The Situation in Hong Kong
Central Intelligence Agency · 1967
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Introduction
The Situation in Hong Kong is the title of declassified CIA document 0000096493, dated May 1, 1967. The heading is a general situation label for the colony. The brief file precedes the agency's outlook on Hong Kong by two months in this catalog. It gives readers the earlier item of a pair. The later one is the outlook on the same place.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Central Intelligence Agency |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 1967 |
| COLLECTION | DECLASSIFIED |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 16188 |
| VERSION | 1.0 |
| LICENSE | Public Domain |
| RIGHTS | PUBLIC DOMAIN |
| SOURCE | Internet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror |
Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000096493
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Full text
The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:
DIRE€TORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Intelligence Memorandum The Situation in Hong Kong SPR. 11 July 196 No. 1366/61 APPROVED FOR RELEASE 23 DEC 1996 nd Use Only sem Abroad/Controlle LSsem CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 1l July 1967 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM The Situation in Hong Kong Summary The border clash on 8 July during which five policemen were killed in an exchange of small arms fire with Communist militia makes it clear that the Chinese authorities intend to keep the Hong Kong is- sue hot. -Peking's official treatment of the in- cident thus far, however, does not indicate that the Chinese Communists are aiming for a showdown with the British at this time. There will probably be more trouble during the weeks ahead. Riots and vio-~ lent demonstrations inside the Colony appear almost certain and there may be additional border incidents. Given the state of confusion within the Chinese Com-~ munist leadership and the pressures generated in the Capital, at the provincial level, and within the Com- munist. apparatus in Hong Kong by the latest phase of the "cultural revolution," these could get out of hand and escalate: into a direct confrontation over the status of the Colony. The pattern of events dur- ing the past several months suggests, however, that Peking is operating on a longer range plan calculated to erode the position of the Hong Kong authorities and thus prepare the ground for an effort by the lo- cal Communist apparatus to assume de facto control over Hong Kong in a year or so-~on the pattern of the Macao takeover last winter. The resolute stand taken thus far by the British, the demonstrated ef- fectiveness of control measures adopted by the Hong Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Economic Research. m Abroad/Controlled Dj “No Foreign i Ba nd Use Only No For ssem/Backgr flesem Abrosd -Controlle Kong authorities, and the lack of "revolutionary" enthusiasm shown by the general population in the Colony, seem unlikely to encourage Peking to move more quickly. The Chinese Communists can be ex- pected to continue--and perhaps to increase--their support of local opposition in Hong Kong but prob- ably will refrain from actions involving the risk of war, or even moves which would disrupt the Colony to such an extent that Peking was denied the vital foreign exchange earned there--approximately one third of China's total earnings in 1966. aoe I i m Abroad/Controlled Di tas No-Foreign Ba Use Only issem Abroad/Controlle Background l. The present troubles in Hong Kong can be traced back to a shift in Communist tactics with re- spect to the Colony which apparently was adopted around the beginning of this year. Prior to that time the Communist apparatus in Hong Kong had been relatively circumspect. Instructions issued in Jan- uary 1967 by a senior official who had returned from a visit to China the preceding month changed this line. He ordered increased exploitation of industrial disputes in order to indoctrinate the workers with "Maoist thought” and stated specifically that the objective of the new program was to further the “anti-British struggle." 2. There was an increase in industrial unrest during the late winter and early spring, but the British authorities sought to avoid trouble by stand- ing clear of the disputes and leaving them to be settled by labor-management bargaining. On 6 May, however, violence broke out during a factory strike which required police intervention. The Communist press-~first in Hong Kong and then on the mainland-- reacted with charges that the Hong Kong Government had committed “atrocities" and demanded that those responsible be punished. 3. The initial propaganda attack was followed by three days of Communist-inspired rioting which began on ll May. On 15 May Peking took formal cog- nizance of the situation by delivering a Foreign Ministry statement to the British chargé demanding that workers arrested in Hong Kong be released, that those responsible for the arrests be punished, that apologies and compensation be offered, and that a guarantee be provided against any similar incident in the future. A campaign of harassment against Brit- ish diplomatic personnel in China began at this time. Massive demonstrations were staged outside the Brit- ish Embassy. The British Consulate in Shanghai was forced to close and the officers there were roughly handled by Red Guard hoodlums. = m-Abroad/Controlled Dis --No Foreign se Only The Initiative for the Pisorders 4. It is still not clear whether the strike violence on 6 May and the ensuing riots in the Colony were the result of local Communist initiative or were specifically ordered by Peking. The nine-day delay between the incident on 6 May and the Foreign Ministry statement on 15 May suggests, however, that the cam- paign originated in Hong Kong. The leaders of the local apparatus almost certainly felt under consid- erable pressure to demonstrate their militancy--in view of the current demands of the "cultural revolu- tion"~~and may have decided that the time was ripe to launch a major campaign based on what appear to have been very general instructions to take a harder line in exploiting labor unrest. 5. It 1s possible that the local leaders over- estimated their own capabilities, underestimated the ability of the British to resist pressure, and pre- sented an optimistic picture to Peking which secured official endorsement and direct involvement of the Chinese Communist regime in support of their plans. Foreign Ministry officials in the capital had been under heavy extremist pressure for months and might therefore have been inclined to put “politics in command" over their normal caution. The British Reaction and its Effects 6. Undoubtedly encouraged py the Foreign Min- istry statement, the Hong Kong apparatus launched a series of "Red Guard” type demonstrations and en- couraged strikes designed to cripple public services and promote mass disorder. The Hong Kong Government was Operating on the assumption that Peking did not untend to seize the Colony and that in this situa- tion 1t had much to gain and little to lose by re- fusing to give an inch. London refused to reply to the Chinese Foreign Ministry demands and issued a statement supporting the Hong Kong authorities. The Hong Kong police stood firm and generally were able to maintain order while employing a minimum of force. <li =. 7. Failure of the efforts of local Communists to intimidate the British began to sap their morale and a number of them expressed disappointment over the support they were receiving from Peking. | ; on 23 May a number of senior officials 1.5(c)(d) in the Hong Kong apparatus revealed growing dis- 3.4(b)(1)(6) couragement. They attributed the resolute stand taken by the British to a "reasonable" judgment that China did not wish to take over Hong Kong at that time. They were reported to believe that Peking did not entirely agree with efforts by the local ap- paratus to "escalate" the confrontation and pri- vately admitted that the British were following a clever policy in suppressing the demonstrations with- out creating a host of martyrs--in contrast to the mistakes made by the Portuguese in Macao. 8. By the end of May the Colony had returned to