EstimatedD Pub Date) Nicaraguan Support for Salvadoran Insurgents -- Interagenc
Central Intelligence Agency · 1981
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Introduction
Dated February 1, 1981, with that date marked as an estimate, declassified CIA document 0000115487 links Nicaragua with insurgents in El Salvador. Its heading calls the paper interagency, then breaks off at Interagenc in the title. Support is the link word in the heading itself, between the two countries named there. The brief record preserves the estimate note and the broken ending as released.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Central Intelligence Agency |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 1981 |
| COLLECTION | DECLASSIFIED |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 16802 |
| VERSION | 1.0 |
| LICENSE | Public Domain |
| RIGHTS | PUBLIC DOMAIN |
| SOURCE | Internet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror |
Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000115487
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Full text
The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:
CN Pe NICARAGUAN SUPPORT FOR SALVADORAN INSURGENTS KEY JUDGMENTS We believe that the Sandinista Directorate views support of the Salvadoran insurgency as a key element in the solidification of the Nicaraguan revolution. This priority explains Nicaragua's wide-ranging support activi- ties for the insurgents since the Sandinistas took power in July 1979 and the high level of arms shipments during the period October 1980 - January 1981--despite the pros- pects that such activities could embroil relations with the United States. ! In response to US diplomatic: pressure and enhanced in- terdiction measures, air shipments of arms directly from Nicaragua to El Salvador have apparently stopped since early February. Moreover, land and sea shipments, which are more difficult to monitor, appear to have been cut back sharply. a wide range of other support activities-- R training, secure e of “volunteer” Nicaraguan combatants in El Salvador, and assistance in the. _areas of planning, intelligence, and communications... BR ec eRe ee eo aN pes EVES PEER ASIN S EP OR dete cluding some, from _ Be Sasha RCE EDULE Rae Ok rare ny RN POLO cOnT eld ab Lees Hate ee eer Tere ane Se NS Se Se Ha GT ua neeentt hile sto rs Lore; pO sp ARO PRAY gag EL N ES Bee _ receive additiona for the insurgents and ~ *Warex er PIR «. Cie sits xe. ee wef : irge : . v ~ rene 2 Sep Vgently “arran evroutes, and methods<of:s--:'" . tg TT TE 5 SGT SO Despite th to bear by the United States so far, and the Sandinistas' anticipation of increased pressures, we see no change in their commitment to the an TY SS ESET AT PREY MA = AES AOR TEE RE EE SRP RE Salvadoran insurgents. Temporizing tactics may continue for a time; but, if forced to choose, the Sandinistas will very likely give a higher priority to supporting the insurgents than to appeasing the United States. TES SR SPE IRR TSE oP NE RCS Ae ame erm If, as is likely, the present level of military action continues in El Salvador, we expect to see at least inter- mittent arms shipments from Nicaragua, directly and in- directly over the next several weeks or months. In sum, little short of a sharp change in the revolu- tionary character of the Sandinista regime or termination of serious combat in El Salvador would be likely to force the Nicaraguans to cease or indefinitely curb their support activities. ° DISCUSSION I. SANDINISTA MOTIVES AND PATTERNS OF SUPPORT Motives 1. We believe that the Sandinista Directorate, in effect the government of Nicaragua, views support of the Salvadoran insurgency as a key element in the solidifica- tion of the Nicaraguan revolution. The Sandinistas share the belief of the Castro regime that, in a region long dominated by the United States, the ability of revolutionary governments to withstand antagonistic foreign pressures is linked to the fortunes of other Latin American revolutionary movements. Additionally, the Sandinistas feel a personal debt to the Salvadoran insurgents, who provided arms, per~ sonnel, and financial assistance to the Nicaraguans in their struggle against President Somoza. 2. The calculations of the Sandinista leaders--all former insurgents themselves--reflect practical concerns about the survival of their regime as well as the ideology of revolutionary solidarity. They are acutely sensitive (even paranoid) about their isolated position as the only revolutionary government in Central America, especially vis-a-vis the hostile military-dominated regimes on their=.: . northern flank. By assisting the insurgents, the Sandinistas seek, in the near term, to tie down the Salvadoran military _ and over time, to contribute to the victory of a like-minded sees er MORGUE AS Oks ants ng Lats aragtane pets Ces tae ees nerabilities. "=" Sil a i aaa : ee Lalit tc ot shan Re OE gee L tol gtearcaar sg 2 RMI. lo a eee ERE ag ee "3. dhis Geabination of -factora--ties of revolutionaryess-~--= solidarity, moral indebtedness, and concern for self-defense-- has led the Sandinistas to provide clandestine assistance to Salvadoran insurgents ever since they seized power in July 1979. The close personal ties and clandestine networks forged by Cubans, Sandinistas, and other Central American revolutionaries during the Nicaraguan insurrection provided a framework for rapidly building a support mechanism for the Salvadoran insurgents. In cooperation with Cuba and with other regional revolutionary groups the Nicaraguans have provided military training; secure transit and safe haven; tyolunteer" combatants; intelligence, planning, and communi- cations support and arms and military equipment. We believe that only the last-named has varied much in intensity over time. Training, Transit, and “Volunteers"* 4. Soon after the Sandinistas took power they began to train Salvadoran insurgents--a few hundred of whom re- mained in Nicaragua after fighting against Somoza's forces. Most, if not all, the training has been provided under the direction of the Nicaraguan military, often in regular Arny camps. 5. Apparently, Cuba and Nicaragua have developed a two-stage process for training revolutionaries from El Salvador and other Latin American countries. Basic instruc- Ve tion is frequently given in Nicaragua to prepare for more advanced courses taught in Cuba. Last August, for example, alvadorans reportedly began six weeks of basic train- ing in Nicaragua; afterward, the most promising trainees were to proceed to Cuba for a four-month advanced course. — Between June and September, 12 Salvadorans started a three- ’ month pilot training program i to be completed - in Cuba. A Salvador stated in early November that he had trained in bo countries. " "=" Ns 6. In addition to secure transit to and from Cuba for why sain wpec nyse Stivadonan trainees, the Sandinigtas have, prov! Seo ean sma HrAseina e~ leader ee Nicaraguaneorsicials: haverappargne LYS Laged sai Le i rescue missions into El Salvador to transport wounded Gio aa guerrijles_bo Nicaragus. fox treatment os gee ee ene 2 a nal é 7. The Sandinistas have also encouraged experienced Nicaraguan guerrillas to go to El Salvador to serve as com- batants and advisers. Several sources have described canvassing by Cuban and Nicaraguan officials for volunteers among security force personnel. A Nicaraguan Reg EE ee said he and 40 other Nicaraguans had been recruited by the Sandinista military in November 1979, given five months' additional training, and sent to El Salvador to fight. Planning, Intelligence, and Communications* 8. The Sandinistas, along with the Cubans, have pro- vided assistance in the planning of insurgent strategy and tactics and in intelligence and communications. The Nicaraguans provide false documentation to facilitate the movement of guerrillas throughout the region. They apparently also facilitate communication by pouch and = radio signal. 9. The Salvadorans operated their own radio station (Liberacion) within Nicaragua from 13 December until € February, when US pressures forced it off the air. By. . locating in Nicaragua the insurgents for the first time 2°" gained the security necessary for establishing a semi- permanent facility powerful enough to broadcast throughout _..the region. er ee ee ee DEERE Se SA: penne —_ : - 2a ak ia 7 = “Eng ae ae TS "; TEP eae 0, Until last_fall, direct Nicaragua participation Z0:-- in facilitating the flow of arms to El Salvador was rela= = tively modest. Several reports indicated that in the spring