Toward a Military Government in Peru
Central Intelligence Agency · 1967
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Introduction
Toward a Military Government in Peru is the title of declassified CIA document 0000097280, dated September 6, 1967. The heading reads a direction of travel for Peru's politics. Readers find a short declassified paper on that prospect, its title phrased as a movement toward military rule, filed among the agency's Latin American country studies.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Central Intelligence Agency |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 1967 |
| COLLECTION | DECLASSIFIED |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 21674 |
| VERSION | 1.0 |
| LICENSE | Public Domain |
| RIGHTS | PUBLIC DOMAIN |
| SOURCE | Internet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror |
Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000097280
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Full text
The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:
BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES po ee eae | Pe aD = a 29 LB] LIBRARY sateen A Document # SPECIAL MEMORANDUM TOWARD A MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN PERU? See anaIRnRREEI RE ERRmenmnmenEneeneeammenaeeoemnamenetaen = ter aemeteeneeeensemmenecee nee Approved for Release Date M Sven 28 October 1967 No. 8-67 1 a WARNING This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re- ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. GROUP | EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIPICATION See: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES 28 October 1967 SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 8-67 * SUBJECT: Toward a Military Government in Peru? The Belaunde administration, long considered one of the model governments in Latin America, has come upon difficult times. During the past few months, it has been faced with a legislative crisis, a growing inflation, signs of unrest in several towns, acute budgetary and balance of payments problems, and the need to acquiesce in a devaluation of the sol. In view of his weakened political base and growing economic troubles, Belaunde obviously feels that he must give high priority to maintaining good relations with Peru's military leaders. This, in addition to his own conviction that Peru must now begin to replace its antiquated military holdings, lies behind the ar- rangement for purchase of supersonic Mirage 5 aircraft from France -- and behind Belaiinde's refusal to abrogate it. * This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of National Estimates, coordinated with the Office of Economic Research and discussed with the Office of Current Intelligence. Group 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification ke Belaunde's relationship with the US has already come under strain; the emergence of a new irritant in the long-standing dispute between the Peruvian government and the US-owned Inter- national Petroleum Company is adding to this strain; and re- lations will worsen further if the US Government proceeds with @ Major cut in economic aid. We see some danger that Belavinde might be overthrown within the next few weeks, and we believe that the chances of a military take-over will subsequently increase. Whether or not the gov- ernment of Peru comes under the acknowledged control of the military establishment, its policy is likely to include two of that establishment's firm resolves: (1) to carry out its program of modernization -- i.e. procurement of advanced military equip- ment abroad -- impervious to argument, pressure or reprisal, and (2) to maintain public order no matter what disgruntlement the country's economic troubles produce. eRERE 1. ime was when Peruvian military leaders needed little or no pretext to intervene politically. In fact, during Peru's century and a half of independence, three-fifths of the presi- dents have been military men or men of recent military background. Only since World War II has there been a significant change of attitude among military men -- change which involves a growing respect for constitutional procedures, for civilian rule, for social progress. The last military seizure of power ~- in 1962 -- was designed to prevent the election to the presidency of victor Raul Haya de la Torre, who did not receive enough votes to be elected outright, but who would have gained control of the Exec- utive if Congress haa been allowed to choose. Most of the military leaders honestly thought Haya's program would be a calamity for the country as well as for their interests. They sanctioned new elections for the following year, and, with their blessing, @ fragile party coalition, and a smattering of Communist support, Fernando Belaunde Terry won some 39 percent of the vote and a six-year term as president. 2. Under the Peruvian constitution, 4 plurality of more than one-third of the popular vote suffices to elect the President. Belaunde has been a minority president from the beginning, and ( a some two-thirds of the members of Ganetens belong to the two parties whose leaders he defeated in 1963: the Apristas (Haya de le Torre's American Popular Revolutionary Alliance -- APRA) and the Odrifstas (the party of the former president and dictator Manuel Odria -- National Union of Odriistas -- UNO). When Belaxinde won, the populist APRA and the conservative UNO formed an opposition coalition which was none too constructive in the beginning and has become more and more obstructive over time. The government coalition of Belaunde's Popular Action Party (AP) and the small Christian Democratic Party (PDC) is far less pow- erful. Belaunde has managed to put through the Congress a number of bills in keeping with his moderate reform program, but the cumulative effect of trying to deal with the opposition majority has caused him increasing frustration and brought him close to despair. 3. Belaunde's program of reform and development has tended to be over~ambitious in terms of Peru's financial resources, but clearly responsive to some of Peru's most urgent needs. In pressing it, he has posed a challenge to strongly entrenched economic interests. Despite the repeated opposition and inter- ference from Congress, his administration managed to accomplish See? a good deal. Yet ali along Belaunde has had much more success in expanding the spending side of the budget than in expanding revenues. This is but one of the practical difficulties which are now catching up with hin. The Pattern of Economic Strains ibe 58 CC eee 4. The Peruvian economy was booming when Belaunde came to power and the boom continued until 1966. During 1961-1966 Peruvian gross national product increased at an average annual rate of over 6 percent, the highest in South America. Rapid economic growth wes based on & rapid expansion of exports, especially of fishmeal and copper, each of which now accounts for about one-quarter of Peruvian exports. Since 1963, however, production in these fields has stagnated, and the increase in export earnings came from the favorable prices which prevailed until the latter part of 1966. The Belaunde government used much of these earnings for economic development, government investment in infrastructure rose rapidly, and there was also substantial private investment, both domestic and foreign. With these investments Peru took considerable strides in modernization and developed new export and import replacement industries. The economic advance, however, was rapid enough to cause growing strain. Imports grew faster than exports -5- -- imports more than 100 percent between 1960-1966, exports about 75 percent. With incomes rising and population growing some 3.5 percent a year, consumer demand rose faster than the supply of goods available and prices increased steadily, although inflation was kept under control. The lack of responsiveness of food pro- duction, a result of both physical and institutional limitations, was one cause of the inflation. The increasing government budget deficit was another. The inflation, coupled with a fixed foreign exchange rate, slowly eroded Peru's competitive position in the world market. Growing trade deficits were covered thanks to rising assistance from the US which reached large proportions in 1965-1966. 5. Peru's economic boom came to an end as a result of 4 sharp decline in the world market prices of fishmeal and copper in late 1966. As