Electronic Surveillance Legislation
Central Intelligence Agency · 1975
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Introduction
Electronic Surveillance Legislation is the subject of declassified CIA document 0000096937, dated April 2, 1975. The heading names a legal topic rather than a case or a country. The brief file is an agency item on surveillance law as a subject, filed a year before the neighboring record on a proposed surveillance bill.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Central Intelligence Agency |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 1975 |
| COLLECTION | DECLASSIFIED |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 14824 |
| VERSION | 1.0 |
| LICENSE | Public Domain |
| RIGHTS | PUBLIC DOMAIN |
| SOURCE | Internet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror |
Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000096937
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Full text
The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:
Areiqr] ploy “Yy ple1s9 wo Adosoioyg MEMORANDUM eens 2 A024 SUBJECT: Electronic Surveillance Legislation 1. Over a dozen bills have been introduced in Congress to date aimed at restricting electronic surveillance conducted on national security grounds. Although impelled by concern for the Fourth Amendment rights of American citizens, the major bills in this area (S. 743, H.R. 141, H.R. 214) are characterized by a heavy-handed approach which poses a serious threat to the exploitation of foreign SIGINT. sources, both within the United States and overseas. (Signals intelligence subsumes communications intelligence and electronic intelligence.) ? 2. The 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (18 U.S.C. 2510, et seq.) established certain procedures which require the Government to obtain a court order issued on probable cause prior to conducting wire or oral communication interception in the investigation of certain offenses. In section 2511(3) of that Act, Congress specifically disavows any limitation on the constitutional powers of the President in national security matters and recognizes that the President has inherent constitutional authority to engage in certain foreign intelligence activities: (n)othing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 shall limit the constitutional power of the President ... to obtain foreign intelli- gence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to protect national security information apainst foreign intelligence activities. (emphasis added) The emphasized language implicitly recognizes that foreign intelligence surveillances may be distinguished from national security surveillances aimed at the discovery and prosecution of criminal conspiracies and activity. 3. In reliance on these Presidential powers and congressional recognition thereof, foreign intelligence signal and communication interceptions may be conducted within the United States without judicial warrant. a ea z 4 a! “a fd ¢ [x e\ Les =l y Ww \e es APPROVED FOR RELEASE 15 OCT 1996 Aieiqry] ploy “y presen wor Adosojoyg: 4. Sentiment that the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 2511(3) (quoted above) are incompatible with Fourth Amendment rights has spawned a Senate bil] and over a dozen House bills (some of these identical) aimed at closing what the sponsors view as "the national security loophole" in current surveillance laws. A distinctive approach to national security surveillance is taking shape which would prohibit the use of warrantless surveillance for any reason whatsoever, treating national security surveillance under a single rubric, without distin- guishing between gathering foreign intelligence on the one hand, and national security surveillances aimed at the discovery and prosecution of criminality, on the other. (a) S. 743 by Senators Nelson and Kennedy would amend 18 U.S.C. 2510, et seq., as follows: First, repeal 18 U.S.C. 2511(3) thereby withdrawing whatever congressional recognition that section gave the foreign intelligence surveillance powers of the President. Second, prohibit intercepting the communications of an American citizen or alien admitted for permanent residence until a prior judicial warrant is obtained issued on probable cause that a specific crime, e.g., espionage, has been or is about’to be committed. Third, prohibit intercepting the communication of a foreign power or its agent until a prior judicial warrant is obtained by establishing probable cause (a) that such interception is necessary to protect the national defense (note narrower standard than national security); (b) that the interception will be consistent with the international obligations of the United States; and (c) that the target is a foreign power or foreign agent. (A foreign agent is defined as any person, not an American citizen or alien lawfully . admitted for permanent residence, whose activities are intended to serve the interests of a foreign power and to undermine the national defense. Each application for such an interception would be made to the D. C. Federal District Court on personal and written authorization of the President and would provide detailed informa- tion on the target, the purposes and justification of the interception .) Upon court approval, only the FBI would be authorized to intercept the communication. Fourth, require that every American citizen targetted be informed of the specifics of the surveillance within a month of the last authorized interception. (This disclosure could be postponed if the Government satisfies the court that the target is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise or that disclosure would endanger national security interests. A foreign power or - its agent need not be informed of interceptions.) Fifth, require the Attorney General to report to the Congress, at least quarterly, the details of each interception undertaken on national security grounds, to be filed with the Senate Foreign Relations and Judiciary Committees and the House International Relations and Judiciary Committees. ; = ° —. Areiqry] ploy “y pyesay wooly Adosojoyg (b) H. R. 141 by Representative Kastenmeier, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, which has legislative jurisdiction for surveillance, is similar to the above bill. It would repeal 18 U.S.C. 2511(3) and amend Title 18 to permit communications interception in national security cases only under court order issued on probable cause that an individual has committed one of several enumerated offenses or is engaged in activities intended to serve the interests of a foreign principal and to undermine the national security. (From the language of the bill, it could be argued that the foreign agent's activities would have to constitute a criminal offense before a warrant could be issued.) The bill does not mention the communications of a foreign power. Each application for an interception would have to be authorized by the Attorney General and made to a Federal judge of com- petent jurisdiction. The targetted individual would be informed of the surveillance within ninety days. The President, Attorney General, and all Government agencies would be required to supply Congress, through the Senate Judiciary and Foreign Relations Committees and the House Judiciary and International Relations Committees, any information regarding any interception applied for. (c) H. R. 214 by Mr. Mosher and seven identical bills co-sponsored by over 70 Congressmen from both parties, would prohibit any interception of communications, surreptitious entry, mail-opening, or the procuring and inspection of records of telephone, bank, credit, medical, or other business or private transactions of any individual without court order issued on probable cause that a crime has been committed. Like S. 743 and H. R. 141, reviewed above, H.R. 214 would repeal 18 U.S.C. 2511(3). Unlike the above bills, H.R. 214 does not provide for non- law enforcement surveillance. It would also strike out pro- visions for summary procedures for intercepting communications during emergencies and would require that detailed information on each application for a communication interception be reported to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. 5. Intelligence Community Interests: These bills, through imposing judiciary administration over all surveillance, would impair existing responsibility to conduct electronic surveillance in gathering foreign positive intelligence, which now reaches wholly domestic communications, those both transmitted and received within the United States; wholly foreign communications those both transmitted and received abroad; and transnational communications, international communications received in or transmitted from the United States. > z . Arelqr] p1o.j “y pyetay wos Ados0j0yg SIGINT provides a broad range of foreign intelligence ranging from early warning indicators to the most mundane information. The importance of any single intercept or series of interceptions cannot be anticipated