Proposed CIA Response to Request for Information Which Have Been Received From

Central Intelligence Agency · 1973

Read Proposed CIA Response to Request for Information Which Have Been Received From by Central Intelligence Agency (1973) in the Tower of Babel, a free online library of public-domain works preserved in clean, searchable text. No sign-up. The full text is served as a plain-text file at a predictable URL, where text is present: https://antarctic-labs.com/tower-of-babel/cia-0000096944.txt.

Introduction

Proposed CIA response to requests for information received from an unnamed source, in the cut-short heading, is declassified CIA document 0000096944, dated February 3, 1973. The title ends mid-phrase in the catalog. Readers get a draft-response record sharing its date with the routing sheet nearby, the pair showing an answer and its paperwork together.

Catalog record

CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1973
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE9217
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000096944

Browse the full library · About the Tower of Babel

Full text

The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:

21 FEB S73 Le Gea on me ad 6 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence f ‘ VIA: Deputy Director for Plans SUBJECT: Proposed CIA Response to Request for Information Which Have Been Received From the Senate Foreign Relations Sub- committee on Multinational Corporations 1. This memorandum contains action recommendations in para- graphs 4 and 5. 2. Oni2 February 1973, in response to their request for a’ meeting, Mr. Maury, CIA Legislative Counsel, contacted Messrs Jerome Levinson and Jack Blum, staff members of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations. This resulted jn Mr. Maury receiving five questions which the staff members wanted answered. Therauestions focus on the 1970 electHans in Chile and the CIA and ITT role in these elections, Mr. Maury took note of the ques- thons and told the staff members he was not familiar with the substan- tive issues which were involved in the inquiries. Mr. Maury did agree, however, to refer the questions to appropriate CIA officials for study. The staff members are, therefore, expecting a response. Attachment A, which is for information purposes only, lists the five questions and their correct answers. 3. It should be noted that in formulating the paragraph 4 recom- mendation, special note was taken of the 12 February statement by Mr, Levinson to Mr. Maury that he felt there were significant discrepancies between the 5 and 7 February 1973 testimony of Mr. Richard Helms before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the 1970 events in| Chile and data which ITT had previously provided to the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations. In this context Mr. Levinson made the point that these contradictions might require the Subcommittee to ask Mr. Helms to provide additional testimony at a later date, even if this meant Mr. Helms would have to return to Washington fromIran. The . oe * “oO APPROVED FOR RELEASE ae 1956 195 i - ese ne “46 d)(1) Avera nia or nein moan fdaaniater 4.5(c) 4.6(0)(1) 4.6(d)(1) ao CLA debriefing of Mr. Helms on 12 February did not identify any deviations in his testimony from the known facts. This debriefing, however, did not have the benefit of our being able to compare the transcript of Mr. Helms' testimony with his recollections of the salient points thet were discussed with him by the Senate Committee. This was due to the fact that to date the staff members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have refused to release a copy of Mr. Helms' testimony to either CIA or the Department of State. 4, The recommended CIA response to the staff members! ques- tions is as follows: "The testimony of Mr. Helms on 5 and 7 February 1973 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee clearly estab- lished that CIA neither gave to nor received from ITT funds for use in Chile in 1970 for the support of political parties. In addition, Mr. Helms' testimony brought out the fact that there were no joint action programs established between CIA and ITT for implementation in the context of the 1970 political developments in Chile. CIA regards Mr. Helms' testimony on this topic to be accurate, thus no further elaboration is planned." 5. The Subcommittee staff members will undoubtedly find the paragraph 4 response less than satisfactory. It is to be anticipated, therefore, that they will refer the issue inherent in this answer to the Subcommittee in an attempt to setin motion action which would be designed to produce what they would regard as’ a more forthcoming reply from CIA. In the interim between forwarding the paragraph 4 answer to the Subcommittee staff members and their reaching agree- ment with the Subcommittee on how to proceed on the basis of this answer, itis recommended that CIA take the following actions! a. The Legislative Counsel be authorized to sound out Senator Jackson on the prospects of CLA being able to obtain, either Senator Stennis or Senator Symington's assistance in arranging for the CIA Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee to consider the problems of how CIA sources and techniques could be protected before the Agency proceeds further with the Senate Foreign Relations Subcom- mittee on Multinational Corporations. In this connection it should be noted that Senator Jackson has a proven record of 4.5(0) - G® 3. handle a particular picce of Congressional business has been sound. In addition, Senator Jacksonis discreet and can be counted on not to comment further on what he learns about CIA or ITT actions in Chile during 1970. It must be noted, however, that for the discussion with Senator Jackson to be meaningful and for his advice to be sound, CIA would have to give him a briefing on the nature of CIA's relations with ITT in 1970 during the Chilean election period, In short, a risk would be taken for sensitive information would be surfaced to a Senator with there being no guarantee he would be helpful. This is a risk which is worth taking, for the net gain from such action favors CIA if the. desired results are obtained. supporting CIA and in the past his advice on how CIA might . 2 { ere wee ee ee ra PERE T b. If Senator Jackson believes that it would be useful for the Agency to approach Senator Stennis or Senator Symington, then such an approach should be made. Perhaps Senator*Jackson could pave the way for such a contact. In the discussion with either Senator Stennis or Symington, CLA should work toward the goal of having its testimony on events in 1 Chile” during 1970 shifted to the Senate Committee on CIA. Once that objective is acuicved, ihe DCL could speil out in Executive 5ession to the Senate Committee on CIA that the Agency and ITT did not engage in joint action programs in Chile. The DCI would indicate, however, that CIA and ITT did exchange views on political and economic trends in Chile. 1.5(cXd) 1.6(4)(1)(6) received such a briefing as a member of the Senate Committee on CIA, itis believed that Senator Stennis or Symington could be persuaded to work out with the Senate Foreign Relations Sub- committee on Multinational Corporations an arrangement whereby/ the DCI could mezke a controlled presentation before the latter | group. In such an appearance the DCI would want to make the _| ~ critical point i.e., CIA neither received from nor gave toITT funds for the support of political parties in Chile in 1970. See Attachment B for a proposed statement that would be used by the DCI in meking a controlled appearance before. the Subcom- mittee on Multinational Corporations. = c. As itis anticipated that even thouch Senators Stennis or Symington might arrange for a controlled .ppearance by the DGles, 1.5(c) —_ om ! before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, it is possible that at the time of the DCI's appearance, some Senator might choose to violate the understanding. In such a case the DCI would have to fall. back on Executive Privilege, and in so doing would have to avoid answering any questions that would compromise instructions which the Agency received from the President, Dr. Kissinger or the 40 Committee. Since it may be necessary to invoke Executive Privilege, we

Read the complete text