The September 15TH Statement on the Dominican Republic by the Honorable J. Will

Central Intelligence Agency · 1965

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Introduction

The September 15TH Statement on the Dominican Republic by the Honorable J. Will is the heading, cut off mid-name, on declassified CIA document 0000118930, dated August 3, 1965. The title gives a dated statement on the Dominican Republic by a man named only as J. Will. His surname breaks off where the heading ends. The brief record preserves the partial name and the break as released.

Catalog record

CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1965
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE23830
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000118930

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Full text

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE LBj LIBRARY snoRE Mandatory Review Case # NTT Ne -2 G53 Documn+ Ga) 15 September 1965 MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: Tne September 15th Statement on the Dominican 2zepublichy the Honorable J. William Fulbright 1. In a lengthy statement released on 15 septenber senator J. Willian Fulbright developed primarily two major themes concerning the role of the US in the Dominican rebeliion: a, The US intervened for the purpose of the preventing victory by a revolutionary force judged to be comuunist dominated, He said that "There is no doubt caat vane Tureac of communism rather than Ganger to American lives was nis (Ambassador Sennett's) primary or sole reason for recommending military action. b. At no time did the conmunists control the rebellion prior to the landing of U2 Harines. “Their participation was to have been expectec, ve analyze below these two themes and include as annexes conments on subsidiary points made by the Senator. 4, Our analysis of the first theme shows that“py Avril 28 Santo Domingo was in a state of anarchy. It is true that officials of the smbassy in Santo Domingo as weli as government officials in Washington were concerned with growing Communist influence in the Dominican Republic and the almost immediate role that some communist activists too: as early as the second day of the revolt. However, tne trigger which sent US troops ashore was the mortal threat to the lives of Americans and many other nationals in a city where law and order had collapsed. Unruly grouns haa entered the Hotel Zmbajador on two occasions, once in search of an American citizen) and had fired indiscriminately into rooms and corxidors. The premises of several embassies were invadec, and the British vice consul reported to the US ambassador on the afternoon of 28 April that the cowntown situation was "horrible" and that mobs of 200-300 were sacking homes in the residential area of Arroyo Hondo where many Americans lived. 5 SEP 1997 —SESR 3. The collapse of the local police forces was almost complete by April 28. Police Chief Despradel told the American Bublic Safety Adviser on that day that his men were not trained to fight against the heavy weapons being used by the rebels. Some police were in hiding, some were hiding their uniforms and mixing with the mobs, some were already the victims of atrocities. 4, By the late afternoon of Avril 28 as Ambassador Bennett talked to Washington shots could be heard against the Embassy building. It was in this context of anarchy that the junta leader Colonel Benoit informed the US ambassador that he could no longer guarantee the safety of foreign nationals. The following day the Papal Muncio, who had been most active in trying to convince both sides to lay down their arms, described the marines as "performing a humanitarian purpose in protecting lives." 