The Outlook for Hong Kong

Central Intelligence Agency · 1967

Read The Outlook for Hong Kong by Central Intelligence Agency (1967) in the Tower of Babel, a free online library of public-domain works preserved in clean, searchable text. No sign-up. The full text is served as a plain-text file at a predictable URL, where text is present: https://antarctic-labs.com/tower-of-babel/cia-0000096492.txt.

Introduction

The Outlook for Hong Kong is the title of declassified CIA document 0000096492, dated July 5, 1967. The heading promises a forward look at the colony in four words. The brief file is a short declassified outlook item, companion to the agency's situation report on Hong Kong filed two months earlier in the same catalog run.

Catalog record

CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1967
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE17491
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000096492

Browse the full library · About the Tower of Babel

Full text

The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:

- Cle Fret = Neri) «xf gs ; , ~~ . wx LBJ LIBRARY | S oreign Mandatory Revie SAN ee _¥29 Case # NLI_S Decument * DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Intelligence Memorandum The Outlook for Hong Kong 25 August 196) No. 1383/67? This document contains in ytion affecting the national dcfcuse of the Unitggs@fates, wit e meaning of Title 1S, sections fund 794, of the US as amended. Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence 25 August 1967 7 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM The Outlook for Hong Kong Summary Renewed Chinese Communist pressure on the British over the situation in Hong Kong raises new questions concerning the immediate future of the colony and the prospects over the longer term. The increasingly fluid situation in Peking and the continuing "revolutionary" disorder throughout China make confident predictions of Chinese be- navior more difficult than ever. Nevertheless, China's demeanor in the past three months has led us to conclude that the Chinese authorities intended from the outset to keep the Hong Kong issue hot and to continue their support for dissident elements in the colony. We have also concluded that Peking undertook a campaign aimed at gradually eroding the position of the Hong Kong authorities and thus preparing the ground for a new attempt by the local Commu- nists to seize de facto control in a year or so. We believe that in the meantime the Chinese Com- munists will refrain from actions against the colony involving the risk of war, or even moves which would so disrupt Hong Kong as to put it out of business and thus deny Peking the vital foreign exchange earned there. Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelli- gence and coordinated with the Office of Economic Research and the Office of National Estimates. The latest Chinese Communist actions appear to bear out this analysis. The handing of an ultimatum to the British and the assault on the British Embassy in Peking followed a series of humiliating British rebuffs to Chinese demands. These moves may have been partly in response to pressure from hard- pressed Communist leaders in Hong Kong for more significant support than Peking had been contribut- ing to their campaign. The sacking of the embassy did, however, fulfill Peking's threat to the British of “serious consequences" .without involving serious risks. The Hong Kong Communists have probably been encouraged by these actions and can be expected to step up their efforts to create disorder. Recent Chinese Communist behavior and propaganda suggest, however, that Peking does not intend at this time to go much beyond the kind of action already taken to support the local Communist apparatus. It does not appear likely that the Chinese Communists intend to attack across the border, but there are two possible actions stemming from main- land China that could make the situation very difficult for the Hong Kong authorities. Red Guard radical mobs, acting either on their own or under orders from Peking, could attempt an aggressive action against the colony. It seems likely, however, that the Gurkha troops could contain such a move. More serious difficulties could arise if military authority in neighboring Kwangtung Province broke down and masses of Chinese refugees fled to the freedom of the colony. The British have shown themselves capable of handling Communist terrorism and violence within Hong Kong itself. Nevertheless, the long term outlook for the colony is uncertain at best. Business confidence has been shaken and capital is beginning to flow out from the colony. Unless peace, however uneasy, is restored to the colony, a trend could develop which might sharply reduce the rate of economic growth and lead to growing unemployment. This would provide the Communists with new opportunities and that may be what they are seeking. A change in leadership in Peking, however, and a consequent change in Chinese Communist policies would probably reduce the force behind the Hong Kong Communists’ trouble- making potential and allow the colony to recover some of the losses it has suffered. a3 ii eee . en _ @ign Di - Recent Background 1. The burning of the British Embassy in Pe- 7 king on 22 August came at the end of a period dur- ing which Peking had probably become increasingly frustrated by the failure of the Communist apparatus in Hong Kong to shake the position of the authorities. In the aftermath of the Sha Tau Kok incident on 8 July the colonial government launched a vigorous counterattack against Communist efforts to create large-scale disorder. 2. Troops were used to back up police for the first time on 12 July in a successful raid which cleaned out a leftist union headquarters which had been used as a command post for organized rioting which had plagued the colony for nearly a week. The morale of local Communist organizations was severely shaken by this raid and by subsequent moves against other control centers which put many Com- munist leaders behind bars. 3. The number of violent incidents and large- scale disorders fell off and by the end of July it appeared that despite continued sporadic terrorist attacks on the police and against public transporta- tion services, the authorities were well on the way toward breaking the back of the Communist apparatus. a food strike was’ cancelled and the strike against harbor facilities was increasingly ineffective. 4, Throughout this period Peking's propaganda, while encouraging the local Communists to carry on with their fight against "oppression," continued to stress that the main burden in the struggle would have to be carried by the "compatriots" in the colony. When three NCNA representatives in Hong Kong were arrested around the middle of July, the Chinese Com- munists protested vociferously and staged small dem- onstrations in front of the British Embassy in Pe- king but took no further action. 5. New small-scale border incidents took place in early August but these do not appear to have been the result of orders from Peking, or even from pro- _vincial authorities. Chinese troops guarding the sani Aha tote: dos fas 2 Rey GS Wt border intervened on a number of occasions to pre~ vent major troubles from developing in Kwangtung. The most serious of these incidents -took place on 11 August when a gang of Red Guard ruffians crossed the border and attacked the police post at Man Kam To. The Red Guards disarmed sentries and forced a British police official to sign an agreement £0. Te= move barbed wire barriers near the frontier, and to pay compensation for alleged injuries to a local farmer. 6. The next day the British coolly repudiated the "agreement" on the ground that it had been signed under duress and proceeded to close the border ex— cept for the rail crossing at Lowu. This prompted a protest note from the Chinese Foreign Ministry on 14 August which the British rejected, although they later lifted restrictions at most of the border crossing points. 7, Three days later, on 17 August, the Hong Kong authorities closed down three leading pro-Commu-— nist newspapers which had been printing inflammatory editorials and arrested key staff members. This ap- pears to have been the last straw for

Read the complete text