Intelligence Warning of the Tet Offensive in South Vietnam PublicationN Date Es
Central Intelligence Agency · 1968
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Introduction
Intelligence Warning of the Tet Offensive in South Vietnam, with publication date estimated, is declassified CIA document 0000097712, dated March 1, 1968. The heading flags the dating estimate in parentheses. Readers get a short declassified paper on warning before the Tet Offensive, its subject the intelligence that preceded a major attack in South Vietnam.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Central Intelligence Agency |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 1968 |
| COLLECTION | DECLASSIFIED |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 18303 |
| VERSION | 1.0 |
| LICENSE | Public Domain |
| RIGHTS | PUBLIC DOMAIN |
| SOURCE | Internet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror |
Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000097712
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Full text
The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:
1.5(¢) TOP-sroki, QD 3.4(0)(1) No Foreign Dissem RECEIVED | INTELLIGENCE WARNING OF THE TET 0&?ARTMENT oF sTATE—~INA/RCI OFFENSIVE IN SOUTH VIETNAM 2 ADO « (Interim Report) APR» 1968 A.M. P.M, MSWMM EBB 4. 2G ! A. Procedures 1. A working group has been formed under the chairmanship of R. J. Smith, on which CIA, DIA, INR, NSA, and the Joint Staff are represented. This group has compiled dossiers on the raw intelligence informa- and intelligence summaries and judgments received in various US headquarters before Tet, with emphasis on the period 15-30 January 1968, and on the finished intelligence disseminated to senior officers of the government as a result. 2. Representatives of the group from CIA, DIA, and the Joint Staff visited Vietnam from 16 to 23 March. They were joined there by observers from GINCPAC, MACV, and the CIA station in Saigon. In addition to collecting a large quantity of pertinent documents, the delegation received briefings and conducted interviews, both in Saigon and the field, with many senior officials, US and Vietnamese. On the US side, members of the delegation talked to Ambassador Bunker, General Westmorelanc, General Abrams, Ambassador Komer, Lt. General Cushman, Lt. General Rosson, Maj. General Peers, Maj. General Eckhardt, and the commanding generals of lst Marine Division and 4th Infantry Division. They also inter- viewed the G-2s of I and II Field Forces and the G-2 of III Marine Amphibious Force, and the G-2 advisers and the CIA Regional officers in all four Corps Tactical Zones (CTZs). They were briefed ex- tensively by MACV J-2 and by the CIA station in Saigon, and contacted the Director of Intelligence, Seventh Air Force, NSA Representative Vietnam, and the Army Headquarters Area Command in Saigon. On the Vietnamese side, they interviewed the commanding generals of I and II Corps, J-2 of the Joint General Staff and his deputy, and the deputy director of National Police. In the course of these discus- sions members of the group visited Phu 3ai, Da Nang, Pleiku, Camo Enari, Nha Tranc, Bien Hoa, Lone Binh, and Can Tho. APPROVED FOR RELEASE APR 28 1897 No Foreign Dissem 4.5(c) 3.4(b)(1) pa a oe o Foreign Dissem 3.4(6)(1) B. General Findings 3. As the DCI informed the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in February, there was evidence, both in Saigon and in Washington, that the enemy was engaging in his much-advertised "winter- spring campaign" and was preparing for a series of coordinated attacks, probably on a larger scale than ever before. There was evidence in January that some attacks in the highlands might be con- ducted during the Tet holiday. .In the latter part ° e month it was eviden nat other attacks were imminent ; and some of the Lardets bad pest idéntified. fo) in Saigon and in Washington this intelligence was communicated to senior military and political officers. As a result, a series of actions were taken in Vietnam which d e impact of the enemy offensive. 4. The warning thus provided represents no small achievement for the US intelligence apparatus in Vietnam. it has no high-level clandestine pene- trations of the Communist hierarchy and high-level Communist communications are for the most part unreadable. It must therefore rely on classic in- dications techniques. This is difficult under any circumstances. The intelligence organization itself, military and civil, US and Vietnamese, is complex and the volume of material it handles is large. Thus, the recognition of significant reports from human sources through the blare of background noise presents.a major problem. Moreover, the very nature of the war_leads tg the “crying wolf" svndrome. @ have little doubt that at some level of the in- felliaence apparatus low-level reports could be found forecasting manv of the attacks made at Tet; we have eauallv little doubt that similar reports qoulg be found _alludingto-attacks on many other Td_be found alluding to attacks on many other cities and on manv other dates. 5. The enemy took great pains to conceal his intentions: Knowledge of his plans was fully com- partmented and the actual attack order was dis- seminated to attacking units only in the final 24 to 72 hours. Although US and Vietnamese authori- ties received some reports of individual attack plans, probably no Communist officer below the 4.5(c) ee Bree) 5 3.4(6)(1) TPT Gi Oo a 1.5(c) : 3,A(ey(1) level of COSVN, front, or military region was aware of the full scope of the offensive. General west- moreland believes the Communists sacrificed coordina- tion for security, and this is evident in the pre- mature attacks by units of Military Region 5 (MR 5) on the night of 29-30 January, attacks which served to alert the US command to the much more extensive attacks on the following night. 6. Despite enemy security measures, communica- tions intelligence was able to provide clear warnin that attacks, probably on a larger scai ten le than ever before, were in the offing. Considerable numbers — of medium- and Low-grade enciphered enemy messages were read. These messages appeared in many areas of South Vietnam. They included references to im- pending attacks, more widespread and numerous than Seen before. Moreover, they indicated a sense of” urgency, along with an emphasis on thorough plan- ning and secrecy not previously seen in such communi-~ cations. These messages, taken with such nontextual indicators as~increased message volumes and radio direction finding, served both to validate informa- tion from other sources in the hands of local au- thorities and to provide warning to senior offi- cials. The indicators, however, were not suf- ficient to predict the exact timing of the attack. nd C. Impact of the Enemy Offensive 7. Although warning had thus been provided, the intensity; coordination, and timing of the enemy attack were not fully anticipated. Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland attest fo this. The most important: factor was timing. Few US or GVN officials believed the enemy would attac uring Tet, nor dal fhe Vietnamese public. There was good reason <Or this: Tet symbolizes the solidarity of the Vietnam- ese people. It_is the most important holidav_in Vietnam, an occasion observed by all members of every family whether they are Buddhist, Christian, oF Communist. The Communists evidently believed they could exploit this solidarity to produce an antigovernment, antiforeign, antiwar uprising. This did not take place. The enemy therefore paid a price in the antagonisms he generated among the urban population, 4.5{c) ac inet ? iss a 3. A(b)) | 1.5(¢) “No Foreign Dissem but he gained enormously in two ways: The GVN's army and police were generally far below their usual state of readiness, and the precedent of Tet made it possible for large numbers of VC to enter the cities without causing alarm. General Westmore- land expected heavy attacks either just before or just after Tet, and as Tet approached and major attacks had not materialized, the Vietnamese Joint General Staff had authorized 50 percent leaves. Evidence to upset this general belief did not come to hand until 24 hours or so before the, attacks were launched, the most important being the premature initiatives in MR-5. The latter brought the intelligence already available into sharp focus and provided the missing element of timing. In the short time available, US and