5. Senator Fulbright's second theme develops the point that at no time did the communists control the rebellion prior to the landing of US marines. Our view is that taken by itself this statement is correct. The point is, nowever, that by the evening of April 27 the moderate PRD leaders of the rebellion, hitherto in shaky control of the movenent, lost their nerve and began abandoning their posts. The Molina Urena government fell and many of its principal figures went into asylum. One of the most prominent of these, Jose Pena Gomez admitted that the communists who joined the rebel force had infiltratec into positions of importance ana that it was very difficult to stop then. For his vart, Molince Urens +s reported to have saic on May 3 that he wanted to get the truth of communist infiltration of the rebellion across to the world, but that he cauld not face further jeopardizing his own anc his family's safety by doing so. (See Tab 3, Henorancum, "The communist Role fond in the Lominican Revolt'', 7 Hay 1965.) 6. There was then no one in effective leadersnip. It is perhaps significant that the French ambassador in Santo Lomingo described events there "as following the classic communist patiern."” He conciuded that his British, CmewooT rs ERE Itaiian anc West German colleagues were in agreement that the "“Caamano group", which grew out of the rebellion, was directed "at its base' by communists. 7. In essence, then, on the evening of the Marines' lancing the first task facing the US was protecting the lives og Americans and other foreign nationals, Its second task was more complex. The US was faced with making the agonizing determination of whether increasingly evident : communist participation and influence within the rebellion would--—in the absence of other leadership--soon become com- plete control. All available evidence pointed toward this eventuality. Attachnents Tab A; The Situation in Santo BGomingo on 28 April Tab B: The Communist Role in the Dominican Revolt, 7 Hay 1965 Tab C: The Communist 2ole in the Dominican Rebel Hovement, 16-27 May Tab ©: Communist Connections of Juan Bosch: A Fresh Interpetation vak 4: Statements from the Fulbright Speech and Facts Ste r— ss CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY e ROUTINE Intelligence Information Cable = 5(c) ! | COUNTRY CUBA NENEZUES Sava veUaS 3.4(b)(1) DATEOF 8 MAY 1965 DISTR. 11 MAY 1965 INFO. met __ SUBJECT COMMENTS ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND ITS RELATION TO CUBA PLACE & CATE ACQ. REF IN -€3789 SOURCE FIELD REPORT NO. (RG 1.5(c) are . 3.4(b)(1) APPRAISAL: . ne ES 1. ON 8 MAY 1965 3,4(b)(1) aE et A. UNITED STATES SHIPS ARE PATROLLING CUBAN KEYS AND COASTS. B. IN CUBA SBECIAL WEAPONS, INCLUDING MISSILE INSTALLATIONS ARE READY AND PREPARED AGAINST A POSSIBLE ATTACK. C. THE INTEGRATION OF MULTILATERAL FORCES IN SANTO DOMINGO IS VERY DANGERCUS FOR CUBA BECAUSE AN ATTACK AGSINST CUBA CCviD RE- SULT WITHOUT THE UNITED STATES ASSUMING SOLS RESPONSIBILITY FOR ft. This material contains information affecting the National Defense cf the United States within the meaning of the Explonage Laws, Tithe 4.5(c) 18, U.S.C. Secs, 703 and TH. the transmission or revalation of which in any manner to em unauthorised person is prohibited by law. $C ee ee STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSL NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA Nic MK USIA CCl ONE OCR ORR OO FRI CIA/NMCC APPROVED FOR RELPASE ay. SEP 1997 INS 3.4(b)(1) Ce eed) Re IN _63789 SECRET PAGE 2 ns 4.5(C) 3,4(b)(1) D, AT NO TIME, EXCEPT DURING THE OCTOBER 1962 MISSILE CRISIS, HAS THE UNITED STATES HAD A MORE PROPITIOUS AND JUSTIFIED OCCASION TO ATTACK CUBA. E. IF UNITED STATES TROOPS ARE WITHDRAWN FROM THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC A SIMILAR SITUATION (REVOLT) WILL BE REPEATED IN VENEZUELA. F. IN ANY EVENT, REBELLIONS WILL TAKE PLACE IN OTHER COUNTRIES. | eee MTT 8§Pen COMMENT: THERE HAVE BEEN UNSUBSTANTIATED REPORTS OF AN IMMINENT CASTRO- COMMUNIST COUP TO TAKE PLACE IN URUGUAY [z..a yet) «HOWEVER, NEITZER TEE CRUCEAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCU) NOR ANY OTHER LEFTIST SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION APPEARS PREPARED TO STAGE A COUP IN URUGUAY. THE PCJ HAS ORGANIZED PARA- MILITARY UNITS TO TAKE TO THE STREETS TO STIMULATE THE PEOPLE TO STAGE A COUNTERREVOLUTION IN THE EVENT THAT MILITARY PLOTTERS TRY TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT [\ 3.4(b)(1) 2. [MMMMMJ DISSEM: COMKWESTFOR, CINCLANT, CINCSO. [a END OF MESSAGE att.

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