Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) – Engineered Controls Database and Use

Lampe, Benjamin · 2025

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Introduction

Idaho National Laboratory report INL/RPT-25-88315, written by Benjamin Lampe in September 2025, explains a database of engineered controls gathered under the cyber-informed engineering program. Engineered controls are built-in design features that stop a cyber attack from causing physical harm, rather than software guards that only protect data. A step-by-step method ties every critical function to the controls that guard it.

Each entry is checked against four jobs on the resilience curve: prevent the impact, slow the failure, redirect the system toward safety, and recover fast. Where a critical function lacks a control for one job, the method says to design one in. The database gives engineers worked examples to copy when they harden new systems against attack.

Catalog record

CREATORLampe, Benjamin
YEAR2025
COLLECTIONPAPERS
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE19 KB
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEDOE OSTI

Source: https://www.osti.gov/biblio/3006995

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INL/RPT-25-88315-Revision-0 Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Engineered Controls Database and Use September 2025 INL is a U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratory operated by Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC This information was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the U.S. Government. Neither the U.S. Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness, of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. References herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trade mark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the U.S. Government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the U.S. Government or any agency thereof. INL/RPT-25-88315-Revision-0 Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Engineered Controls Database and Use September 2025 Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 http://www.inl.gov Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy Under DOE Idaho Operations Office Contract DE-AC07-05ID14517 Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) – Engineered Controls Database and Use Scope and Intent Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) addresses the reality that cyber-attacks on engineered systems can have consequences far beyond data loss or disruption of digital networks. When control systems are compromised, safety, reliability, and performance of the physical process itself may be threatened. This database is meant to establish clear examples and guidance for defining and applying engineered controls in CIE. It explains what engineered controls are, how they differ from information security measures, and how they are integrated into system design. The goal is to ensure that resilience is engineered into systems from the outset. Unlike cybersecurity protections that defend the digital layer, engineered controls act directly at the physical and algorithmic levels to guarantee that unacceptable consequences are prevented or limited. CIE keeps the consequences of a cyber attack from impacting the safety, reliability, and performance of engineered systems. Definition of Engineered Controls Engineered controls are design features embedded in engineered systems that remove avenues of cyber attack or limit the consequences of such attacks. They function as resilient-by-design mechanisms, ensuring that even if digital protections fail, the system remains safe, reliable, and capable of recovery. These controls are fundamentally different from information security tools such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems, encryption, or patching. Those tools protect data, access, and networks. Engineered controls, by contrast, protect the engineered process itself. They represent the point where engineering practice intersects with cyber resilience, and they are evaluated not for confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information, but for their ability to safeguard safety, reliability, and performance. Categories of Engineered Controls Engineered controls fall into several distinct categories, each rooted in physical or algorithmic design principles. Physical logic mechanisms are devices like hardwired relays, governors, interlocks, and relief valves that enforce decisions independent of digital software. They are among the strongest protections, since they operate outside the reach of cyber manipulation. Redundant designs provide multiple protective paths, often combining physical and digital domains. A common example is the pairing of thermal and magnetic elements in a breaker trip, ensuring that failure of one pathway does not eliminate protection. Cross-domain redundancy, where different physical principles coexist, strengthens resilience by design. Physical constraints and material properties rely on inherent physical characteristics to enforce safe operation. A fusible plug that melts at a fixed temperature, or a bimetallic switch that opens under thermal expansion, will act regardless of digital commands. Digital engineered controls are algorithmic mechanisms deliberately designed to function under adversarial or untrustworthy inputs. These include resilient estimators, anomaly-tolerant observers, or adaptive controllers that maintain stability when digital data is compromised. Passive physical dynamics harness natural system physics to buffer disturbances. Flywheels that smooth torque or hydraulic accumulators that absorb pressure surges are examples of controls that slow degradation without active intervention. One-way enforcement and irreversible actions include mechanisms such as ratchets, clutches, or data diodes. By their very design, they eliminate entire classes of cyber attack by making reversal or backflow impossible. Fail-safe defaults, often described as de-energize-to-safe designs, ensure that loss of control or power automatically drives the system into a safe state. Spring-return valves that close when unpowered and motor contactors that drop out without energy are typical examples. Together, these categories create a portfolio of resilience options. Each one contributes differently to the phases of the resilience curve. The Resilience Curve The resilience curve is a conceptual tool for understanding how systems experience disruption and return to stability. It describes three phases: the degradation phase, when the system begins to fail under disturbance; the recovery phase, when stabilization and control are regained; and the return to operation, when the system either resumes its original state or adapts into a hardened form. Engineered controls map to six functions along this curve. Some controls focus on restricting the impact opportunity (i.e., prevention), stopping degradation outright. Others provide slope control (i.e., resistance), slowing the rate of failure and enabling graceful degradation. Redirection (i.e., respond) mechanisms steer systems toward recovery rather than collapse. Restore speed (i.e., recover) functions accelerate and stabilize the return to safe operation. Reconfigure (i.e., adapt) mechanisms ensure that systems learn from disruption and harden against future events. Finally, recognizing through detection and monitoring (i.e., indication) enhance awareness of how the system is moving along the curve, giving operators and automation visibility into both degradation and recovery. Mapping of Control Types to Resilience Functions Not every control type contributes equally to every resilience function. Physical logic mechanisms, one-way devices, and material constraints dominate prevention because they can physically block attack avenues. Passive dynamics and redundancy play their greatest role in slope control, buffering and slowing down failure. Fail-safe defaults, redundancy, and resilient algorithms are especially powerful in redirection, as they pivot system dynamics toward safe or recoverable states. Recovery speed is most strongly supported by fail-safe defaults and physical logic, which allow systems to snap back into safe states automatically. Adaptation is almost entirely the domain of digital engineered controls, which adjust algorithms and decision strategies based on lessons learned from disruption. Finally, detection and monitoring are driven largely by digital observers and estimators, though physical indicators such as gauges or trip flags can complement digital methods. Engineered Controls Mapped to Resilience Functions and System Objectives Engineered Primary Contribution to Contribution to Contribution to Control Type Resilience Safety Reliability Performance Functions Supported Physical Logic Prevention, Strong – block Strong – enforce Moderate – ensure Mechanisms Redirection, unsafe actions stable fallback stable operation Recovery Speed Redundant Designs Slope Control, Strong – backup Strong – ensure Moderate – Redirection paths maintain continuity maintains service safety under failure Physical Prevention Strong – enforce Moderate – limit Weak – may Constraints/Materi physical safety fault spread degrade als limits performance under stress Digital Engineered Adaptation, Moderate – Strong – Strong – optimize Controls Detection/Monitori algorithmic compensate for performance and ng, Redirection fallback data loss adaptation Passive Physical Slope Control Moderate – reduce Strong – buy time Moderate – Dynamics hazard escalation for operators smooths fluctuations One-Way Prevention, Strong – eliminate Moderate – force Weak – limited Enforcement Redirection attack avenues safe state effect

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