UntitledD) re Pakistan Strong Motivatation to Develop Their Nuclear Capability
Central Intelligence Agency · 1978
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Introduction
Untitled re Pakistan Strong Motivatation to Develop Their Nuclear Capability is the heading, with motivation misspelled, on declassified CIA document 0000107983, dated March 3, 1978. The catalog marks the file untitled, then gives this subject line on Pakistan. Motivation, not method, is the stated topic in the heading itself. The brief record preserves the misspelling exactly as released in the files.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Central Intelligence Agency |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 1978 |
| COLLECTION | DECLASSIFIED |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 29787 |
| VERSION | 1.0 |
| LICENSE | Public Domain |
| RIGHTS | PUBLIC DOMAIN |
| SOURCE | Internet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror |
Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000107983
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Full text
The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:
“April 1978 Introduction and Summary 1. Pakistan is strongly motivated to develop at least a potential nuclear capability, in part for prestige purpose. but more strongly because it genuinely believes its national security could ultimately be threatened by India. A decision made by any subsequent Pakistani leader to gain a nuclear capability will be strongly suppor!ed by the military sector, the most important power center in Pakistan, and by the populace in general. But at present there is no visible sense of urgency about the matter and a decision to proceed may be postponed for many years. 2. Pakistan has already undertaken certain actions which could give it a nuclear pei ont --it negotiated the purchase from France of a facility for reprocessing irradiated reactor fuel into plutonium suitable for weapons. Were this facility, as originally planned, to be completed (and this becoming increasing doubtful), and were Pakistan willing to violate safeguards, this would enable it to obtain the plutonium needed for a number of nuclear devices. ~-It has established a nuclear device design organization within the Atomic Energy Commission specifically charged with ensuring that Pakistan will be in a position to produce a device if a final decision is made to do so. 3. Delivery of the reprocessing plants components has been delayed and may well be altered or even cancelled. If it is built, the plant can begin to produce plutonium from irradiated fuel of the KANUPP re2ctor, Pakistan's only Operating nuclear power unit, at some time in the early 1980s, possibly as early as 1982. As of April 1978, negotiations with France over this plant were continuing and may do so for some time. If the plant is not built, Faksitan may be able to use manual methods to produce sufficient plutonium for 2 single device in roughly the same time scale, but is unlikely to do so. It might also try to build a smail, crude re- processing facility on its own which, when completed, could quickly produce enough plutonium for several devices. But the technical skills of the Pakistanis on probably still too rudimentary to permit any early success in such a venture over at least the next five years and possibly much longer. € 4. A Pakistani nuclear design group now appears to be operating at a relatively tow priority. Even so, it can probably provide a design for a simple low-yield fission device by the time plutonium Lecomes available. Thus, if the opticn is pursued, Pakistan could have a nuclear device in hand c»:ceivably as early as the first part of the 1980s. Earrirg an unexpected wirdfall of fissionable Material, a device earlier than that is unlikely. 5. There are various forms of penalties Pakistan might susfer were it to go nuclear. One would be the reduction in nuclear assistance from Western supplier countries, which woule fucther cripple Islamapad's lagging power program. 6. Probzbly more important, were Pakistan to explode a device without being able to embark on a weapons program, such could well lead India--which does have that capability-- to develop nuclear weapons on its own--thereby tilting the military balance even more strongly against Pakistan. Acquisition of an effective reprocessing capability is thus critical in Islamabad's decision making and is likely to determine whether it goes nuclear or not. 7. Pakistan has announced an ambitious but inflated nuclear power program with an ultimate goal of self-sufficiency in electric power. For the foreseeable future, however, it will be dependent on foreign suppliers even for the operation of its present, minimal Svoguam> let alone its expansion. Thus for many years to come Pakistan will face a choice between foregoing its nuclear device option or foregoing much of its projected nuclear power plans. 8. Prevent supplies of fuel for the -KANUPP reactor near Karachi, will be exhausted by the summer of 1978. Fakistan was Cepeneen: on Canada for xe-supply cf fuel for this reactor and also for che spare parts and néavy water “which it will require. These have now all been cutoff by the Canadian government. The Pakistanis have discovered uranium in the Western Punjab and apparently can have a fuel fabrication plant in operation by late 1979. In 1977, 150 tons of uranium were reported mined and refined there. Islamabad also approached Niger in an attempt to obtain uranium. It has asked the People's Republic of China to assist in the fabrication of the fuel rods and to supplant Canada as a supplier of heavy water and spare parts. Whether China will be both able and willing to comply with this request is not known. Even if it does provide support for the KANUPP reactor the PRC cannot fulfill Pakistan's long-ranye nuclear power plans. 9. If Pakistan does get a reprocessing plant, it couid then proceed to develop a nuclear device or even a stockpile of weapons. There is of course a great difference between the development and testing of a simple nuclear device and the development of a nuclear weapons system, which would in- clude both relatively sophisticated nuclear designs and an appropriate delivery system. The price of the former in terms of financial costs and drain on technical resources would be minimal; the price of the latter would be great by Pakistani standards--but probaly manageable, particularly with outside help. The simplest case, a iarge aircraft bomb design, would probably require at least 2 years from the date of the demonstration device. In terms of delivery systems presently available to Pakistan such a weapons could be de- livered cnly by the obsolescent, highly vulnerable B-57. Pakistan has no capability for indigenous production or either aircraft or missiles. Aircraft it might acquire from abroad »or missiles it might ultimately develop on its own would entail -5- development of more sophisticated bombs or warheads which, while not necessarily beyond Pakistan's capabilities, would entail great investments in time, technical resources, and money. 10. If Pakistan acquires significant reprocessing facilities, and if it can keep the KANUPP reactor operating, it would eventually be able to produce an ample number of plutonium already produced by RANUPP~% will also be available once a reprocessing facility were acquired. (Reactor-grade plutonium is undesirable for weapons but could be used.) the available data points to a judgment that even a very eeaae Pakistani nuclear device is probably many years away. A mix of shortcomings in scientific know how, likely difficulty in acquiring or de- veloping critical reprocessing facilities capable of producing usable plutonium, domestic financial problems, fear of an active Indian response, concern over adverse reactions of major foreign powers, and a continued uncertain political atmosphere all increase the odds against Pakistan going nuclear--perhaps for the next decade or even longer. But acquisition of a significant reprocessing capability would change this assessment sharply. Introduction 12. That the Pakistanis are almost unanimous in their desire to develop at least a nuclear weapons capability is a truism. India has exploded a nuclear device and has a latent capability to develop an arsenal of weapons. Indian Prime Minister Desai’s renunciations of further testing and of any weapons program whatsoever have, along with continued domestic uncertainty and financial,strictures, taken much of a sense of urgency out of Pakistani's nuclear efforts. But that country remains essentially