Identifying reservoirs of infection: a conceptual and practical challenge.
Haydon DT, Cleaveland S, Taylor LH, Laurenson MK. · 2002
Read Identifying reservoirs of infection: a conceptual and practical challenge. by Haydon DT, Cleaveland S, Taylor LH, Laurenson MK. (2002) in the Tower of Babel, a free online library of public-domain works preserved in clean, searchable text. No sign-up. The full text is served as a plain-text file at a predictable URL, where text is present: https://antarctic-labs.com/tower-of-babel/europmc-pmc2738515.txt.
Introduction
Haydon, Cleaveland, Taylor, and Laurenson argued in 2002 that reservoirs of infection are often loosely defined and rarely proven. A reservoir is a host or place that keeps a pathogen alive and passes it to a target group. Most human and livestock pathogens infect several host species, so suspected reservoirs are common. Control programs sometimes attack a suspected reservoir at great cost without firm proof.
They define a reservoir only in relation to a defined target population. It must be a set of linked populations or environments where the pathogen persists for good. Infection must pass from there to the target. A reservoir is confirmed when target infection cannot sustain itself once cross-transmission is cut. When control inside the target alone suffices, detailed reservoir knowledge may not be needed.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Haydon DT, Cleaveland S, Taylor LH, Laurenson MK. |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 2002 |
| COLLECTION | PAPERS |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 34 KB |
| LICENSE | CC BY 4.0 |
| RIGHTS | CC BY |
| SOURCE | Europe PMC |
Browse the full library · About the Tower of Babel
Full text
The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:
Identifying Reservoirs of Infection: A Conceptual and Practical Challenge Published in: Emerging Infectious Diseases DOI: 10.3201/eid0812.010317 ABSTRACT Abstract Many infectious agents, especially those that cause emerging diseases, infect more than one host species. Managing reservoirs of multihost pathogens often plays a crucial role in effective disease control. However, reservoirs remain variously and loosely defined. We propose that reservoirs can only be understood with reference to defined target populations. Therefore, we define a reservoir as one or more epidemiologically connected populations or environments in which the pathogen can be permanently maintained and from which infection is transmitted to the defined target population. Existence of a reservoir is confirmed when infection within the target population cannot be sustained after all transmission between target and nontarget populations has been eliminated. When disease can be controlled solely by interventions within target populations, little knowledge of potentially complex reservoir infection dynamics is necessary for effective control. We discuss the practical value of different approaches that may be used to identify reservoirs in the field. Keywords: reservoir, epidemiology, pathogen, disease control, transmission Infectious agents that can infect more than one host species are ubiquitous. Indeed, 62% of all human pathogens are classified as zoonoses (1), and 77% of livestock pathogens and 91% of domestic carnivore pathogens infect multiple hosts. Fifty seven of the 70 animal diseases considered to be of greatest international importance infect multiple hosts (2). The ability of pathogens to infect a wide range of hosts has been demonstrated as a risk factor for disease emergence in both humans (1) and domestic animals (2). (Virtually all recent outbreaks of disease in endangered wildlife have been caused by pathogens that can infect other, more abundant host species [3,4]). Pathogens that infect more that one host species are by definition likely to be encountered in several host populations, some of which may constitute infection reservoirs. Therefore, a key issue in the design of control measures for multihost pathogens is defining what is meant by reservoirs of infection and developing guidelines for their identification. Although many emerging diseases of human, domestic animal, and wildlife populations are assumed to be maintained in reservoir hosts (4), these reservoirs are rarely identified. In recent years, several emerging infectious disease threats to human and animal health have been managed through large-scale measures directed at suspected reservoirs of infection. Sometimes action arises from a clearly perceived notion of where infection resides. For example, approximately 1 million pigs were slaughtered in Malaysia in 1999 to control the Nipah virus (5); several million chickens were slaughtered in Hong Kong in 1998 and 2001 to prevent a projected pandemic of Influenza A virus (6); and several million cows were slaughtered in Britain to curtail the epidemic of bovine spongiform encephalopathy, and its possible transmission to humans (7). However, many situations exist in which the role of reservoirs is less clear; for example, the reservoirs that harbor emerging viruses such as Ebola and Marburg remain unknown. For Mycobacterium bovis in the United Kingdom, a complex reservoir system seems most likely, and identification of the most important source of infection for cattle remains highly controversial (8). Incomplete understanding of reservoirs has hampered control of many diseases in Africa, such as Ebola virus infection, Buruli ulcer, and rabies (9–13). Many different and often contradictory definitions of reservoirs exist. Studies stress different characteristics of reservoirs, namely, that infections in reservoir hosts are always nonpathogenic; any natural host is a reservoir host; the reservoir must be a different species; reservoirs are economically unimportant hosts; or reservoirs may be primary or secondary hosts (14–18). Some definitions imply that a reservoir comprises only one species; other definitions suggest that an ecologic system may act as a reservoir (16,18). Confusing, conflicting, and often incomplete concepts of what constitutes a disease reservoir result. We propose a conceptual framework for defining and identifying reservoirs and discuss the practical value of different approaches that may be used to identify reservoirs in the field. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK We propose the following approach, which can be applied to any disease system, for understanding the role of potentially relevant reservoirs in that system. Figure 1 illustrates how this framework might be applied to various systems. [Figure: Examples of simple and more complex target-reservoir systems. In the simplest case, A, a maintenance population transmits a pathogen (indicated by arrows) to a target population that is smaller than the critical community size (CCS) and therefore classified as nonmaintenance. In B, the reservoir is composed of two connected nonmaintenance populations, only one of which is the source population, and neither of which could constitute a reservoir alone (typically akin to some vector-borne infections). Elimination of infection in population X will result in elimination of infection in the target. C depicts a situation in which Y is a maintenance population, but transmission can occur directly between Y and the target population or through another source population, Z. Although not essential to pathogen maintenance, Z is still part of the reservoir because it contributes to transmission of the pathogen to the target. In D, four nontarget populations must be included within the reservoir if its full dynamics are to be understood. Elimination of infection in U will not result in elimination of infection in the target, as V is an independent maintenance population. In E, all populations are sources. F illustrates that the target population itself may constitute part of the reservoir and G that the target population can be a maintenance population. If W is not required to maintain the infection, then W falls outside the maintenance community but is still part of the reservoir because it is a source.] Suggested Terminology The target population is the population of concern or interest to us. All other potentially susceptible host populations that are epidemiologically connected directly or indirectly to the target population are nontarget populations and could potentially constitute all or part of the reservoir. If we are interested in protecting humans (the target species) from cryptosporidiosis, for example, the wide range of domestic and wild animal species in the environment in which Cryptosporidim parvum occurs (19) is the nontarget population, and those species constitute potential reservoir hosts. In epidemiologic theory, the critical community size is the minimum size of a closed population within which a pathogen can persist indefinitely (20). In smaller populations the number or density of infected hosts frequently falls to low levels, random extinction (fadeout) becomes inevitable, and the pathogen cannot persist. Populations smaller than the critical community size, or those rendered effectively smaller than that critical size through control measures, we term nonmaintenance populations. Pathogens will persist in populations larger than the critical community size, and these populations we term maintenance populations. In complex systems, pathogen transmission between a number of nonmaintenance populations could constitute a maintenance community. Any population that transmits infection directly to the target population, we defined as a source population. Source populations may themselves be maintenance populations or, alternatively, may constitute all or part of a transmission link from a maintenance population to the target population. If a target population is smaller than the critical community size and thus cannot maintain a pathogen, completely isolating the target population from any transmission from outside (ring-fencing) will cause