Probable Reactions to Various Courses of Action with Respect to North Vietnam

Central Intelligence Agency · 1964

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Introduction

Probable Reactions to Various Courses of Action with Respect to North Vietnam is the subject of declassified CIA document 0000118681, dated January 4, 1964. The heading asks how others would react to varied courses of action on North Vietnam. Probable reactions is the forecast phrase at the front of the title. The brief record is a reactions study item from the first week of 1964.

Catalog record

CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1964
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE19816
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000118681

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APPROVED FOR RELEA o YT 1997 TS# 185702-b CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES 2 January 1964 REVISED MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR SUBJECT: Probable Reactions to Various Courses of Action with Respect to North Vietram REFERENCE: MACV- QQ Op-Plan No. 34 A-64/ TIGER, 4.5(c) of 15 December 1963 3,A(b)(V) 1. In response to General Krulak's request, we assess below the probable Communist and international reactions to 13 specific operations given us from among those of the referenced Cp-Plan. With one exception, the given operations are small unit (South Vietnamese) airborne or maritime sabotage efforts against specific targets (bridges, railways, dumps, etc.) in various areas of North Vietnam. ‘The one exception is a three company (plus) reid against a small island just north of the 17th parallel DM. All of the 13 operations are part of general Krulak's Fhase I: i.e., to bacmmiited ween apnout four months'time from the Op- Plan's activation. We note that except for the island raid This memorandum has been prepared with the assistance of o/CI and DD/P. noted above and a few other of the 13, most of these operations Hea have already been approved. 1 (Cc) 3.4(p)(1) 2. In sum, we believe that: Be Communist reactions to most of these operations would be slight. De Communist reactions would be sharper in the cases of (1) Haiphong (No. 33, below); (2) Ile Du Tigre (No. 34); and (3) the railroads near the borders of China (Nos. 54 and 55). ‘The reactions would be felt primarily in South Vietnam and Iaos but would not be so extreme as to change the character of hostilities in those ccuntries. C. The operations under review would not be likely to lead to appreciably increased Chinese Communist involvement in the area. Neither would these operations --~ with the possible excep- tion of the Ile du Tigre raid -- lead the Soviets to believe that the US bad made a significant change in its policies. d. The 13 operations under review, taken by themselves, and even if all were successful, would not "convince the DRV leader- ship that their continued direction and support of insurgent activities arte: jo es Se tS ee eS Se a in the RVN (South Vietnam) and Laos should cease” -- this, according to the reference Op-Plan, being their stated goal. e. It is possible, however, that the North Vietnamese Goverument might see these operations (especially if that against the Ile du Tigre were included) as representing 4 significant in- creese in the vigor of US policy, potentially dangerous to them. If so, they would probably wish to halt the new developments at an early date, and would therefore try to arouse internatioral pressure for a conference to settle the problem of Vietnam be- fore it expanded into a more general conflict in the Far East. f. In general, such operations as the 13 here con- sidered would probably be viewed with disfavor by most of our rajor allies, Taipei and Bangkok, of course, would probably support the US strongly. British officials in South Vietnam would probably see these operations! merit and consider then worth trying, but London's reaction -- particularly to any international political complaints engendered -- would be com~ plicated by the UK's position as co-chairman of the Geneva Conference and hence (with the USSR) principal guarantor of . the terms of the 1954 Geneva Accords, which such operations would violate. France would almost certainly be opposed to any us/RVN attempt to carry the war to the North, and would probably cause the US the most difficulty. Canada would probably find it difficult to support the US in any North Vietnamese complaints formally submitted to the Icc. If such operations helped generate a Communist call for an international conference, this call would probably find mich support elsewhere in the Free World. ge The principal determinant of DRV prosecution of the yar will not be damage suffered from such small-scale operations, but the course of the war in the South and the degree o2 risk Hanoi believes will be involved in its prosecution. 3. We assess the various operations below, under their designated Op-Plan categories of I, It, or III. We note, however, that these categories of {nereased expected damege to the DRV do not necessarily corresyond to what we believe to be increased reactions, We believe, in general, that: a. Those small unit airborne and raritime operetions not far north of the 17th parallel (all, that is, except Nos. 33, 34, 54, and 55 below, and whether category I, II, or III) would probably provoke the least response. is Vacs b. The Haiphong channel operation (No. 33) and the large raid against the Ile du Tigre (No. 34) would provoke greater response. Ce The sabotage efforts egainst the Hanoi-Lang Son (No. 54) and Yen Bay-Iao Kay (No. 55) railroads would probably provoke little if any overt response at first, but if successfully contimied would probably provoke the Chinese to more threatening outeries, increased offers of support to tke DRV, and attempts to dnerease the Chinese presence in North Vietnam and northermmost Laos. SPECIFIC RESPONSES BY CATEGORIES CATEGORY I - HARASSING OPERATIONS 4. General description. This category includes small, unspectacular demolition operations and small-scale intelligence collection actions, including tactical reconnaissance probes by small military units, temporary interdiction of lines of comminica- tion, and general low level harassment. These operations may. be launched and effected by land, sea, and/or air. 5. Svecific overations under consideration.* - a. (29) Interdiction of Route T about 50 miles from Lao border by airdropped 15-man team to exfiltrate through Laos. b. (30) Interdiction of Route 8 southwest of Vinh by 8-man airdropped team. c. (31) Interdiction of Route 12 by 15-man airdropped tean. d. (43) Amphibious raid by h-man team on Ly Hoa Bridge across the Rao [a River near Radon. e. (45) Amphibious raid by 13-man team on security post at mouth of Dong Hoi River. 6. In essence, operations of this category have been taking place since June 1963. Additional such operations will probably evoke reactions similar to those prompted by past operations: €.Ge,; propaganda complaints and spy trials, but little more. We share the view expressed in the Op-Plan's Appendix 6 that Hanoi might * For more details, see Annex.. The operation numbers are those used in Appendix 3 to Annex C of Op-Plan 34 A-64/TIGER. -6- begin preparing é fornal protest to the ICC. With the Op-Plan, we think it unlikely that non-Commmnist nations or the UN would become concerned with operations in this category, and Communist China's reaction would probably rersin confined to deminciations of the US and its "puppets." J. We believe, however, that operations launched from Laos against targets well north of the 17th parallel and/or operations involving the exfiltretion of teams through Laotian territory -- i.e., operation No. 29 -~- are not of the same order as the others in this category. Some such activity is already going on, of course, and if the level and success of present activity are not markedly increased, Hanoi's reaction Is not likely to change in any major respect. On the other hand, should Laos~based or Lacs- exfiltrating teams begin achieving some substantial success, the Communists would

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