El Salvador: the Significance of Popular Support - TruthH Commission I)

Central Intelligence Agency · 1981

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Introduction

The significance of popular support in El Salvador is the subject of declassified CIA document 0000049408, dated January 5, 1981. Noted for the Truth Commission, the paper weighs public support as a factor in the country. It survives as a short declassified item whose title poses its theme plainly, part of the agency's early reading of the conflict.

Catalog record

CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1981
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE4785
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000049408

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The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

EL SALVADOR: The Significance of Popular Suppgrt

_ “The aritioal factor in &l Salvador now ia the military situa-
tton and arma flow. Over the medium term, er, the oampatgn to
at: from a disenchaited publica will be a deatatve factor. //

//The left came close to igniting a national insurrec-
tion early last year--well before the accelerated arms
flow--because of its popular backing. Membership in
wtremist-controlled front groups exceeded 60,000, and
guerrilla groups Were making inroads in urban labor.

The combination of street damonstrations--in some cases
drawing tens of thousands--and strikes was beginning to
a the government's fontrol of San Salvador.//

4

//the government arrested the left's momentum by
launching reforms and bv improving security measures in
the capital, but these programe have virtually stalled.

The majority of the lation, repeli the violence
on both sidey, is stil uncomaite

/ftne Filles are increasingly r nising the
drawbacks o cplinneet the populace. Previously, they
had boasted publicly of scores of indiscriminate killings
during takeovers of various towns. ‘They are now more
actively cultivating domestic support by seducing attacks
on ation cen vehestabli ed their own
radio stations.//

‘fthe insurgents, however, are not attracting much

popular support. Recruitment for the la forces
does not appear to he picking up.//

ee aeencantes
ae _ fy proved tor Releas@
; NOV iy

//There are an eatimated 3,500 to 4,000 full-time
armed insurgenta and perhaps several thousand part-time
co' laborators. Moreover, guerrilla ranks were at least

temporarily thinned by seve. hundred casualties during
the recent offanaive.// eaiany

//%t they are to gain more adherents, the guerrillas
need a spectacular military success or a continuation
yOf government insensitivity and abuse. Conversely, if
the government is able to curb the excesses that charac-
terize life in El salvador today and follow through on
reforms, it will be turn the tide and gain adherents
for its cause.//

//Goverrment leaders recognize the need to enlist
popular support. They know that failure to push ahead
with their reform rogram leaves them vulnerable. Lack
Of technical and tinanciel resources, however, and the
continuing violence have permitted little forward move-
ment on la 1 the heart of the junta's economic
progran.//

/(Most of Bl Salvador's cultivated land nas been tar-
geted for expropriation gnd redistribution, but adequate
technical assistance, fern credit, and marketing organi-
zation are rer not available. Phase one of the land
reform, redistribution of the largest estates, was largely
Completed last year. Mana nt problems on the coopera-
tive, however, have redu yields and encouraged 9
fron production of export to basic food crops.//

//Phase two, the expropriation of the medium-sized
farms has been shelved because of the impact this would
have on the country's already GQuindling Tt earnings.

letion of the so-called Jand-to-the-tiller® phase
is far off ia the future. Trained administrative and
technical personne) to « de ambitious under-
tak{ng are not evailable.//

/fthe land reform rogram has enraged the right. It
also 1s opposed by the left since it threatens to increase
peasant support for the government. As a result, gunmen

ony

eeesne

from both factions are killing peasanta on the newly
formed cooperatives and intimidating land reform admin-
istratora.//

//Deapite the pressing military problems, the junta's
greatest longer run vulnerability is violence that is
officially tolerated. The murders in November of left-
iat political leaders, including a miniater of the first
reform junta, were the work of security forces.//

//Summary execution of prisoners is a standard prac-
tice. Widespread, and oftan random, violence by private
rightwing groups is viewed as part of government repres-
sion because @re is no official move to curb it.//

//As @ result, the reputation of junta President
Luarte and his Christian Democratic Party have been
tarnished, and the conditional support for the govern-
ment--among the populace and abroad--has been jeopardized.
Many members of the 150,000-strong peasant union, the
principal beneficiary of land reforn, probably blame

government-allied thu @ murder of union lqader
Viera in January.// Gia

//U8 labor organisucions, which have strongly backed
the government and have major influence, this month warned
the government that it will lose their support if it does
not rove labor relations witin 90 days. Selvadoran
and US labor organisations want the government to open a
genuine dialogue with union leaderg--rather than what

they believe has been arrogant treatment. °
want ultraconservative officers sacked.// ead,

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