CIA Secrecy Agreements

Central Intelligence Agency · 1985

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Introduction

CIA Secrecy Agreements is the short heading on declassified CIA document 0000118929, dated November 2, 1985. The title names the agency's own secrecy agreements, the pledges tied to handling secret work. No person or case is named in the heading itself at all. The brief record is an internal rules item, filed in the autumn of 1985 as released.

Catalog record

CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1985
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE6553
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000118929

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Full text

The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:

Central Intelligence Agency

SYSTEM II
91294

24 December 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

SUBJECT: CIA Secrecy Agreements

1. In light of a recent request from the Information
Security Oversight Office (1800) that we adopt for Agency
use the standard ISO0O nondisclosure agreement, we believe
it is necessary to reconfirm our position as set forth in
our letter to Mr. McFarlane dated 14 December 1983. A copy
of that letter is attached.

2. In National Security Decision Directive No. 84
(NSDD-84), the President mandated the institution of cer-
tain security practices and procedures designed to improve
the protection of classified information within the United
States Government. AS you know, one feature of the NSDD
was a requirement that individuals being granted access to
classified information sign, as a condition of such access,

a legally binding agreement not to disclose classified
information to unauthorized persons. To assist departments
and agencies with no expertise in this area, NSDD-84 provided
that the Director of ISO0O would develop a standardized form
that would satisfy the requirements of the NSDD. Such a
standardized classified information nondisclosure agreement
was promulgated by IS0O and made available for Government-wide
use.

3. These efforts to protect classified information go
a long way toward upgrading security within the Government
and have my full support. Of course, the Central Intelli-
gence Agency (CIA) does not need to use, and will not use
the standardized form made available by ISOO, since the
execution of a far more stringent Secrecy Agreement is
currently required as a condition of CIA employment, and
of access to CIA information, and has been required by every
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) as a condition of CIA
employment, and access to CIA information, since the CIA was

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established. The requirement that such a Secrecy Agreement

be executea flows from the responsibility of the DCI to protect
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure
as set forth in section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act
of 1947. This responsibility has also been specifically recog-
nized in National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. l
and Executive Order 12333.

4. Obviously, NSDD-84 does not purport to divest the DCI
of his responsibility under law to set CIA security standards
that will ensure the protection of intelligence sources and
methods, nor does it even suggest that ISOO's standardized
form shall replace the CIA's more stringent Secrecy Agreements
(it should be noted that the prototype for such agreements was
upheld by the Supreme Court in the Snepp case). Since we do
not believe that it was ever intended that the NSDD substitute
the judgment of the Director of IS0O0O for the judgment of the
DCI concerning the level of protection necessary to safeguard
classified information within CIA, we do not believe the NSDD
can reasonably be construed as requiring the CIA to seek ISOO
review of its Secrecy Agreements. Accordingly, we do not
regard the CIA's Secrecy Agreements as being subject to ISOO
Or any other review and we do not intend to seek or accept
ISOO review, or any other review, of our agreements.

5. Please indicate your concurrence by signing below.

llliam/y. Cas
Director of Ce al In igence

Attachment

CONCUR:

John M. Poindexter

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The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President

for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Bud:

In National Security Decision Directive No. 84 (NSDD-84),
the President mandated the institution of certain security
practices and procedures designed to improve the protection of.
classified information within the United States Government. One
feature of the NSDD was a requirement that individuals being |
granted access to classified information sign, as a condition of
such access, a legally binding agreement not te disclose classi-
fied information to unauthorized persons. To assist departments
and agencies with no expertise in this area, NSDD-84 provided
that: the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office
(1SO00) would-develop a.standardized form.that would satisfy the
requirements of the NSDD. Recently, such a standardized classi-

- fied information nondisclosure agreement was promulgated by 1S00
and made available for Government-wide use.

These efforts to protect classified information go a long
way toward upgrading security within the Government and have my
full support. However, the execution of a far more stringent,
legally binding Secrecy Agreement is currently required as a
condition of CIA employment and has been required by every
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) as a condition of employ-
ment since the CIA was established. The requirement that such a
Secrecy Agreement be executed flows from the responsibility of
the DCI to protect intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure as set forth in Section 102(d)(3) of the
National Security Act of 1947. This responsibility has also been
specifically recognized in National Security Council Intelligence
Directive No. 1 and Executive Order 12333. Therefore, the
Central Intelligence Agency does not need to use, and does not
intend to use, the standardized form made available by IS00.

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NSDD-84 does not purport to divest the DC1 of his
responsibility under law to set CIA security standards that will
ensure the protection of intelligence sources and methods, nor
does it even suggest that 1800's standardized form shall replace
the CIA's more stringent Secrecy Agreement, which was upheld by
the Supreme Court in the Snepp case. Since we do not believe Lt
was ever intended that the NSDD substitute the judgment of the
Director of 1SO00 for the judgment of the DCI concerning the level
of protection necessary to safepuard classified information
within CIA, we do not believe the NSDD can reasonably be con-
strued as requiring the CIA to seek ISOO review of its Secrecy
Agreement. Accordingly, we do not regard the CIA's Secrecy
Agreement as being subject to ISOO review. We intend to continue
the use of our current Form 368 Secrecy Agreement which 1 am
enclosing a copy of for your information.

Yours, ey

a ; e Cas
Js) Witiam ©
William J. Casey

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