Probable Developments in the World Situation Through MID-1953

Central Intelligence Agency · 1951

Read Probable Developments in the World Situation Through MID-1953 by Central Intelligence Agency (1951) in the Tower of Babel, a free online library of public-domain works preserved in clean, searchable text. No sign-up. The full text is served as a plain-text file at a predictable URL, where text is present: https://antarctic-labs.com/tower-of-babel/cia-0000119697.txt.

Introduction

This August 1951 paper is a National Intelligence Estimate on probable developments in the world situation through mid-1953. Estimates were the intelligence community's most formal forecasts, meant to give leaders a shared picture of what lay ahead. The Korean War was then in its second year, and Stalin still ruled the Soviet Union.

The estimate ranges across the globe, weighing war, politics, and the balance between the blocs. Forecasts on this scale show how the young CIA thought about the whole board at once. Reading it now lets one test the agency's judgment against what actually happened, a rare chance to grade the forecasters of the early Cold War.

Catalog record

CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1951
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE46456
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000119697

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Full text

The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:

TOP SECRET INR/DDR ot 6535 Nev State SPECIAL ESTIMATE || PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WORLD ed eB Asproved for Release rNRIDDE SEP 1997 TNIDBE SITUATION THROUGH MID- 1953 ; SE - 13 Published 24 September 1951 78% | 027 5° tNR/DDR 6835 Now State. n77739 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RECEIVED x, ~ * x \ pusecn of insellign® 7 ries? EPA ( TOP SECRET ~ SF VASP IP <P a1 “fD —POP-SEGRET— 6335 °° TO ALL HOLDERS OF SE-13 Revised Paragraph 2b of SE-13 Approved by the | Intelligence Advisory Committee on 27 September 1951 b. Atomic Capabilities. ! While Soviet atomic capabilities will re- main inferior to those of the US, it is estimated that the Soviet stock- pile of atomic weapons (some of which might have an energy yield as high as 100 kilotons) will increase as follows: Present - 50 Mid-1952 - 100 Mid-1953 - 200 At present the Soviet air force has an estimated T/O and E strength of about 600 to 700 TU-4 medium bombers capable of one-way missions, carrying atomic bombs, to practically all important targets in the US. Although there is no evidence that the USSR has developed aerial re- fueling techniques, with such techniques these aircraft may be capable 1/ The following factors must be considered in connection with the above estimate of Soviet atomic capabilities: (a) The number and/or size of the production facilities postu- lated as a basis for this estimate may be incorrect. The minimum program, which is not inconsistent with the information available, would provide a stockpile of about one-half the number of weapons indicated. On the other hand, from the information available at the present time, the possibility that additional or expanded production facilities will be constructed during the period under consideration cannot be precluded. (b) The type of weapon postulated for calculating the stockpile figures may be incorrect. It is possible by changing the weapon de- sign to substantially increase or decrease the number of weapons in the stockpile, given a certain quantity of fissionable material, Such changes, however, alter the kilotonnage of the individual weapons accordingly. 35 ~oR Ge 8 ta t @ of two-way missions to most important US targets. By mid-1952 the USSR may have approximately 1,000 TU-4’s and by mid-1953 about 1,200. By mid-1953 the USSR also may have approximately 100 long- range bombers capable of round trip missions against nearly all vital targets in the US. It probably will have by this time substantial numbers of twin-jet high performance bombers capable of atomic attack on Western Europe and US overseas bases, and possibly a jet bomber capable of attacking the US. By mid-1953 the USSR should also have sufficient stockpiles of nerve gas for sustained, extensive employment. ~EOP-SRCRET™ AYO TREE Pa mE oe we et ’ ENR/DDR 6535 tex State SPECIAL ESTIMATE PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WORLD SITUATION THROUGH MID-1953 SE-13 Published 24 September 1951 This estimate was prepared at the request of the Senior Staff of the National Security Council as Appendix A to Parts I and II of United States Programs for National Security. The estimate was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency in consultation with the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff. The Intelligence Advisory Committee concured in this estimate on 20 September 1951. —FOR-SECRELN PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WORLD SITUATION THROUGH MID-1953 1, PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS I A. Probable Growth in Soviet and Satellite Capabilities. 1. The Soviet sphere will probably continue to increase its military, economic, and political strength over the next two years. Its absolute strength will be considerably greater in over-all terms by mid-1953 than at present. 2. General Military Capabilities. The military strength-in- being of the Soviet orbit should further increase over the next few years. Of greatest significance are a probable im- provement in Soviet capabilities for atomic attack and for defense against such attack, the further development of Chinese Communist military strength, and continued growth of European Satellite military power. a. Substantial modernization programs are continuing in all three Soviet services and Soviet forces should remain at a high state of war readiness. No sizable increase is expected in the Soviet army, which now totals some 2,500,000 men, including 175 line divisions, and can probably mobilize an additional 145 divisions by M + 30 days. While the over-all numerical strength of the Soviet air force is expected to remain substantially the same, Soviet air power will become increasingly effective through continued conversion to jet fighters and bombers, improved 1/ Except in general terms, the position of Communist China is discussed in Section II. training standards, operational use of heavy bombers, and acquisition of additional electronic equipment. More- over, the USSR is increasing its strength in Eastern Europe and the Far East to maintain its relative advan- tage over Western strength. b. Atomic Capabilities. 1/ While Soviet atomic capa- pilities will remain inferior to those of the US, the USSR may have aS many aS 100 bombs by mid-1952, and as many as 200 by mid-1953. Some of these bombs might have an energy yield as high as 100 kjlotons. At present the Soviet air force has an estimated T/O and E strength of about 600 to 700 TU-4 medium pombers capable of one-way missions, carrying atomic bombs, to practically all important targets in the US. Although there is no A a 1/ Special attention is called to the fact that estimates of the Soviet atomic stockpile are tentative and uncertain because: (a) The number and/or size of the production facilities postulated as a basis for this estimate may be incorrect. The minimum program, which is not inconsistent with the information available, would provide a stockpile of about one-half the number of weapons indicated. On the other hand, from the information available at the present time, the possibility that additional or expanded produc - tion facilities will be constructed during the period under consideration cannot be precluded. (b) The type of weapon postulated for calculating the stockpile figures may be incorrect. It is possible by changing the weapon design to substantially increase or decrease the number of weapons in the stockpile, given a certain quantity of fissionable material, Such changes, however, alter the kilotonnage of the individual weapons accordingly. evidence that the USSR has developed aerial refueling techniques, with such techniques these aircraft may be capable of two-way missions to most important US targets. By mid-1952 the USSR may have approximately 1,000 TU-4’s and by mid-1953 about 1,200. By mid- 1953 the USSR also may have approximately 100 long- range bombers capable of round trip missions against nearly all vital targets in the US. It probably will have by this time substantial numbers of twin-jet high performance bombers capable of atomic attack on Western Europe and US overseas bases, and possibly a jet bomber capable of attacking the US. By mid- 1953 the USSR should also have sufficient stockpiles of nerve gas for sustained, extensive employment. c. Soviet air defenses probably will be substantially improved by mid-1953. A good all-weather interceptor aircraft with adequate airborne intercept radar should be available in limited to moderate quantities by that

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