Rightwing Terrorism - TruthH Commission I)

Central Intelligence Agency · 1981

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Introduction

Rightwing Terrorism is the heading of declassified CIA document 0000075267, dated March 5, 1981, marked for the Truth Commission. The item takes rightwing terrorism as its whole subject in two words. It survives as a brief declassified record whose blunt title matches its topic, filed among the agency's Salvadoran-era materials on political violence.

Catalog record

CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1981
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE4854
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000075267

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Full text

The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:

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Rightwing Terrorigsn

The ultraright in El Salvador has a long history of
using violence as a doliticus tool, perhaps marked most
vividly by the widespread repression and murder of cam-
pesinos following the unsuccessful peasant rebellion in
1932. In the 19606, a surge of politica] activity among
peasants and urban workers inspired the creation of many
new rightwing organizations, both official and clandes-
tine.

One such goVernment-sponsored group--the National
Democratic Organization (ORDEN)--was comprised of tens
of thousands of Conservative rural peasants and served
as a tool of the landed elites. it included many former
armed forces personnel who were part of the nation's re-
serve force, the Territoriel Service. ORDEN served prin-
Cipally as an intelligence-gathering orgenization--identifly-
ing real or suspected enemies of the regime--but it also
occasiorally took direct action egeinst then.

Augmenting the seniofficial organizations were «
variety of secret vigilante groups thet have faded in
and out of existence. Traditionally. cightwing death
squads have included civilian mercenaries, idealists
tied to particular wealthy elites, and ective and retired
security force personnel. Given the impunity with which
death esqueds continue to operate today, it is clear that
security force personnel continue to cooperate with and
participate in vigilante terror.

Information on the besdereni a5¢ organization of
rightwing terrorist gr is sketchy. A esall sreup
of wealthy Salvadorans living in Miami, however. is be-
lieved to be behind the Ridnaping and intimidation of
businessaen who have shown « thy for the civil-
ailitary rrment or for Us policy in Bl Salvador.
These viduels also may have ordered the assassina-
tions of the two Ug AFL-Cho representatives in January.
Tied to this group of wealthy expatriates are business-
a in 81 Salvador who belong to the Broad National Front.

‘Aubuisson and e@ young ultraconserve-
tive,

rated

17 April 1981

aga

Approved for Release
NOV 1993

The extreme right wing therefore has limited need
for external support, given 1ts financing by millionaire
exlles. The terror squads use a broad range of side
arms, machine pistols, ang rifles that are readily
available on the regional black market and in the United
States. The involvement of security force personnel in
the rightist terrorism ensures a further supply of arms
and license to use them. For example, the March attack
on the Nicaraguan Embassy in San Salvador by assailants
using RPG-2 rockets followed the capture of a substantial
supply of these weapons by government troops.

Membership in rightwing terrorist groups probably
approaches several hundred, but our information in this
area ie limited. Security force personnel operate on
their own or are employed in an off-duty Capacity by ci-
vilians. Mercenaries outside armed forces ranks are
also utilized.

The rumor that foreign personnel--usually Nicara-
ans or Guatemalans--are active in rightwing activities
s heard frequently, but there is little hard evidence.
Following Somozsa's overthrow, some 1,300 Nicaraguan Na-
tional Guard troops arfived in Kl Salvador, the vast
majority of whom were enlisted personne).
sugcested a large number of them were to be integrate
into the Salvadoran armed forces, but this was never con-
firmed and the numbers actually integrated were probably
quite modest. Many others may have been recruited into
the private guerd forces of elite. Members of either
group could omy be involved in rightwing violence,
but it is impossible to estimata numbers accurately.

ETE 8100 constantly
charge t Guatemalan paramilitary forces are active in

El Salvader. Contacts and consultations between right-
wing Salvadoran and Guatemalan officials do occur--and
sone civilian terrorist personne) may have trained in
Guatemala with like-minded organiszations--but there is

no persuasive evidence that significant assistance has
deen given. It seens extremely unlike! that the Guate-
malan Goverment would have authorised dispatch to El
Salvador of Yivermeent reonne), in sufti or otherwise,
under prevailing conditions.

7=

17 April 1981

Zz a aa

Nevertheleas, even prior to the self-exile of El
Salvador's conservutive economic elite, there were fre-
‘ment contacts between hardlining businesamen in Guate-
mala and El Salvador and .-me aoliciting of funds from
the Guatemalan brethren. The travela of Major D'Aubuisson
attest to continuing contacts,
have discussed the possibility of providing funds or men
to the Salvadoran right wing. Although the current level
of rightwing ectivities in El Salvador could easily be
maintained without resort to outside aid, in the event
of a major Salvadoran crisis a segment of the Guatemalan
right would probably provide concrete assistance if

asked.

Nek

17 April 1983

ane |

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