Cuba-a Status Report
Central Intelligence Agency · 1963
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Introduction
Cuba, A Status Report is the title of declassified CIA document 0000098090, dated November 4, 1963. The heading promises a general status account of the island. The brief file is a declassified status report in that plain form. It is a companion to the Guantanamo policy item. It also sits near the Cuba options paper in the same cluster.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Central Intelligence Agency |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 1963 |
| COLLECTION | DECLASSIFIED |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 13349 |
| VERSION | 1.0 |
| LICENSE | Public Domain |
| RIGHTS | PUBLIC DOMAIN |
| SOURCE | Internet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror |
Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000098090
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Full text
The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:
Vp Bae Gees: 2: Seggen Sea CGE Tat eae dhe. Bo lites te SSP: SRMBITIVE Sg oe eg hg Tet ee | Aa cone eee 1 a hy Fane SASS CAE aM Ee 28” @ENTRAL INTEL SLIGENCE. AGENCY eee? ee ee ‘ a ae ‘ ae LBJ LIBRARY ie anda view (1° 34 sees ietle ' -12 December 1963 Case # NLJ ‘ ge es ehaesie e ; Document # ; ; MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: Cuba ~- A Status Report Current US Policy With Respect to Cuba 1. Current US policy is to isolate Cuba from the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the Free World and to exert maximum possible pressures, short of open and direct US military inter- vention, to prevent e consolidation and stabilization o Castro-Communist regime. The CIA covert action program is de- Signed to support other governmental measures to proliferate and intensify the pressures on Castro to encourage dissident’ elements, particularly in the military, to carry out a coup and eliminate Castro and the Soviet presence in Cuba. 2. Our ultimate objective in Cuba is to replace the Castro : regime with one which will be fully compatible with the goals of . the US and will cooperate with US efforts to establish friendly — and stable ‘regimes throughout Latin America. - t 4 Prospects for Achieving US Objectives Under Present Policies and Programs . 3./ Castro's position within Cuba appears to be eroding gradually and recently he has been forced to adopt increasingly harsh measures to maintain his control. The situation in Cuba is characterized by economic stagnation, depressed living con- ditions, the loss of revolutionary impetus, and the disillusion- ment of an increasingly large majority of the population. To some extent, this is a result of innate economic deficiencies in Cuba, and more recently, Hurricane Flora; but to a consider-. able degree the problems confronting the Castro regime have been ~:~ magnified by Castro's.own ineptitude and by the US policy of economic and political isolation, ane orne® harassment and sabotage measures. eee e & os - , a ary o4 GROUP 1 APPROVED ron peieasé Ce ee 3.0 OCT 998 Gace | “spread in Cuba. But while apathy and resentment might com- “\plicate Castro's problems, they do not represent a serious : :./ threat to him or his regime. In short, we believe that ©. :: Castro, with Bloc and a certain amount of Free World help, -:: “ds likely to weather his present difficulties. _He is also =°. : likely to intensify his subversive activities in Latin =. .;° “America, where the fragile political situation increases ‘the potential of his limited subversive capabilities. — “as one of low risk and low return: we are unlikely to. bite ox experience a direct confrontation with the USSR or to engender - of toppling the Castro regime and of eliminating Castro's -:.: ‘subversive efforts against friendly Latin American regimes. 9.) ~~. ‘This is not to say that a continuation of .our present policy 2'2. 000" ‘position; it is to say that under our present policy Castro". oy ‘through Castro's example or through his direct efforts, our. ©. ee ee Possible Future Courses of Action present levels are not likely, barring unforeseen events such “27-0 45: taken to quicken the pace of events. . The possible future -.-courses of action which follow are less risky than either an invasion or blockade, but would probably involve a rete aoe “substantially higher "noise level" and risk of confrontation . .: with the Soviets than those presently in effect. 0. 2) Penn ', .° to operate at the pace originally envisioned, will come Paige re ; eae oe ee a re ee a eee "4, We believe that apathy and resentment are now wide-. . 5. /In sum, our present policy can be characterized | political strains with allied or neutral nations. . On the Ee other hand, we are still far from accomplishing our objectives ~ will not result in a further deterioration:in Castro's. might be able ta hang on for several years. During this time, own efforts in Latin America will be vastly complicated or even neutralized. ps Pe 6. Since it appears that current US programs at their Peete as the sudden death of Castro, to result in the early over-..- | throw of the Castro/Communist regime, it would seem timely. °".- to examine what additional covert and overt measures can be . Covert Actions me : program, if permitted ~ <q. The current ‘covert action telagat ed ; close to riaking naximun use of aa policy. : Consideration should be Bea ihe ‘expanding | 2 “harassment, "However, hazardous ‘operational-conditions * and concern over :the:: elitical AEC) + ee inhibited mounting. maritime raids. 6 -; of -these-targets, “however, may be more ‘effectively attacked : from ‘the air under acceptable risk conditions .. : : 8. Two courses of action towethar with their advantages, os Stand disadvantages are submitted for consideration: Ss “sy, ar Relaxation ‘of the jpeseat policy ‘banning ‘all | |) gndependent [i Cuban exile haritime raids and air strikes against targets in Cuba Advantages - (1) Would increase number of raids having some ‘economic ** and psychological effect; would dramatically highlight the - inability of the regime to cope with these raids" and tend. - to demoralize the armed Oncce ee tthe eS atte el eS (2) In addition’-to some economic “damage, ' ‘would cause ~ - the Cuban government to divert its manpower = and other ae _resources from pressing economic Proper s. eae sages (3) Could embolden a eunber ‘of “wait and Pace” Latin nes _- American countries to support stronger. ‘unilateral and multi aeEeERe measures ha Sete bcuseae ee te -. _ Disadvantages my (1) Would putes iHoise level" and increase ‘risk of - ineidents on i Biehs seas. an which =e Pitas might become . involved. 2) Might cause Soviet reaction an Berlin or. elsewhere, (3) Actions uncontrolled by ‘US both as to Citas. and selection of targets, possibly Benen Te at Soviet vessels | and installations, — we '(4) US Government aourd be charged with couplicity oP. since American territory being used as base. - Lea tat ok x ok Ok ok oe b. Authorization to conduct air strikes against selected major .*~- 2 BA economic targets such as the power plants and ott refineries. Advantages (1) Same as for a. above and, <0 addition, would cause » major damage to the Cuban econony. . - Disadvantages q) Same as for a. above and, eS addition, could cause _ revulsion against Cuban exiles and possibly US if target ea missed and sizeable number of innocent people killed. : / B. Overt Actions by Other US Agencies Supported by CIA as” Appropriate The main emphasis of overt US programs against Buin ‘As to complete the economic, political and psycho- . logical isolation of Cuba from Latin America and the free . world and to build defenses against Castro/Communist sub-— version in Latin America, These measures have been largely responsible for Castro's current economic distress, but - ~ gdditional effective economic warfare measures could be '. taken, ‘These are cited below pepetier bes their ne eRe Gi cadyentarer: ve coe _ *