Comment on Certain Questions Relating to the Situation in Laos

Central Intelligence Agency · 1964

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Introduction

Comment on certain questions relating to the situation in Laos is the title of declassified CIA document 0000095146, dated May 6, 1964. The heading is cautious and general, naming Laos and questions rather than answers. Readers find a short declassified comment item whose vagueness is worth noting, since the record promises questions about a situation, not findings.

Catalog record

CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1964
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE2573
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000095146

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Full text

The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:

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Chat a Ae INTELLIGENCE Kenney

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
27 June 196k

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Cement on Certain Questions Relating to the Situation
' din Laos.

1. The State Department has requested answers to three questions,
as set forth below, relating to the situation in Laos. The following

. represents the opinion of analysts from this Office, from OCI, and
frou DD/Pe | a a
Ae What is the likelihood of a Pathet Lao attack on Muong
Soui under present circumstances?
 Itis impossible to estimate on this question with
eny confidence, but we believe that the chances of such an
attack at some time in the fairly near future are slightly
better than eveno We know of no evidence of such a PL/VM
military build-up as would indicate an intention to make an
early attack, but notmuch of a build-up would be necessarye

Our estimate is based on more general grounds, namely (a) that

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an attack on Muong Souk would be a feasible retaliation

for the 1-28 bombings, especially if these should continue,

and (b) that the PL/VM may wish to damage further the military

capabilities of the Kong le neutralist forces, and to stremthen
the Communist position for any future negotiations that may

take places

Be What is the likelihood of a PL/WM attack on Muong Soui if

' the contemplated RLG operation north of Vang Vieng is undertaken?

In this circumstance we believe that the PL/VM forces
probably would attack. They have frequently demonstrated both
their disposition to react with force against any neutralist
military initiatives, and their ability to do so with success.

C. If a PL/VM attack does take place, what is the likelihood
that the RLG forces would be destroyed under the above hypotheses?

(a) If a PL/WM attack were launched against forces presently
in Muong Soul, it is probable that the latter would be defeated
in a few days and forced to withdraw.

(b) If a PL/VM attack occurred after the proposed RLG operation
took place (and assuming that the operation succeaded), there
is probably about an even chance that RLG forces could hold

their position at Muong Soui, at least for some time. —

(c) If RLG forces were defeated in either of these cases,
it is likely that the units would not be destroyed but would
straggle away to the south and in time be reformed.

2. The above views are given with no firm indication yet at hand
of the effect of T=28 strikes on the capabilities and morale either
of the PI/VM forces or of those of the RLGe.

eee oe

Sherman Kent

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