Cuban Policy Toward Latin America: National Intelligence Estimate Volume Ii --
Central Intelligence Agency · 1981
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Introduction
Cuban Policy Toward Latin America: National Intelligence Estimate Volume Ii -- is the heading, ending with dashes, on declassified CIA document 0000115451, dated June 2, 1981. The title marks the second volume of a formal estimate on Cuban policy toward Latin America. Volume two signals a fuller treatment, in the heading itself. The brief record is an estimate volume from 1981.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Central Intelligence Agency |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 1981 |
| COLLECTION | DECLASSIFIED |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 71100 |
| VERSION | 1.0 |
| LICENSE | Public Domain |
| RIGHTS | PUBLIC DOMAIN |
| SOURCE | Internet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror |
Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000115451
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Full text
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Cuban Policy Toward Latin America Natlonal Intelligence Estimate Volume [1—Supportiag Analysis cr 277 Aoproved tor Retwagc pate} JUN 1995 CONTENTS Poge 1 THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING... cc cccccceccceccesesssecessonssenenestseee i I. THE DOMESTIC CUBAN SETTING Wo cesecscscececrcseetsmneeereessenseee 2 HE. SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE uu. cceaseecneneee 5 A. Cuban Doctrine. cccccccssecssscessccssssasestsccessssccecsssssessescssessssstecsecsssseseece § B. Support for Insurgent Croups.....ccccceescssscsrsesssesssescecessatscvecsenessensenearens 5 Gy. Revolutionary Cover nments...ccccccccecccsssscssescserevecstssssssssassnsseeseusssseceneas 6 D. Progressive Governments and Move ments ......cccccccccssccssstscesestenseacsens q IV. THE SOVIET ROLE occ seesescessssscssessssssssersesessaserseanseteresesseces 9 VY. PROSPECTS FOR CUBAN SUPPORT FOR REYOLUTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA... ....cccccccesccetesscceres cccesssscacseseseseassasserssnsessessaeene 10 A. EJ Salvador and Guatemala... cccccccceseessscssssescssscsesessetssesenstnasees 10 BL Nicaragua....ccccccseccssssssesesesccecssssecceseserescessssssencetesvesesesetesesescescersecaceesont ij VI. PROSPECTS FOR CUBAN POLICY AND RELATIONS ELSEWHERE IN LATIN AMERICA .u..cecccccscccscerstsssssesssssstsecsssenes 12 VIL CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 13 A. Relations With the United States 13 B. Castro's Extreme Opthote.un..cccscscsccscssesssecsessesecssusecasssssnsssssssseresuease M4 C. Cuba and the Regions... ccccicccscsstssscssessecsessestessecsescsesssscsssseassaseneacanse 15 4 CUBAN POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA SUPPORTING ANALYSIS: 1. THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING L. The kongstanding abjective of Fidel Castro's padicy beward Latin America and the Caribbean has been lo uadercut US influence and enhance his own, ultimately through the promotion of cooperative fever lulionary governments. In addition to a deep commit. ment to revolutionary causes and a strong desire to expand his personal prestige, Castro's regional policy is influenced by his clase ties with and dependence on the USSR. Castro's underlying attitude toward the United Slates is one of hostility and fear; and he sees US and Cuban interests in the region as irreconcilable. In effect, therefore, he sees a compelling need to expand Cuba's influence in order to curb Washington's [ree- dom of action to isolate and bring pressure on Havana. 2 Over the past lwo years, the Castro government has sharply revised the emphasis and tactical priorities of its regional policy. In contrast to mast of the period of the 1970s, Cuba is now giving much heavier emphasis to support of revolutionary Insurgents, espe cially in Central America, and placing less importance on cultivation of diplomatic and commercial tles with moderate and conservative governments. 4% Changing perceptions of international threats and opportunities were probably one key factor that moved Cuban leaders to revise their regional policy. Cuba's international influence and prestige had never been higher than at the end of 1979, after nearly a decade of sustained and sometimes spectacular suc cesses. Military interventions in Africa had markedly enhanced Havana's International standing, and a num- ber of governments there and in other regions had come to borrow from Cuban organizational models, to emulate Cuban policies, and to solicit, Cuban assistance. 