Monitoring the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Looking for a Needle in a Haystack

Central Intelligence Agency · 1991

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Introduction

Monitoring the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention is the subject of declassified CIA document 0000075857, dated February 1, 1991, subtitled Looking for a Needle in a Haystack. The paper frames treaty monitoring as a hard search problem. Its vivid subtitle is the record's most memorable feature, preserved in a short declassified item on weapons treaty oversight.

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CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1991
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE7545
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000075857

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Full text

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COS226

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Directorate of
Intelligence

Monitoring the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention: Looking for
a Needle in a Haystack

An Intelligence Assessment

APPROVED FOR

RELEASELIDATE:

16-Mar-2009 Septet 5
SW 91-10008X p

February 1991
a1 gab

Directorate of
Intelligence

Monitoring the Biological and Toxin

Weapons Convention: Looking for
a Needle in a Haystack

An Intelligence Assessment

Secplt
SW91-10008X
February 1991

Reverse Blank

Monitoring the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention: Looking for

a Needle in a Haystack

Key Judgments

information available
as of 15 February 1991
was used in this report.

iii Seer
W 91-10008X

February 199}

as a RS

Contents

Appendixes

A.

Summary of Confirmed and Suspect Offensive BW Programs It
Worldwide

| Biological Hazard Containment IT

Sectét_

Insets

The BWC: Checklist of Prohibited Activities —

ret vi

a

Monitoring the Biological and Toxin

Weapons Convention: Looking for

a Needle in a Haystack

Introduction
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BWC)—signed in 1972 and entered into force in
1975—is the international! vehicle for the elimination
of offensive biological warfare (BW) capabilities. Ap-
proximately 111 countries are signatories to the Con-
vention—including the United States, the United
Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, the depositories for
the Convention. |

The BWC defines and prohibits BW activities that
are deemed to have an offensive intent but permits

maintenance of a defensive capability (see inset).

Article I of the BWC is the key provision prohibiting
offensive BW activities. Such work would include
developing an organism or toxin for use asa BW
agent, producing micro-organisms or toxins to be used
as BW agents, or stockpiling biological products as

BW weapons.

The BWC: Checklist of Prohibited Activities

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention was
negotiated in 1972 and is officially entitled the
“Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Bio-
logical) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruc-
tion.” Articles I, I, and III provide the specifics of
prohibited activities:

e Article I, “... never in any circumstances to devel-
op, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or
retain: (1} microbial or other biological agents or
toxins, whatever their origin or method of produc-
tion, of type and in quantities that have no justifica-
tion for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful
purposes; (2) weapons, equipment, or means of
delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for
hostile purposes or in armed conflict.”

e Article LI. “... to destroy, or to divert to peaceful
purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine
months after the entry into force of the Convention,
all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means
of delivery specified in Article I."

« Article III. “... not to transfer to any recipient
whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any
way to assist, encourage or induce any State, group
of States, or international organizations to manu-
facture or otherwise acquire any of the agents,
toxins, weapons, equipment, or means of delivery
specified in Article f.”"

Article HI was an attempt to stop the proliferation of
biological weapons.

Ses

a

No international consensus has been reached on the
technical requirements for defensive development and
production—that is, how much agent can be devel-
oped or produced and still be considered defensive

BW work.

et

In recognition of the inherent weakness of the BWC,
the States Parties adopted a set of CBMs at the 1986
RevCon. They were adopted partly to avoid stricter

et

mrt

Moa

¢ A written declaration stating the locations of all

government-owned, high-biocontainment laborato-
ries at the P-3 level and all laboratories at the P-4
level (see appendix C).

monitoring proposals presented by several States Par-

ties. One of the CBMs adopted was a formal declara-

tion process that included an exchange of the follow-

ing data, which could be associated with BW

programs:

° A budget breakdown of all military funding for
biological research programs.

« Listings of publications on research related to infec-
tious diseases and toxins.

° A declaration for each facility engaged in govern-
ment research on infectious diseases, specifically
listing the micro-organisms being studied

of 4

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Appendix A

Summary of Confirmed and Suspect
Offensive BW Programs Worldwide

Indonesia

NUBIKA, the
Indonesian Army's nuclear, biological, and chemical
warfare directorate, conducts limited research ostensi-
bly in defensive measures to biological weapons.
NUBIKA has reportedly researched and attempted to
culture several pathogenic bacteria and viruses since
1987]

si

ra

Appendix B

Appendix C

Biological Hazard Containment

Prophylactic measures must be taken at special health
care and biological research facilities to prevent the
spread of disease-causing organisms, viruses, and
biotoxins. The US biological research community
created an internationally accepted scale of biological
hazard-containment measures conforming to various
levels of risk associated with biohazards. The four
internationally recognized biohazard-containment (or
biosafety) levels are P-1 (for basic precautions), P-2
P-3, and P-4 (for maximum biocontainment).

The P-1 biosafety level consists of standard microbio-
logical laboratory practices and safety techniques. No
special biocontainment facilities or safety equipment

are required.

The P-2 biosafety level includes P-1—-level practices
plus the use of laboratory coats and protective gloves,
decontamination of all infectious waste, limited or
controlled access to P-2 areas, and biohazard warning
signs. In addition, a P-2 facility would have partial-
biocontainment equipment for performing procedures
that have a high risk of exposure. The biocontainment
equipment would typically include class II (low bio-
containment) or class III (complete biocontainment)
biological safety cabinets, also known as hoods, that
maintain internal negative pressure to control poten-
tial leaks. The safety precautions associated with a
P-2 laboratory are roughly analogous to what might
be expected in a hospital room

The P-3 biosafety level includes P-2—-level practices
plus use of special laboratory clothing and controlled
access to the P-3 area. Ia addition, the facility would

have high-biocontainment biological safety cabinets,
also known as glove boxes, for manipulating infectious
materials. Negative pressure would be maintained
throughout P-3 laboratory areas to control potential
leakage from glove boxes and biocontainment equip-
ment. The safety precautions associated with a P-3
laboratory are similar to those used in clean rooms in
the aerospace and semiconductor industries,

The P-4 biosafety level includes P-3-level practices
plus a change and shower room at the entrance and
exit points to the P-4 laboratory and decontamination
of all waste leaving the facility. In addition, negative
pressure would be maintained in areas surrounding
the laboratory area, lower negative pressure would be
maintained in the P-4 laboratory, and still lower
negative pressure would be maintained for biocontain-
ment equipment in the laboratory. The equipment
would include either class IT] biological safety cabi-
nets or partial biocontainment equipment in combina-
tion with use of full-body personnel suits supplied with

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