Statements on the Cultural Revolution, Reduced Military Training, Poor Morale,

Central Intelligence Agency · 1967

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Introduction

Statements on the Cultural Revolution, reduced military training, and poor morale are gathered in declassified CIA document 0000096484, dated July 4, 1967. The heading lists three unlike topics in one breath. Readers find a short declassified statements item from China reporting, its mixed contents announced plainly in a title that reads like a contents line.

Catalog record

CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1967
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE7602
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000096484

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Full text

The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:

LBY LIBRARY ane Magdatory Review pecan Soar Case'# Nj J_ 95-522 Fee : Document #_33__ . . . e . CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY . ROUTINE _*. Intelligence Information Cable 35. PAGE 1 OF © paGeES STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA Nic SIA S00 ONE OCR ORR OCS CGS) CIA/NMCC ~~ . This material contains tnformation affecting the National Defense ae Lene che United § States} yithin the meaning of the Peper Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and To, the transmisson or revelation of which in an thorized person 1s prohibited by law. os THIS 1S AN INFORMATION REPORT, WoT FINALLY SVALUMRED INTELLIGENCE, SS lt CT Ot) Pa oS Yo tgtz. * BST 32 AucusT COUNTRY-- ° CHINA/ TAIWAN . - T IN SUGJECT-- INN s7 ATENENTS ON THE CULTURAL REVO- LUTION, REDUCED MILITARY TRAINING, POOR HORALE, WUHAN INCIDENT, RED GUARDS, POOR HARVEST, AND SOVIET BORDER INCIDENT. | | - cq -- i . SOURCE -- 1.5(c) | - 3,4(b)(1) ‘li SUMMARY. es WHO SERVED WITH THE JM INF ANTRY : SAID THAT MANY OF HIS COMRADES 4 5(c) ee IN AMoy NINN 7 ¢ AFD THE CULTURAL 3.4(b)(1) : REVOLUTION AS. h. NECESSARY AND CONTINUING PHENONENON. Ps | JROGPS' MUST OBEY GRDERS AND HAO'NO CHOECE BUT TO CARRY OUT ORDERS | 5 ISSUED BY COMMANDERS 18 THE CURRENT REVOLUTION, MMMM Hiurtary ya MORALE AND DISCIPLINE. ARE ATA ‘LOW POINT, AND ONLY ONE-THIRD OF TRE TIHE 1S NOW DEVOTED TO MILITARY TRAINING. A POOR HARVEST, POSSIBLY The WORST IN RECENT YEARS, was EXPERIENCED IN THE any eae _ es |” APPROVED FOR RELEASE 180) — wn fo nectfinrtinat ffissem controlel °* IN PAGE 2 OF 6 PAGES 1.5(¢) 3.4(b)(1) (classification) (oie controls) pREA. OA RUMOR CARCULATING IN ANOY “IWOLCATED THAT THE PLA HAD DE- " EEATED TWO SOVIET HILITARY UNITS IN SINKIANG. ~ 1.5(c) . MR any WM PLA COMRADES REGARDED “SHE CULTURAL 3.4(b)(1) REVOLUTION AS ‘' VERY NECESSARY, '' ALTHOUGH SOME WERE UPSET BY THE ACCOMPANYING CHAOS. WHEN ASKED WHEN HE THOUGHT THE CULTURAL | REVOLUT[ON WOULD END, MM SAID "'Many’' PRB aA comrades BELIEVE 1.5(c) fT WILL * ‘NEVER END'* AND SHOULD NEVER END'' BECAUSE THEY FEAR oe THAT CHINA ""WILL CHANGE 175 POLITICAL COLORING IF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION ENDED. *" 3. WR tee CULTURAL REVOLUTION HAD A SHATTERING EFFECT 1.5(c) . - 3.4(b)(1) on MILITARY TRALNI NG. De ea] HE WAS IN QtaRGE OF POLITICAL INOOCTRINATION IN HIS SQUAD, AND HE SAID THAT - rs 2. PLA UNITS WERE DEVOTING THO- THIRDS OF THEIR TINE TO POLITICAL SESSIONS AND ONLY ONE- THIRD TO $:5(c) ‘ MILITARY TRAINING.” “THIS ONE-THIRO ALSO INCLUDED TIME “ALLOTED FoR = -4(b)(1) PRODUCTIVE LABOR. MM icity EFFICIENCY WAS-AT A LOW PO{NT, | WM ke TROOPS ARE BECOMING SLOPPY AND THERE was NT) DISCIPLINE. nee re WN or WAS. VERY Low IN WIS UNIT AND HE BELIEVED | THAT THIS ALSO APPLIED TO THE ENTIRE PLA. - HE ATTRIBUTED LOW: MORALE “T0 THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. AND ITs OISRUPTIVE POLICIES. — a ofc, ty eae ; 1.5(¢) > nappa eee | ee Sai}, (classification) (dissem contr. ; : ee ea) ; : ; . “hf ee Pw WO Ph ON feless PAGE 3 OF 6 PAGES. ae OS PSs aaa a Atix(t) (classification) (dissem controls) “MANY PLA CONRAD ES WERE UPSET BY THE LAWLESSNESS AND CHAOS, AND THERE WAS GREAT CONCERN FOR THE SAFETY OF JREIR FAMILIES. my | MOST OF HIS FELLOW COMRADES WERE HOMESICK anid ML Sa nce JANUARY Len 1967, THE PLA Had REFUSED 10 GRANT FIchters LEAVE To Go HOME. ED. WM A NOTICE WAS ISSUED AT COMPANY LEVEL IN JARUARY 1967 STOPPING x Home Leaves. RBBB THis Heasure was TAMEN FoR THE SAKE OF tee ECONOMY BECAUSE THE STATE NEEDED TO SAVE MONEY. HOWEVER, | —— 8.4(b)(1) WE pone LEAVES WERE SUSPENDED BECAUSE PLA COMMANDERS FEARED | “THAT SOLDIERS WHO RETURNED WOME WOULD BE UPSET WITH THE CONDITIONS THEY FOUND. | 7 5; Large GREAT DEAL OF PUBLICITY WAS GIVEN TO THE ''WUHAN oi? INCIDENT. : sas opency CALLED & "'MILETARY coup,'* AND — 3-4(b)(1) = IT WAS WELL KNOWN THAT THIS WAS h MOVEMENT AGAINST MAO. — ae WIS PLA COMRADES LOOKED UPON THE WUHAN INCIDENT AS ‘''A " GOOD THING’ BECAUSE IT WOULD INSPIRE OTHERS To RESIST THE RED <GUAROS AND THE CULTUR AL REVOLUTION, HOWEVER, THIS WAS ONLY HIS BE- LIEF SINCE HIS COMRADES WERE, RELUCTANT TO DISCUSS THE MATTER OPENLY. : WINN, 5 AND HIS COMRADES WOULD HAVE COMPLIED WITH ORDERS FROM cON-, MANDERS TO ARREST ANYONE, SUCH AS HSIEH Fu-crin, ok EVEW SUPPRESS THE MASSES BECAUSE THEY HAVE No CHOICE. ee ie ee if ifcation} {dissem controls) Tyee + eM Nw Pp UI 1 ‘ i felcssification) fdissem con ‘ Ce he Ect tA Rah TL AoA felessification) (dissem controls) FIGHTERS HAVE TO OBEY ORDERS, WE reer HAVE WO CHOICE. 6s HE DOUBTED THAT MANY OR EVEN ANY FIGHTERS WOULD REBEL AGALNST vi ORDERS FROM THEIR COMMANDERS. Wc COULD NOT OFFER AN OPEN- ION AS TO WHETHER oR nor A COMMANDER ‘WOULD REBEL AGAINST HIGHER a AUTHORITY OR. REJECT CERTAIN ORDERS. . 3.4(b)(1) . MR Fon. the east SEVERAL MONTHS HIS UNET HAD BEEN REPEATEDLY TOLD To SUPPORT. THE RED cuaeos. WD riers were SPECIFIC ORDERS AGAINST INTERFERING WITH THE RED GUARDS, EVEN WHEN THEY WERE ACTING IMPROPERLY. WE kc Hab NEVER SEEN ANY ARMED | 5 RED GDAROS, BUT HE YNOECATED THAT HE. Wa HEARD THAT IN SOME AREAS 3.4(b)(1) OF FUKIEN THE RED GUARDS HAD STOLEN WEAPONS AND WERE USING THEM AGALNST THEIR OPPONENTS. oc | PLA WAS SUPPORTING THE RED GUARDS IN ANOY. | | , WM ste toavest in FURIEN HAD BEEN coneLeTED [AM — WAS A’ POOR HARVEST AND WMT was 34(y) SAID TO BE ONE OF THE WORST tN RECENT. YEARS. HE ATTRIGUTED THE _ POOR HARVEST TO HEAVY. WINDS AND PESTS. HE WAS UNABLE TO IDEWTIFY THE TYPE OF INSECT, BUT KE ASSUMED - AT was SOME SORT OF LOCUST. 8. WE a conor CIRCULATED af) AMOY IN FEBRUARY 1967. THAT THE PLA KAD DEFEATED Two SOVLET UNITS THAT Hap TRIED ae se TUN ADE® . “4.5(¢) : * 3.4(b)(1) “a ~ ‘ ‘ PAGE'5 OF 6 PAGES 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1) ° . ier ee (classification) dissem controls) _ = e rh © wien felessificeation) SINKIANG. WE 0x OF THE UNITS wes A CAVALRY bivisies AND THE. OTHER WAS A MOBILE ARTILLERY UNIT. | 4.5(c) 9, MD kc was ASTONISRED BY THE APP OLNTNENT OF CHIANG — 3.4(b)(1) CHING /MADAME HAO AS CULTURAL ADVISOR TO THE PLA. REM tHexc WAS SONE OPEN CRITICISN ABOUT KER APPOINTNENT AMONG PLA TROOPS. WE hc HARDEST TRING FOR PLA. FIGHTERS TO ACCEPT IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION WAS THE SLANDER OUS ATTACKS ON LIU SHAO-CHI'S "" HOW TO ge a 6000 condunrsT.'' [RBBB every pia SOLDIER WAS VERY FAMILIAR 1.5(c) ote aes 3.4(b)(1) WITH THE: 8COK AND WENN MOsT BELIEVED 1J WAS AN EXCELLENT PLECE OF . CONNUNIST WRITING. 1p. MMMM[o1d Nor KNOW VERY NUCH ABOUT PURGES. IN THE SENIOR RANKS OF THE PLA. WBBM THERE Were MANY POSTERS CRITICIZING YEH FEI, LO JUI-CHING AND PENG TEH-HUAI. HE HAD NOT SEEN ANY CAITICISM OF cov TEX. MMMM LI e rac WAS

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