Monitoring the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Looking for a Needle in a Haystack
Central Intelligence Agency · 1991
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Introduction
Monitoring the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention is the subject of declassified CIA document 0000075857, dated February 1, 1991, subtitled Looking for a Needle in a Haystack. The paper frames treaty monitoring as a hard search problem. Its vivid subtitle is the record's most memorable feature, preserved in a short declassified item on weapons treaty oversight.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Central Intelligence Agency |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 1991 |
| COLLECTION | DECLASSIFIED |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 7545 |
| VERSION | 1.0 |
| LICENSE | Public Domain |
| RIGHTS | PUBLIC DOMAIN |
| SOURCE | Internet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror |
Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000075857
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Full text
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COS226 005226 Cx) Directorate of Intelligence Monitoring the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Looking for a Needle in a Haystack An Intelligence Assessment APPROVED FOR RELEASELIDATE: 16-Mar-2009 Septet 5 SW 91-10008X p February 1991 a1 gab Directorate of Intelligence Monitoring the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Looking for a Needle in a Haystack An Intelligence Assessment Secplt SW91-10008X February 1991 Reverse Blank Monitoring the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Looking for a Needle in a Haystack Key Judgments information available as of 15 February 1991 was used in this report. iii Seer W 91-10008X February 199} as a RS Contents Appendixes A. Summary of Confirmed and Suspect Offensive BW Programs It Worldwide | Biological Hazard Containment IT Sectét_ Insets The BWC: Checklist of Prohibited Activities — ret vi a Monitoring the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Looking for a Needle in a Haystack Introduction The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)—signed in 1972 and entered into force in 1975—is the international! vehicle for the elimination of offensive biological warfare (BW) capabilities. Ap- proximately 111 countries are signatories to the Con- vention—including the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, the depositories for the Convention. | The BWC defines and prohibits BW activities that are deemed to have an offensive intent but permits maintenance of a defensive capability (see inset). Article I of the BWC is the key provision prohibiting offensive BW activities. Such work would include developing an organism or toxin for use asa BW agent, producing micro-organisms or toxins to be used as BW agents, or stockpiling biological products as BW weapons. The BWC: Checklist of Prohibited Activities The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention was negotiated in 1972 and is officially entitled the “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Bio- logical) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruc- tion.” Articles I, I, and III provide the specifics of prohibited activities: e Article I, “... never in any circumstances to devel- op, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain: (1} microbial or other biological agents or toxins, whatever their origin or method of produc- tion, of type and in quantities that have no justifica- tion for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes; (2) weapons, equipment, or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.” e Article LI. “... to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine months after the entry into force of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I." « Article III. “... not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any State, group of States, or international organizations to manu- facture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, or means of delivery specified in Article f.”" Article HI was an attempt to stop the proliferation of biological weapons. Ses a No international consensus has been reached on the technical requirements for defensive development and production—that is, how much agent can be devel- oped or produced and still be considered defensive BW work. et In recognition of the inherent weakness of the BWC, the States Parties adopted a set of CBMs at the 1986 RevCon. They were adopted partly to avoid stricter et mrt Moa ¢ A written declaration stating the locations of all government-owned, high-biocontainment laborato- ries at the P-3 level and all laboratories at the P-4 level (see appendix C). monitoring proposals presented by several States Par- ties. One of the CBMs adopted was a formal declara- tion process that included an exchange of the follow- ing data, which could be associated with BW programs: ° A budget breakdown of all military funding for biological research programs. « Listings of publications on research related to infec- tious diseases and toxins. ° A declaration for each facility engaged in govern- ment research on infectious diseases, specifically listing the micro-organisms being studied of 4 spe 5s Sef Selec Secrft Appendix A Summary of Confirmed and Suspect Offensive BW Programs Worldwide Indonesia NUBIKA, the Indonesian Army's nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare directorate, conducts limited research ostensi- bly in defensive measures to biological weapons. NUBIKA has reportedly researched and attempted to culture several pathogenic bacteria and viruses since 1987] si ra Appendix B Appendix C Biological Hazard Containment Prophylactic measures must be taken at special health care and biological research facilities to prevent the spread of disease-causing organisms, viruses, and biotoxins. The US biological research community created an internationally accepted scale of biological hazard-containment measures conforming to various levels of risk associated with biohazards. The four internationally recognized biohazard-containment (or biosafety) levels are P-1 (for basic precautions), P-2 P-3, and P-4 (for maximum biocontainment). The P-1 biosafety level consists of standard microbio- logical laboratory practices and safety techniques. No special biocontainment facilities or safety equipment are required. The P-2 biosafety level includes P-1—-level practices plus the use of laboratory coats and protective gloves, decontamination of all infectious waste, limited or controlled access to P-2 areas, and biohazard warning signs. In addition, a P-2 facility would have partial- biocontainment equipment for performing procedures that have a high risk of exposure. The biocontainment equipment would typically include class II (low bio- containment) or class III (complete biocontainment) biological safety cabinets, also known as hoods, that maintain internal negative pressure to control poten- tial leaks. The safety precautions associated with a P-2 laboratory are roughly analogous to what might be expected in a hospital room The P-3 biosafety level includes P-2—-level practices plus use of special laboratory clothing and controlled access to the P-3 area. Ia addition, the facility would have high-biocontainment biological safety cabinets, also known as glove boxes, for manipulating infectious materials. Negative pressure would be maintained throughout P-3 laboratory areas to control potential leakage from glove boxes and biocontainment equip- ment. The safety precautions associated with a P-3 laboratory are similar to those used in clean rooms in the aerospace and semiconductor industries, The P-4 biosafety level includes P-3-level practices plus a change and shower room at the entrance and exit points to the P-4 laboratory and decontamination of all waste leaving the facility. In addition, negative pressure would be maintained in areas surrounding the laboratory area, lower negative pressure would be maintained in the P-4 laboratory, and still lower negative pressure would be maintained for biocontain- ment equipment in the laboratory. The equipment would include either class IT] biological safety cabi- nets or partial biocontainment equipment in combina- tion with use of full-body personnel suits supplied with