El Salvador: Election Outlook - TruthH Commission I)

Central Intelligence Agency · 1984

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Introduction

Election outlook in El Salvador is the subject of declassified CIA document 0000049406, dated February 2, 1984. The paper carries a Truth Commission note and looks ahead to a Salvadoran vote. Readers find a short declassified forecast item whose title states its purpose, part of the agency's regular political reporting on El Salvador during the war years.

Catalog record

CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1984
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE3031
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000049406

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Full text

The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:

Central
Intelligence

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NOV 1993

Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS

NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor /Consultants

PROPIN- Caution—Propristary Information involved

NFIBONLY- NFIB Departments Only

ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of information
Controlled by Originator

REL..- This Information Has Been Authorized for
Release to...

FG Foreign Government Information
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SNIE 83.1-84
| EL SALVADOR:

ELECTION OUTLOOK

; Information eveileble as of 2 March 1904 was
weed in the preparation of this Estimate

RK

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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following inteligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate: .

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the inteligence organization of the Department of State.

Also Participating:
The Assistant Chiel of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Inteligence, Dipartment of the Alr Force

The Director of Inteligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

TNS no riggreen mene genre TOT

16 Cea D'Aubuisson is
exuding confidence at press conferences and political

rallies, but it is doubtful that ARENA is significantly
stronger than in 1982. Indeed, rather than enhancing
its popular mandate on 25 March, ARENA could have
problems maintaining its 1982 voting share of 30
percent. Since the Assembly elections,

have suggested that D’Aubuisson has lost favor among
some conservative backers because of his inability to
control either the provisions! government or the
armed forces, and because of his ineffectiveness in
blocking reform legislation. QM hes
suggested that some followers recruited earlier from
more moderate parties may have defected back, per-
haps alienated by the political extremism and anti-US
sentiment associated with ARENA and, in particular.
by D'Aubuisson's notoriety as a sponsor of death
squads: The 25 March balloting will see ARENA
sharing the conservative vote with at least four other
parties, nd@D its leaders are concerned about
their prospects if they face the Christian Democrats in
a runoff. No moderate conservative party is commit-
ted now to any coalition building with ARENA. QB

15

a a

63. Under an ARENA-led coalition government,
the human rights situation would be unlikely to im-
prove. While death-squad activity might wane some-
what if the ultraright felt less compulsion to use this

- fetm of control so indiscriminately, the persecution

and intimidation of political opponents could escalate.
driving many of them to side with the insurgents or to

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