Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program; More Self-reliant,more Deadly(sanitized)

Central Intelligence Agency · 1990

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Introduction

Iraq's chemical warfare program, described as more self-reliant and more deadly, is the subject of declassified CIA document 0000072254, dated August 1, 1990. The record notes the paper as sanitized. Readers find a short declassified assessment whose heading states the program's direction in stark terms, preserved as the agency summarized Iraq's chemical effort at that date.

Catalog record

CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1990
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE32850
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000072254

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Full text

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0044 gy ee 2 ek ve ee ae ee a Directorate of + Intelligence CASH... h-LOOSSTS.... Iraq’s Chemical Warfare Program: More Self-Reliant, More Deadly A Research Paper APPROVED FOR RELEASEL DATE: 21-Jun-2011 SH 0.100521 August [990 | cory 317 34 National Security Unauthorized Disclosure Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions Directorate of , —Lop-Secrtt Intelligence Iraq’s Chemical Warfare Program: More Self-Reliant, More Deadly A Research Paper This paper was prepared by (Office of Scientific and Weapons Research, with contributions fromm! OSWR Office of magery Analysis, and Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief. Science and Technology Division, OSWR. —Fop Secret Reverse Blank August ae Summary Information available as of 7 August 1990 was used in this report. Iraq’s Chemical Warfare Program: More Self-Reliant, More Deadly The Iraqi chemical warfare (CW) program, by far the largest in the Third World, is rapidly becoming self-sufficient. By 1993 Iraq will have complet- ed several facilities that will supply nearly all of the precursor chemicals needed to support large-scale nerve agent production using raw materials acquired in the country. With optimum use of their CW facilities, the Iraqis may then be able to achieve combined nerve and blister agent production levels of about 4,000 tons per year—-twice the 2,000 tons per year they were producing by the end of the Iran-Iraq war—without having to worry about foreign embargoes of most essential precursors. In addition, the apparent integration of pesticide production into Iraq’s CW infrastruc- ture will lend an air of legitimacy to the program. Since the cease-fire with Iran, Iraq has stressed development of advanced CW agents and delivery systems. It is pursuing persistent nerve agents such as VX that are much more toxic than the blister agent mustard and the nerve agent sarin—the principal agents now in Iraq’s arsenal. In addition, Iraq probably is developing binary chemical weapons with a longer shelf life, enabling it to maintain a sizable stockpile. Iraq also is si- multaneously developing five types of short- to intermediate-range ballistic missiles that may be fitted with chemical warheads. Missile-delivered CW agents will offer Iraq greater standoff capability and deterrent value. In concert with developing a more sophisticated CW stockpile, the Iraqis are maintaining a wide range of battlefield-proven delivery options, including bombs, shells, and artillery rockets. Apparently Iraq believes it needs chemical weapons for deterrent pur- poses—primarily against Israel’s nuclear option—and as a key weapon supporting its professed role as military “protector” of the Arab world. In conjunction with CW, Iraq also has aggressive biological warfare and ballistic missile development programs in which self-sufficiency is a primary goal. The high priority enjoyed by the CW program probably also reflects Iraq’s pleasure with the results of massive nerve agent strikes against Iranian forces in 1988 and subsequent CW use against Kurdish insurgents. However, Iraqi willingness to initiate use of chemical weapons in any future conflict undoubtedly will be tempered if its opponents possess credible CW capabilities. The Iraqi CW program poses a serious threat to US forces and interests in the Middle East. There are strong indications that Iraq is prepared to use chemical weapons in a potential invasion of Saudi Arabia, even if the SW 90-10053IX. August 1990 Re RISE United States or other countries intervene. Iraq most likely would use the nonpersistent nerve agent sarin—possibly in binary form—in artillery rockets and aerial bombs on the battlefield but might also use the persistent blister agent mustard against rear-area targets, such as airfields. iv Contents Page ___ Summary Saeed ss _ ee iit peas af Background Sosa ar tte I = Indigenous Precursor Production—Key to Eliminating Dependence on ] _Forei gn Suppliers ole eee! cages Pesticide Production—An Air of Legitimacy — __ New CW Agents and Production Methods—Developing a More Potent Arsenal 7 me a Advanced Agents 7 Improved Production Methods cae = Longer Shelf Life 7 Delivery Systems—Maintaining a Wide Range of Options e 8 ee ee, Bombs, Shells, and Rockets—Tried and True = aia s—‘(isisé a ____ Ballistic Missiles—The Long-Range Option tesa 8 Ree CW Protection and Training 9 eae Outlook—-Deterrence, Self-Sufficiency, First-Use Considerations, and 10 Threat to the United States Appendixes Boa SO os = B. Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons 25 mn Cfo — ___D. Chemical Warfare Agents and Field Employment 29 E. Inset a ___ Hraqi CW Agents Used During the Iran-Irag War Bt set v —Fep-Secret-— Reverse Blank is Iraq’s Chemical Warfare Program: More Self-Reliant, More Deadly For every insect there is an insecticide. Lt. Gen. Mahir Abd al-Rashid Commander, Iraqi VIT Corps circa 1985 Now, Iraq is in possession of the binary chemical weapon. According to our technical, scientific, and military calculations, this is sufficient deterrent to confront the Israeli nuclear weapon. Saddam ” 1 July 1990 Background After nearly two decades of work, Iraq has developed the most extensive chemical warfare (CW) program in the Third World. Iraq first seriously considered developing an offensive CW program in the mid-1960s but did not establish an R&D effort until 1972. construction of a CW pilot plant facility at alman Pak (see figure 1) and a full-scale chemical weapons complex near Samarra (see figure 2) began in 1975. (See appendix A for a description of key CW facilities in Iraq.) The outbreak of war with Iran in 1980 provided the impetus for Iraq to accelerate its CW program. Large-scale production of the blister agent mustard probably began at Samarra in early 1983; by August of that year, Iraq was using this agent against Iran (see inset for a summary of Iraqi CW agents used against Iran and appendix B for details of Iraqi use of chemical weapons). Iraq’s concerted CW effort during the war enabled the Iraqis to establish a sizable and sophisticated infrastructure for R&D, production, testing, and stor- age of chemical weapons. (See appendix C for a summary of Iraq's CW program organization.) By the war’s end, Iraq was able to produce about | ,000 tons each per year of blister and nerve agents. Although Iraq had little difficulty obtaining the raw materials it needed to support such production, it began develop- ing an indigenous precursor production capability after the United States and other Western nations began controlling sales of key precursor chemicals. Construction of three facilities began near Habban- iyah in 1984 as part of this precursor production effort. Iraq also has aggressive biological warfare (BW) ' and ballistic missile programs that, in many ways, parallel its CW effort. As with CW, the BW and missile efforts are striving for self-sufficiency. Also, all three high-priority programs play a key role in Iraqi deter- rence against Israel's unconventional and superior conventional weapons capability. The 1988 cease-fire with Iran did not diminish the importance of Iraq's CW program, but it did signifi- cantly alter the program's focus. The demands of the war necessitated that Iraq’s CW program dedicate much of its resources to large-scale production of chemical weapons. Following the cease-fire, however, production of chemical weapons with a limited shelf life was no longer practical or even necessary, freeing Iraq to enhance its CW effort in preparation for future conflicts. Iraq apparently also is secking ways to better utilize its semidormant CW facilities.

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