Results of Nguyen Phong Thiep's 21 October 1968 Visit to Saigon

Central Intelligence Agency · 1968

Read Results of Nguyen Phong Thiep's 21 October 1968 Visit to Saigon by Central Intelligence Agency (1968) in the Tower of Babel, a free online library of public-domain works preserved in clean, searchable text. No sign-up. The full text is served as a plain-text file at a predictable URL, where text is present: https://antarctic-labs.com/tower-of-babel/cia-0000094997.txt.

Introduction

Results of Nguyen Phong Thiep's visit to Saigon on October 21, 1968, are recorded in declassified CIA document 0000094997, dated September 5, 1968 in the catalog. The catalog date sits oddly before the visit date in its own heading. Readers get a short results record whose internal dating mismatch is itself worth flagging. Its catalog entry preserves the original heading word for word.

Catalog record

CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1968
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE3431
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000094997

Browse the full library · About the Tower of Babel

Full text

The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:

3 3& 4 3(a)(4)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

LB] LIBRARY

25 October 1968 Mendatory Review

Case # NLY_ edly

Document #33

‘MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. ae a
Special Assistant to the President

The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Results of Nguyen Phong Thiep's
21 October 1968 Visit to Saigon

4.3(a)(4)

2. MME Nevyen Phong Thiep, member of the South
Vietnamese observer delegation to the Paris talks, J returned to
Paris on 22 October 1968 from a one day visit to Saigon, South 4.3(a)(4)
Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Chanh Thanh instructed Phong
to tell South Vietnamese Consul General and observer delegation
chief Phan Dang Lam that, til the commencement of second stage
talks, substantive discussions between the Americans and the South
Vietnamese would take place solely in Saigon and Lam thus bore no
responsibilities in this area. This was in response to Lam's com-
plaint that he was not being kept fully informed about talks in Saigon.
Thanh promised to keep Lam better informed,
and this has been borne out by an increase in reporting from Saigon
to Paris.

4.3layf

3. On the composition of the South Vietnamese delegation,
Thanh told Thiep that Pham Van Thinh, South Vietnamese Ambassador
in Bern, and Le Van Li, Vietnamese delegate to the United Nations
Organizations in Geneva, were being added to the South Vietnamese

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

JAN 1995"
4.3(a)

ae 4.3(a)(4)

delegation and would be arriving soon in Paris. Wu Vuong Bac,
prominent Saigon lawyer, probably will not join the delegation
because of the press of personal business in Saigon. Nguyen

Ngoc Linh, Director of Vietnam Presse, has insisted that he be
given the personal rank of Ambassador as a precondition for his
joining the delegation as spokesman. [I Linh 1.3(ay(4)
bases this demand on his belief that Mr. William Jorden, U.S.
Mission spokesman, has the same rank. Thanh told Thiep that he
doubted that he could agree to this condition. For the job of
military delegate, Thanh said that former IV Corps Commander and
Revolutionary Development Chief General Nguyen Duc Thang was
being actively considered but that no decision has been made.

4. During his visit to Saigon, Thiep had a private talk with 4 3(a)(4)
President Nguyen Van Thieu. QM ~Thiecu said that °
there was no fundamental disagreement between himself and the
Americans on the question of ultimately permitting the National
Liberation Front to participate in the political life of South Vietnam
by standing for public office in free elections. The main difference
was rather the point of permitting the Liberation Front to take part
in the negotiations without first having established their right to do so
in this way. President Thieu said that he was afraid that chaos would
result in Saigon if the Liberation Front joined the negotiations as a
separate entity. He said that he expected trouble from the military,
the Catholics and the militant Buddhists. Among the military, he
believed the main trouble would come from company grade officers
and lower ranks since the general officers were fairly well under
control and the field grade officers could understand why it might be
necessary to make concessions to the Liberation Front. He said
that he was less confident of the ability of the Catholic hierarchy to
control the Catholics, particularly if the militant Buddhists began
causing trouble.

Read the complete text