Cable from Lincoln Stating Justification for Requesting Broad Authority to Dir
Central Intelligence Agency · 1954
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Introduction
A cable in the declassified CIA files, dated 2 May 1954, covers the case for broad authority to direct the work, argued in a cable from Lincoln in May. Lincoln was the station cryptonym for PBSUCCESS, the CIA operation against President Arbenz in Guatemala that ended in June 1954. Taken with the rest of the station traffic, it helps map who handled what, and when, inside the mission.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Central Intelligence Agency |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 1954 |
| COLLECTION | DECLASSIFIED |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 3431 |
| VERSION | 1.0 |
| LICENSE | Public Domain |
| RIGHTS | PUBLIC DOMAIN |
| SOURCE | Internet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror |
Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000136288
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Full text
The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:
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