Statement on el Salvador -- Certification Issues Before the Senate Committee On

Central Intelligence Agency · 1982

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Introduction

A statement on El Salvador and certification issues before the Senate committee is preserved as declassified CIA document 0000049413, dated July 1, 1982. The heading is cut short in the catalog but names the setting plainly. Readers find a short record of a formal statement, tied to the certification debate that runs through several Salvadoran files.

Catalog record

CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1982
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE14909
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000049413

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Full text

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¢ DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY | STATEMENT ON EL SALVADOR -- CERTIFICATION ISSUES a BEFORE THE : SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 2 AUGUST 1982 Approved for Release NOV th33 / 2 August 1982 DDCI STATEMENT SFRC HEARING ON EL SALVADOR — CERTIFICATION ISSUES Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opcortunity to discuss with you today the intelligence Issues that bear on the President's recent certification that El Salvador is making progress fn Its human rights program. I have with me today who are prepared to discuss any of the {issues J raise in more details, if you so desire. Representatives from the DIA and from the State Department are also here. Mr. Chairman, Certification issyes for El Salvador are not areas that the Central Intelligence Agency specifically has targetted for elther collection or analysis. | Nevertheless, based on reporting largely from ’ but also from a variety of other services Including will give you the Intelligence Community's assessment of that country’s performance concerning certification questions. This assessment was agreed upon by the National Foreign Intelligence Board during a meeting chaired by the DCI on 27 July 1982. #.Ithough some abuses continue to occur, the monthly rate of political deaths Is declining and the Salvadoran government and military leaders continue to work toward curbing human and civil rights abuses, and to respond to the public's Interest in participatory government as underscored by the 28 March constituent assembly elections. Nevertheless, thelr efforts continue to be hampered by the weaknesses of El Salvadoc's unsophisticated body politic. These Include arrinabllity to separate partisan and personal goals from common national priorities, and a failure to put aside ideological conflicts that {n the past have thwarted the democratic process. . Despite the rigidity of the political system and the myopia of certain of Its key _ participants, the prospects for continuing progress—while slow and arduous—seem generally positive. The civilian government has so far been characterized generally by pragmatic compromise, with the result that political, economic, and social reforms are continuing and violence has been reduced. This position has been reinforced by the military high command, which distinguished itself as the major moderating force during the fractious political negotiations that followed the election. Led by Defense Minister Garcia, the armed forces appear increasingly aware of the pescholyeer dimension of the + -: g War and cognizant that the Insurgents are the ultimate benefic les! any abuses. On the issue of El Salvador's efforts to comply with internationally recognized human rights: - We have no infor mation AAA. ! Sapien on El Salvador's civil and criminal fustice system, but some progress apparently has been made In strengthening the courts and improving enforcement of existing laws that protect a eltizenry. TE constituent assembly hes, for example, unanimously appointed an independent supreme court and is | preparing to write a new constitution. Political prisoners remanded to civil authorities, meanwhile, appear to be well-treated ond gully ere visited frequently by family members, church organizations, international relief agencies, and foreign diplomats. Persons are also held inf acilities of the military and the security forces; their treatment varies from reasonable to harsh. - Although violence remains endemic, the number of political killings is declining and is now at its lowest level since the insurgents’ "final re ‘ eee: offensive" of January 1991.! The monthly average of political deaths for that year was 510, while the 1982 rate stands at 285—a decrease of 45 percent. In our judgment, this downward trend reflects the greater emphasis on large engagements between bonafide combatants—more in rural than urban areas—since January 1981, measures taken by government and insurgent leaders to reduce indiscriminate violence in an attempt to build greater popular support, extreme rightist death squads which have been less active in 1982 than previously, and some potential victims on both es the extreme left and right going underground or into exile, ~ Senior military leaders have repeatedly demonstrated public and private concern over the need to improve the human rights conduct of their troops. We believe they recognize that official excesses alienate the civilian populace, damage the government internationally, reinforce the position of the Insurgents, and most importantly jeopardize U.S. military and economic assistance. On the issue of El Salvador's progress In achieving control over all elements of its armed forces: . | ~ The military leadership is continuing its efforts to punish human rights violators within armed fore: s ranks and to curb abuses by rightwing paramilitary forces. We believe this resolve likely has been strengthened by recent Indications that the emphasis on human rights is aiding the effort against the insurgents. During 1980 and 1981, the Army and the security Inpolitical deaths", includes deaths of civilians and ee military personnel with reports of circumstances which conform to the follo ng basic criteria: (1) not reported as criminal deaths; (2) attributed to the extreme left or government forces; (3) vietim reported apprehended (that is, taken from home or vehicle) and killed on the spot or later found dead. In addition, "political deaths" takes Into account the modus operandi of armed forces of the extreme left and e ight. It is a partial nterpretatlon since press reports—the basis (oll chee reports—do not attribute deaths to "political violence." On oec : violence may be intentionally disguised as political violence. wee [or ces qa pe: cin anded to civiltan courts some 215 enlisted men charged with assault, rape, or murder. Since January of this year, an additional 50 personnel have been arrested for these crimes and are in jail awaiting trial by civilian courts. Moreover, several civilian members of rightist death squads have been apprehended and charged with specific political killings. ~ The human rights doctrine that is now part of the curriculum for new cadets in El Salvador's military academy underscores the armed forces? growing sensitivity to the political fallout of continued abuses. The military's decision to modernize its policies and methods complements the efforts of U.S. trainers, who are schooling Salvadoran officers and enlisted men to respect the rights of civilians and improve their treatment of prisoners and defectors. We belleve the performance of U.8.-trained units is not only tactically superior to that of regular troops, but that their sensitivity to civilians has diminished popular support for the guerrillas in certain areas of the country. _ ~ Other military units, meanwhile, have begun using improved human relations techniques to inspire defections among the insurgents and enlist the confidence of the local population. Although the number of defections appears modest so far—due largely to the insurgents! strict control over their cadre and support elements—some villagers are returning to their towns and fields because of the improved image of the local armed forces. In a few cases, Army commanders have ordered their troops to spare settlements known to house guerrillas in order to provide civilian refugees with a home to return to. aa ~ The military's growing awareness of the psychological aspect of warfare has been particularly pronounced in Cabanas Department. Last year, this northern border region was the focus of intense sruerrilla activity, and government forces appeared as politically isolated from the local populace as they were militarily from the insurgents. Through humanitarian and material support

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