4. In 1979, two of Castro's most sought-after foreign policy goals were achieved: his campaign to help - create a sibling regime In the hemisphere was doubly —_—_—— * Jalormation as of £3 June 1961 was used la the preparation of Volume —Supporting Analysis. fulfilled, when pro-Cuban revolutionaries were viclo- rious in Grenada aud in Nicaragua; and, in Septerber, he assumed the leadership of the nowaligned movement (NAM) at ils summit in Havana. Buoyed by thee and other victorics, he traveled to the United Nations in October in a virtuoso role he had rehearsed foe years, and was able with some credibility to pase as spokesman for the world’s underprivileged and oppressed. § In the accomplishments of the 1970s, the original romantic and nationalistic impulses of Castro's forvign policy converged with the pro-Soviet policies that he had adopted in the 1960s. Because of his diplomatic and political skill, the burden of Cuba's increased dependence on the USSR and willingness to perform proxy services did not substantially undercut his ma- neuverability. Thus, Castro seemingly was able to perform simultaneously as & loyal Soviet ally, an eminent Latin American statesman, and a world-class spokesman for revolutionary and nonaligned causes. 6. lronically, Castro was able to relish these tri- umpls for only a short time, before the delicate balance of his foreign policy was upset by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan In December 1979. No event In more than a decade so unequivocally exposed Cuban subservience to the USSR and the limits that relationship Imposes on Havana's ability to pursue an independent line. Cuba's dutiful endorsement of So- vet actions and its success in blocking efforts by some NAM members lo censure Moscow have sharply un- dercut Castro's international prestige. Havana in- curred almost immediate direct damage when It had to withdraw its candidacy for a coveted UN Security Council seat after It lost the support of a number of NAM countries, and Its quest for a seat was frustrated again In late 1980. Castro's plans to exploit his three- year term as head of the NAM have also been badly damaged. As long as Soviet troops continue to occupy Afghanistan, he probably will have to be content to thaintaln a relatively defensive posture in the move- ment, to protect Soviet Interests. 7, Moreover, heightened international tensions be- cause of Afghanistan—and, more recently, Poland— t+: aed have increased Cuban fears of the United States. Cuban leaders are more concerned than at any time since the early 1960s that Cuba could becume a pawn in great power rivalries. Castro Is not convinced that the USSR would defend Cuba against US military actions, especially in the absence of a formal defense treaty with the Soviets despite his efforts to secure one. Cuban leaders realize their country Is vulnerable as the mast cxpused salient of Soviet power and are alarmed that a consensus may be emerging in the United States in favor of tougher ‘policies. Even before Afghanistan, Castro apparently had come to believe that US national security officials were attempting to contrive pretexts for punitive actions against Cuba. In 1980 he became even more concerned about the prospects for sharper confrontations with the United States under a Reagan administration. 8 Developments in Latin America have also helped to alter many of the assumptions and circumstances on which Cuban foreign policy was based during the 1970s. Even before Afghanistan, Castro had suffered a number of setbacks in the region that undermined the ‘ policies espoused by such leading pragmatists as Vice President and Politburo member Carlos Rafael Rodri- guez. By the end of the decade, after efforts to negotiate commercial treaties with several major coun- tries were rebuffed, Cuba's only significant trading partner in the region was Argentina. 9. The moderate policies that the Cuban regime pursued during the 1970s also [ell short of achieving the important objective of cementing its legitimacy as a Latin American regional power. Although a majority of countries established diplomatic relations with Ha- vana, Brazil and a number of others did not (see map). Havana's hopes to expand. its influence with many of the governments with which it has formal relations have also been frustrated, especially in the Caribbean, because of fear of Cuban subversion. Castro has also had to accept the unpleasant reality that the benefits of carefully cultivated relations can be transitory. He was particularly irritated when the special relationship he had developed with Venezuela deteriorated after Luis Herrera Campins succeeded Carlos Andres Perez as president early in 1979. 10. Certain dramatic regional developments favor- able to Cuban interests reinforced the pressures of these adverse developments in prompting a reap praisal of Cuba's regional doctrine, priorities, and methods