Behavioral models of impulsivity in relation to ADHD: translation between clinical and preclinical studies.
Winstanley CA, Eagle DM, Robbins TW. · 2006
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Introduction
Winstanley, Eagle and Robbins reviewed in 2006 how impulsivity is modeled in animals to shed light on ADHD. Impulsivity, acting without foresight, appears in ADHD, mania, and substance abuse. The term covers several distinct behaviors that may have distinct brain bases, so each needs its own test.
The review breaks impulsivity into parts and matches each to a rodent task borrowed from human testing. Three paradigms get the closest look. First is the five-choice serial reaction time task. Second is the stop-signal task, which tests halting a response already launched. Third, delay-discounting tasks measure impatience for rewards. The authors weigh what animal work with these tasks has taught about the brain circuits and chemistry of impulsivity. They also judge how well each model translates back to the clinic and to ADHD treatment.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Winstanley CA, Eagle DM, Robbins TW. |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 2006 |
| COLLECTION | PAPERS |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 83 KB |
| LICENSE | CC BY 4.0 |
| RIGHTS | CC BY |
| SOURCE | Europe PMC |
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Behavioral models of impulsivity in relation to ADHD: Translation between clinical and preclinical studies By Catharine A. Winstanley, Dawn M. Eagle, Trevor W. Robbins Published in: Clinical Psychology Review DOI: 10.1016/j.cpr.2006.01.001 ABSTRACT Impulsivity, broadly defined as action without foresight, is a component of numerous psychiatric illnesses including attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), mania and substance abuse. In order to investigate the mechanisms underpinning impulsive behavior, the nature of impulsivity itself needs to be defined in operational terms that can be used as the basis for empirical investigation. Due to the range of behaviors that the term impulsivity describes, it has been suggested that impulsivity is not a unitary construct, but encompasses a variety of related phenomena that may differ in their biological basis. Through fractionating impulsivity into these component parts, it has proved possible to devise different behavioral paradigms to measure various aspects of impulsivity in both humans and laboratory animals. This review describes and evaluates some of the current behavioral models of impulsivity developed for use with rodents based on human neuropsychological tests, focusing on the five-choice serial reaction time task, the stop-signal reaction time task and delay-discounting paradigms. Furthermore, the contributions made by preclinical studies using such methodology to improve our understanding of the neural and neurochemical basis of impulsivity and ADHD are discussed, with particular reference to the involvement of both the serotonergic and dopaminergic systems, and frontostriatal circuitry. INTRODUCTION Impulsivity is a characteristic of human behavior that can be both beneficial and detrimental to our everyday lives. For example, the ability to act on impulse may allow us to seize a valuable opportunity, or to make a disastrous decision that we then live to regret. Impulsivity can be viewed as a dimension of normal personality (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1977), but high levels of impulsivity are associated with psychiatric disorders such as ADHD, mania, substance abuse and personality disorders, indicating that this personality trait can be maladaptive (DSM IV, 1994). It has been suggested that impulsivity is not a unitary construct (Evenden, 1999; Moeller, Barratt, Dougherty, Schmitz, & Swann, 2001), and that increases in different aspects of impulsivity may represent different subtypes of ADHD (Nigg, 2003; Sonuga-Barke, 2002). The aim of this review is to discuss current thought regarding the nature of impulse control, and to evaluate the advancements that have been made in improving our understanding of the neural and neurochemical basis of impulsive behavior. Integral to furthering progress in this field has been the development of behavioral paradigms designed to measure impulsivity in laboratory animals, based on human neuropsychological tests. Data from clinical and preclinical studies are compared and areas of agreement and diversity underlined, with particular reference to multi-process models of both ADHD and impulse control. Future research directions are also suggested which may help resolve some of the issues and inconsistencies present in the literature. THE MULTI-FACETED NATURE OF IMPULSIVITY Although impulsivity can be broadly defined as action without foresight, researchers and psychiatrists alike have struggled to formulate a single definition of impulsivity that captures every aspect of behavior encompassed by this concept. A commonly used technique in clinical psychology to measure and identify different aspects of behavior is through the use of self-report questionnaires. A number of such questionnaires have been designed in order to try to quantify and qualify impulsivity in both normal adult and patient populations, such as the Barratt Impulsiveness scale (Barratt, 1994) and the I7 (Eysenck, 1993), but measures of impulsivity are also included in other more general assessments of personality such as the Karolinska Scales of Personality, and the Tridimensional Personality Questionnaire (Cloninger, 1987). Factor analysis of self-report questionnaires suggests that impulsive behavior consists of several independent dimensions, although there is considerable variation as to the precise definition of these constituent parts (see Evenden, 1999 for review). However, common themes include decreased inhibitory control, intolerance of delay to rewards and quick decision-making due to lack of consideration, as well as more universal deficits such as poor attentional ability. Therefore, one definition of impulsivity which seems particularly appropriate is that “impulsivity encompasses a range of actions which are poorly conceived, prematurely expressed, unduly risky or inappropriate to the situation and that often result in undesirable consequences” (Daruna & Barnes, 1993). MEASURING IMPULSIVITY IN THE LABORATORY Given the diversity of behavior that the term impulsivity appears to cover, it has been suggested that impulsivity is not a unitary construct at all, but is used to classify a variety of phenomena that may have independent underlying biological mechanisms (Evenden, 1999). Through focusing on different aspects of impulsive behavior, it has proved possible to devise a variety of behavioral paradigms to measure impulsivity in both human and non-human subjects. These can be broadly divided into two categories: those measuring impulsive choice or impulsive decision-making, and those measuring impulsive action or motoric impulsivity. MEASURING IMPULSIVE ACTION Impulsive action can be broadly defined as the inability to withhold from making a response. Within the framework of behavioral neuroscience and cognitive psychology, impulse control has been described as an active inhibitory mechanism which modulates the internally or externally driven pre-potent desire for primary reinforcers such as food, sex or other highly desirable rewards. This inhibitory control mechanism may provide the substrate by which rapid conditioned responses and reflexes are transiently suppressed, so that slower cognitive mechanisms can guide behavior. There is an extensive and complex literature on the neural and neurochemical basis of different types of behavioral inhibition (e.g. see Nigg, 2000 for review), the in-depth discussion of which would fall outside the remit of this review, and only the work most relevant to the concept of impulsivity will be considered here. GO/NO-GO AND STOP-SIGNAL REACTION TIME TASKS Two of the most common tests used to study inhibitory processes in both clinical and non-clinical populations are the go/no-go and stop-signal reaction time (SSRT) tasks (see Band & Van Boxtel, 1999 for recent review). In a typical go/no-go paradigm, following the initiation of a trial, the subject learns to make a particular response when cued to do so by the “go” signal (e.g. to touch the stimulus on a screen or to press a key). However, on a subset of trials, the “no-go” signal is presented, either concurrently with the “go” signal or prior to it, whereupon the subject must withhold from making the pre-potent response. The design of the stop-task is very similar, with the exception that the “no-go” or “stop” signal occurs after the presentation of the “go” signal. The closer the stop signal is in time to the moment of responding, the harder it is for the subject to inhibit their behavior. Go/no-go (Harrison, Everitt, & Robbins, 1999), stop-change (Feola, de Wit, & Richards, 2000) and, more recently, SSRT paradigms (Eagle & Robbins, 2003a,b) have been developed for use with rats with some success. In the stop-task, rats are trained to respond rapidly and accurately on first one and then the other of two levers. Correct execution of this response sequence results in the delivery of reward. The average time taken to perform this response is calculated and referred to as the mean go reaction time (mRT). On 20% of the trials in a session, a stop-signal is presented in the form of