RA, John G, Brown G, Brooks CJ, Thompson S, Bodger O, Couch T, Leake K.
YEAR2009
COLLECTIONPAPERS
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE51 KB
LICENSECC BY 4.0
RIGHTSCC BY
SOURCEEurope PMC

Source: https://europepmc.org/articles/PMC2744675

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The SAIL Databank: building a national architecture for e-health research and evaluation By David V Ford, Kerina H Jones, Jean-Philippe Verplancke, Ronan A Lyons, Gareth John, Ginevra Brown, Caroline J Brooks, Simon Thompson, Owen Bodger, Tony Couch, Ken Leake Published in: BMC Health Services Research DOI: 10.1186/1472-6963-9-157 ABSTRACT Background Vast quantities of electronic data are collected about patients and service users as they pass through health service and other public sector organisations, and these data present enormous potential for research and policy evaluation. The Health Information Research Unit (HIRU) aims to realise the potential of electronically-held, person-based, routinely-collected data to conduct and support health-related studies. However, there are considerable challenges that must be addressed before such data can be used for these purposes, to ensure compliance with the legislation and guidelines generally known as Information Governance. Methods A set of objectives was identified to address the challenges and establish the Secure Anonymised Information Linkage (SAIL) system in accordance with Information Governance. These were to: 1) ensure data transportation is secure; 2) operate a reliable record matching technique to enable accurate record linkage across datasets; 3) anonymise and encrypt the data to prevent re-identification of individuals; 4) apply measures to address disclosure risk in data views created for researchers; 5) ensure data access is controlled and authorised; 6) establish methods for scrutinising proposals for data utilisation and approving output; and 7) gain external verification of compliance with Information Governance. Results The SAIL databank has been established and it operates on a DB2 platform (Data Warehouse Edition on AIX) running on an IBM 'P' series Supercomputer: Blue-C. The findings of an independent internal audit were favourable and concluded that the systems in place provide adequate assurance of compliance with Information Governance. This expanding databank already holds over 500 million anonymised and encrypted individual-level records from a range of sources relevant to health and well-being. This includes national datasets covering the whole of Wales (approximately 3 million population) and local provider-level datasets, with further growth in progress. The utility of the databank is demonstrated by increasing engagement in high quality research studies. Conclusion Through the pragmatic approach that has been adopted, we have been able to address the key challenges in establishing a national databank of anonymised person-based records, so that the data are available for research and evaluation whilst meeting the requirements of Information Governance. BACKGROUND Vast amounts of personal data are collected routinely by health and social care systems in order to support clinical management and patient care. The secondary use of this data has enormous potential in health-related research, quality improvement, service planning and enhanced clinical decision-making [1]. In the UK, in common with many countries worldwide, the benefits and cost-efficiency potential of using routinely-collected data are widely recognised. The UK Clinical Research Collaboration (UKCRC) is a partnership of organisations working to establish the UK as a world leader in clinical research [2], and this includes a commitment to the use of electronic data within the bounds of data protection and confidentiality [3]. The Health Information Research Unit (HIRU) is an initiative developed by the School of Medicine at Swansea University and it receives core funding as part of the Welsh Assembly Government's commitment to the UKCRC. The aim of HIRU is to realise the potential of electronically-held, person-based, routinely-collected information for the purposes of conducting and supporting health-related research. Furthermore, work is underway to develop a UK Health Informatics Platform under the Office for the Strategic Co-ordination of Health Research (OSCHR) E-Health Records Research Board [4], and the work of HIRU represents the Welsh national component of this system. In establishing a databank containing person-based data, it is imperative that methods are employed to ensure compliance with the data protection legislation and confidentiality guidelines comprising the NHS Information Governance framework [5] (referred to in this paper as Information Governance), so that the identity of individuals is safeguarded at all stages of the process. Many countries have regulatory and legislative procedures that are of particular relevance to this area of work and the UK is no exception. The Data Protection Act of 1998 [6] enforces the 1995 European Directive on Data Protection [7] and is concerned with data that allow the identification of living persons. This includes not only data that contain clear personal identifiers, such as names, but also data that can indirectly identify an individual [8]. The Caldicott report [9] provides guidelines for the use of patient-identifiable data, and these are of particular importance in National Health Service (NHS) systems. A further safeguard is provided by the National Information Governance Board for Health and Social Care (NIGB) [10] which oversees applications for the common law duty of confidentiality to be set aside in specific circumstances, in accordance with Section 251 of the NHS Act 2006 [11]. A common guiding principle is that person-identifiable data should be anonymised before they are used for secondary purposes. Definitions of data anonymisation vary, but those used within this paper are in accordance with the Medical Research Council (MRC) guidance. This states that: 'anonymised data are data prepared from information from which the person to whom it relates cannot be identified. The term is used when referring to robustly pseudonymised/linked data or unlinked anonymised data' [12]. For a dataset to be considered truly anonymous, there should be no access within the organisation holding the dataset to any key that could potentially join the anonymised data to a person's identity. Other approaches encrypt confidential identifiable data but allow decryption of the data through the use of a controlled access key. While these processes reduce the risk of identification, the robustness of the anonymisation relies on data management processes to maintain the physical separation of the key from the data within the same organisation. However, anonymisation alone has been found to be insufficient to address the confidentiality concerns of data holders, in relation to person-based identity and organisational responsibilities. Similarly it cannot fully address the potential for linkage attack in anonymised datasets where researchers may have access to additional information, or where details such as timed-events may be accessed by researchers. A multi-faceted solution including, anonymisation, data aggregation and/or suppression, user authentication, scrutiny to ensure appropriateness of the data use, and disclosure control at analysis and publication, is considered a more robust approach. This must also be combined with responsible data utilisation on the part of the researcher if it is to be effective in data protection. This paper describes the pragmatic multi-level approach taken by HIRU to address the challenges in establishing the SAIL databank for health research and service development within the requirements of the UK Information Governance framework. METHODS Identification of objectives In order to address the challenges of building the SAIL databank in accordance with Information Governance, a set of objectives was identified. These were to: 1) Ensure data transportation is secure so that data are not lost, or accessed without authorisation, during the acquisition process 2) Operate a reliable record matching process so that accurate anonymised record linkage can be carried out 3) Anonymise and encrypt the commonly-recognised identifiable variables so that identifiable data are not received by HIRU 4) Apply measures to control risk of disclosure in data views

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