Preliminary Report of Aircraft Accident C-123K, 57-6293 Near Ban Hong Sa (LS-62

Central Intelligence Agency · 1972

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Introduction

Preliminary report of aircraft accident involving a C-123K, tail number 57-6293, near Ban Hong Sa, is declassified CIA document 0000099450, dated January 5, 1972. The heading gives the aircraft type, the tail number, and the place in full. Readers find a short accident report record, marked preliminary in its own title, preserved with the site designation LS-62 noted in the catalog heading as well.

Catalog record

CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1972
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE7747
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000099450

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Full text

The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:

" COMPANY ( , é f Seg tait ae eh “ATR AMERICA, INC. * WV. 4a 25° ov PRELIMINARY REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT € C-12%K , 57-6293 NEAR BAN HONG SA (IS-62), LAOS 27 DECEMBER 1971 18 February 1972 A. sivopsis On 27 December 1971, Air America, Inc. C-12%K , 57-6293 crewed py PIC G. L. Ritter, F/O R. F. Townley, AFS E. J. Weissenback, eas aise appeared while on a cargo flight to Ban Yieng Lom (18-69), Laos. No re- liable information has been received since of either aircrew or aircraft and it must be presumed both are lost. B. INVESTIGATION 1.1 History of Flight Between 06151 ana 0630 on 27 December 1971 the flight crew for C-12%, 57-6293, consisting of PIC G. L. Ritter, F/O. R. F. Townley, AFS E. a Weissenback, qe. -~ to the Air America, Inc. Flight Gastabions Section at Udern RTAFB for briefing. The early ‘briefing was required since 293 needed a Functional Check Flight (FCF) prior to release for operations. The right propeller had been changed on 26 December 1971 and the aircraft required an FCF. The crew was Desens ‘that they would work out of Peppererineer (PPG). after the FCF. PPG work primarily consists of. loading and dispatching mixed ordnance for up—country sites. The Senior Operations Specialist, Mr. 5. J. Wilson, in the Flight Information Center (FIC/UTH) was able to ascertain that he personally All times herein, unless otherwise noted, are local based on the 24-hour clock. -2- had briefed the aircrew and believes the briefing was actually given to the PIC, Captain Ritter. The briefing was general and covered the normal PPG missions. It included the current tactical situation at 1. to 5 major airfields and some 2 to 3 commonly used Drop Zones (DZs). The situation in the LS-69 area was included since this was a frequent destination for PPG flights. Captain Ritter should have been familiar with the tactical situation near LS-69 since he had flown the same route on 25 December 1971, some two days prior to the mishap. A general briefing was necessitated since the actual destination would not be known until assigned by PPG, The aircrew acknowledged the briefing and was duly signed off on the daily flight seneaate (a normal procedure of the FIC briefer). The aircrew signed for the aircraft/mission and departed to the aircraft. It may be presumed the aircrew reviewed the posted weather, including that of LS-69, prior to departure. Evidently, the ground run was satisfactory and 293 departed T-08 at 0658 for a short FCF, landing at 0722. The aircraft checked normally and the PIC radioed its "OX" condition to the Senior Operations Manager (SOM). He dispatched 293 directly to the PPG. The FCF forms were taken with the aircraft to the PPG - a not infrequent minor discrepancy which probably did not influence the subsequent mishap. At PPG, the aircraft was loaded with 12,892 pounds of mixed ordnance including 75am shells, Slum rounds, 222 caliber smell arms ammunition and white phosphorous smoke rounds. This, plus whatever fuel remained from the original 1250 gallon load brought the aircraft close to its maximum allowable weight of 60,000 pounds (see Weight and Balance Section). 1.4 da Airfield Information LS-69 and LS-69A have been combined to one site now called 18-69. It is basically 3,100' x 100! clay/laterite strip with an on-call non- directional paacon: ” Evidently this beacon was nob functioning at 0900 on 27 December 1971. The surrounding terrain, both north and south, is heavily populated with enemy forces. Search and Rescue The Search and Rescue (SAR) effort was conducted out of the VIE station and consisted largely of Air America, Inc. aircraft. A detailed log of search efforts is available at AAM, Inc. VIE if required. For various _reasons, the USAF could only offer limited assistance. O-1 and A-1 siheratt did search late the first day but the bulk of their assistance was through radio relay from control aircraft. With a few breaks due to weather and one false lead from a native _ claiming to have seen an aircraft, the SAR continued through 5 January 1972. All efforts to find traces of 293 were unsuccessful. Due to the extreme hostility of the area, several AAM, Inc. aircraft received battle damage while on the SAR. Due to the proximity of the hostile Route 46, the SAR was rather constricted in nature. The final effort consisted of dropping leaflets offering rewards for information and/or the aircrew. The SAR, although late in starting, was as thorough as terrain, the weather and the enemy would permit. Further air search was deemed fruitless after 5 Jamuary 1972. -i12- C. ANALYSIS AND CONCIUSIONS | 2 Analysis Very little of a positive nature can be said of the final flight of 57-6293 since its location is still Ande herined: However, fron statements of the pilots of other C-123K aircraft, an analysis of weather, the cargo, and the current tactical situation in and around ‘the LS-62/IS-69 area, a reasonable conclusion can be reached. Based on the computed crosswinds at 8,500 feet, 293's reported altituds, it was likely that 293 was to the right of his desired track enrouta out of 1-08 and at a higher than normal ground speed. The pilot, Captain Ritter, although supposedly well familiar tins esabesiee Likely flying an inadequate crosswind correction heading in and out of cloud bases. This could have placed him to the right of L-23 and, later, well to the right and beyond LS-62 since no navigational aids were avail- ‘able. A valley, similar to that of LS-62, is present just to the north- ' east of LS-62 and close to Route 46. An off-track course to the right could have explained Captain Ritter's apparent concern over ths weather although both of the other two Gareaias were flying at the same reperted altitude but in relatively good weather conditions. Had Captain Ritter been to the northeast of his reported position at LS-62 and initiated a descending left turn towards Ls-69, the enemy reaction over Route 146 would be immediate and violent. Large anti-aircraft guns are only 15 miles north of LS-62. With some 12,892 pounds of ordnance aboard the it could well be imagined that no time for radio calls was aircraft, available. The SAR effort could not be extended into the Route 46 area. Bake _ Several other possibilities in the causal areas include maintenance malfunctions, lost, hijack, etc., but all are even more unlikely than enemy action and would probably have precipitated some radio call(s). The likelihood of 293 merely crashing in the weather is a remote } 2.2 possibility if he were well off-track to the right - say with an in- operative heading indicator but, again, some radio calls should have been made. A possibility that 293 blew up from an internal explosion is present but was not considered likely. Flight in and out of ‘clouds while on a visual clearance is an operational requirement and was not, by itself, considered a factor in this mishap. In summary, although the cause of the disappearance of 293 must bs listed as undetermined, the aircraft probably strayed from course and, over exceedingly hostile country, was hit by enemy fire

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