Cable from Lincoln Stating Justification for Requesting Broad Authority to Dir

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954

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Introduction

A cable in the declassified CIA files, dated 2 May 1954, covers the case for broad authority to direct the work, argued in a cable from Lincoln in May. Lincoln was the station cryptonym for PBSUCCESS, the CIA operation against President Arbenz in Guatemala that ended in June 1954. Taken with the rest of the station traffic, it helps map who handled what, and when, inside the mission.

Catalog record

CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1954
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE3431
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000136288

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Full text

The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:

22 JUN 5h | eo Sais ae
———

Di RECTOR

te
go tai}
406M

LINCOLN we
cafe (tL) (4)

ine Ufik pom “y ie vw ah GRAM

RELEASE IN Ful 1996

DC! (2), Of/OC! (3}, Sa/Pc/oc! (kh), WH (PBS) (5-7), WH (8)

a

ALNCG 1975 (i 20689) = _42ke77 22 GUN Sh g@PRLORLT
TO: DIR CITE: SLINC
RE: DIR 05855 (our 55990) . — .
eee a
RYBAT PBSUCCESS ne oe

we \ 5 5 \
1.  REGUEST F NS Aye AUTHORITY WAS, PREDICATED ON OUR DESIRE

YO GE ABLE To PROPER ‘pts CT FIELD OPERAT1 ONS ON FIMELY BASIS

St THOUT NECESSETY REVIEWING EVERY VARLATION SETH HQS WHICH OCCURS

BHEN PEECEMEAL AUTHGRITY EXISTS, PERHAPS IN EFFORY TO. -~, ater
oo ii Yes

CONSCIENTIOUSLY ABIDE BY YOUR LIMITED AUTHORITY SE HAVE vLOST Gear
MAY PROVE TC BE PRECIOUS HOURS EACH TIME NE¥#-CERCUMSTANCES

© VELOPED, “ye

2. UPON EXARGNATION fOUR CONCEPT OF AIR POWER WE FIND HC

BAS:C DIFFERENCE 11 SUBSTAYCE OR OGUECTIVE ONLY PERHAPS
TEAMINGLOGY WHICH iS NOT ESSENTIAL BHEN FOREGOING FACTORS ARE 1h
AGREEMENT, FOR EXAMPLE #£ SAY “A STRICTLY MILITARY TYOE SeTUATION
HAS MATERIAL) ZED". MEANING, HAVENS TRIED AND FALLED THROUGH
PYSCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICA. MEANS SE ARE NOW CONSRONTES wiTH
WSLSTARY SITUATION WHEREIN SE MUST ATTEMPT DEFECTION OF ARMY

X

THROUGH FORCE OF ARMS. YHIS ££ FELT GUT MECETARY CAPABILETY MUST \ |

IT iS FORGIODEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE — cepy fo.

22 JUN 5h,
LINC Li73 (IN 20681)
PAGE 2

BE EMPLOYED TO MAXIMUM. AS LAST RESORT.

3. WE ENJOIN YOU TO RECONSIDER POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS
OF THREE FIGHTER A/C MANNED BY BATTLE PROVEN ODYOKE PILOTS.
ON PRO-RARA BASIS, NUMBER OF ENEMY TROOPS TO NUMBER OF A/C,
COMPARED TO OTHER MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS WE BELIEVE, RATIO
ONE A/G YO TWO THOUSAND GROUND TROOPS 1S VERY FAVORABLE.
FURTHERMORE IY 1S INCONCEIVABLE ENTIRE ARMY WOULD REQUIRE
SUBMISSION BEFORE LARGE SCALE DEFECTIONS OCCURRED.

he USING QEFECTION OF ARMY AS OUR AGREED OBJECTIVE THEN
1Y FOLLOWS YTHAY ALL EFFORT MUST BE DEVOTED TO THIS PURPOSE
ALONE WHICH FALLS INTO CATEGORIES OF STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL
OPERATIONS.

&) STRATEGIC: YARGETS WHICH WOULD PROVIDE SERIOUS
DISLOCATIONS TONENEMY AND ALTHOUGH NOT IMMEDIATELY EFFECTIVE
WOULD SOON IMPAIR HIS COMBAT CAPABILITY. !.€.: FUEL STORAGE
AND AMMO DUMPS, iNTERDICTION ETC.

&}) TACTICAL: CONCENTRATION OF ALRPOWER ON ENEMY'S
MAIN POINYS OF RESISTANCE IN A SPECIFIC ENGAGEMENT SUCH AS

HANK 4

dy

22 JUN Sk
LENt ht173 (iN 20687)
PAGE 3

s

50 POLITICAL OR PYSCKOLOGICAL TARGETS SUCH AS NATIONAL
PALACE, ARBENZ*S HOME, RACETRACKS, EYC ARE NOT CONSIDERED
WOATHWHILE NOR AS PRODUCTIVE AS COMPARED TO FIRST WINNING THE
BATTLE OF vans. AND ESTABLISHING DECISi VE MILITARY POSTURE.
PRESENT THCUGHY 1S THAT ADAM. TARGETS MENTIONED WOULD BE -
COUNTER=PRODUCTIVE THUS NOT CONTEMPLATED IN PRESENT PLANNING)

6. BEFORE ATTEMPTING FORWARD BROJECTION OF OUR CONCEPT
WE MUST SYAYE THAT PRESENT ENGAGEMENT AT HANK 1S SERIOUSLY
REGARDED AS PLACE OF DECISION, SUCCESS WOULD MOST CERTAINLY
SHAKE ARBENZ*S CONFIDENCE IN HIS ARMY AND ALTER ENTIRE SITUATION
JUST AS FAILURE ANOD SUBSEQUENT ROUTING OF FRIENOLY FORCES WOULD
REQUIRE COMPLETELY NEW EXAMENATION OF SITUATION AY YHAT TIME.

fo VIEW ABOVE, WE woULO PREFER AY YHIS MOMENT Yo
CONCENTRATE ON TYO-MORROW!S BATTLE AND ADVISE you SOONEST oF ANY
ADDITIONAL AUTHORETY WHICH May BE REQUIRED DEPENDING UPON
DEVELOPMENTS. MEANWHILE WE WILL PROCEED wiYH ouR PLANNING
ANO SELECTION OF QTHER TARGETS SHOULD SITUATION REQUIRE THER.

END OF MESSAGE

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