Memorandum for the Holders of SNIE 80-61: Security Conditions in Caracas and B

Central Intelligence Agency · 1961

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Introduction

Memorandum for the Holders of SNIE 80-61 on security conditions in Caracas and beyond, in cut-short heading form, is declassified CIA document 0000098314, dated November 4, 1961. The audience is holders of a numbered estimate. The brief file is a follow-on memorandum record, its subject security conditions in a named capital city.

Catalog record

CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1961
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE5282
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000098314

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: 7 f a
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

7
f

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

LBY LIBRARY
Mondetory Review
Core NEV GPO 3F
Document #
MEMCRANDUM FOR THE HOLDERS OF SNIE 80-61: SECURITY CONDITIONS
. IN CARACAS AND BOGOTA

14 December 1961

wh

The United States Intelligence Board has reviewed SNIE éo-61,
"Security Conditions in Caracas and Bogota," dated 7 Decerber
1961, in the light of information subsequently received (as set
forth in the Annex), and hereby reaffirms that estimate, which
is summarized as follows:

1. The governments of Venezuela and Colombia are

vitally interested in the success of the President's visit, they
will be alert to protect him from danger er embarrassment, and /
they have forces at their disposal adequate to maintain general
control of the situation. Nevertheless, there are elements in
both countries eager to create the appearance of popular antag-
onism toward the US and popular rejection of the Alliance for
Progress, and at the same time to aiucredit their own governments.
These elenents will almost certainly take advantage of the occasion
to stage some sort of hostile danepatnabion. The nature and effect

of these efforts will depend in large measure on the immediate

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
qe

eiremstances ond the matner in which the security forces

deal with the occasion.

2. The object of most hostile efforts would alnost

- certainly be to subject the President and his party to personal

indignity rather than to physical injury, but sone risk of the
latter is inherent in the circumstances. There is, of course,
a possibility of an assassination attempt by some fanatic in-

dividual or snall group.

3. The situation in Caracas could be adversely affected
by developments in the Dominican Republic, particularly if it
could be mde to appear that the US was supporting the restora-

tion of military dictatorship there.

‘The significant information received since 7 Decerber 1961 is

sucmarized at Annex.

LIMITED P{STRIBUTION |

LIMITED TRIBUTION

SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS REPORTED SINCE 7 DECEMBER 1961

Caracas

l. The Venezuelan Government has received information that
leftist opposition groups will attempt to assassinate President

Betancourt before the arrival of President Kennedy.

2. The Communist Politburo is fully agreed that strong action
is required on the Occasion of President Kennedy's visit (but
excluding his assassination) in order to discredit the Betancourt re-
gime and the Alliance for Progress. There is a division of opinion
regarding what should be done. A nilitant faction desires to
attack nilitary and police barracks, dynanite bridges on the
route frog the airport to the city, block traffic, stage denon-
strations at the airport, along the route to the city, and in
Slun areas, and Provoke the police to fire on youthful denon-
strators. Another faction apparently prefers to extenporize and

desires to limit the anount of violence involved,

3. The wave of denonstrations and violence which began

on 28 Novenber has dininished. Hostile agitation continues,

principally in the form of painting slogans on walls and

iN a,

ANNEX

distributing leaflets. Acts of violence still occur, but

the police appear to have the situation reasonably in hand.

Most of the high schools have been closed and some university
students have dispersed for the holidays. While extremist
students are reported to be planning disturbances » the President

has warned that the University will be promptly occupied if dis-
orders begin there.

4, The authorities responsible for maintaining security
during the President's visit have renewed their assurances y but

acknowledge that scattered and minor disturbances may occur.

5 An effort to build up positive popular support for the
President's visit is well underway. President Betancourt, addres-
sing the CIV (labor federation) Conireas » distinguished the cir-
cumstances of this occasion from those of Mr. Nixon's visit and
called on the militants of the cCalition parties and the working
class to be on the streets to give a cordial welcome to a President
"who represents a new thinking toward and poenawnpatiicn with Latin
America rooted in the Rooseveltian Good Neighbor Policy.” These
sentiments were enthusiastically applauded. The Cardinal has

issued a pastoral letter calling for the avoidance of disagreeable

-2ea

incidents that would dishonor the country. The press and radio
are also calling for a warn and friendly welcome under the slogan

"Jacqueline Si, Kennedy Tarbien."

Bogota

6. The Colombian Communists and other extrene leftists did
not Pao any significant popular nanifestation against the
Colonbian Government's breach of diplomatic relations with Cuba.
They have apparently concluded that neither personal attacks on
President Kennedy nor large-scale demonstrations will be feasible
during the President's visit. Their plans are apparently con-
fined prinarily to painting slogans on walls and distributing
propaganda leaflets, although there is some talk of student

denonstrations.

7.. Other disaffected elements -- e.g., the Rojistas and the
Gaitanistas -- have apparently decided to take advantage of the

occasion to make their point by turning out in force to cheer

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