El Salvador: Guerrilla Use of Mine Warfare - TruthH Commission I)
Central Intelligence Agency · 1987
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Introduction
Guerrilla use of mine warfare in El Salvador is the subject of declassified CIA document 0000049319, dated May 5, 1987. The paper, noted for the Truth Commission, focuses on one tactic rather than the war as a whole. It survives as a short declassified record that names its topic plainly, useful for tracing what subjects the agency tracked during the conflict.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Central Intelligence Agency |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 1987 |
| COLLECTION | DECLASSIFIED |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 5656 |
| VERSION | 1.0 |
| LICENSE | Public Domain |
| RIGHTS | PUBLIC DOMAIN |
| SOURCE | Internet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror |
Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000049319
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Full text
The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:
Latin America Review Articles E! Salvador: Guerrilla Use of Mine Warfar The insurgents’ recent propasal to halt mine warfare if the Army will halt its use of artillery and acrial bombing highlights a guerrilla tactic that has inflicted heavy casualties on both military persone] and civilians. Hard hit by declining manpower and facing an increasingly effective Army, the rebels over the past two years have come to rely less on pitched battles and more on landmines to prolong the war and make it costly to the government. Army countermeasures have had only limited success, although a government propaganda campaign has generated criticism of the guerrillas. Since San Salvador has rejected the proposal, the ingorgents almost certainly will continue to use mining, and both government and noncombet civilian casustties are likely to moun As Army capabilities have grown and their own fortunes have ebbed, the Salvadoran guerrillas have resorted increasingly to the use of landmines. These weapons offer a relatively Cheap, low-risk, and efficient way to inflict Casualties on the armed forces. The guerrillas deploy landmines both offensively and defensively with devastating effect. indicates command-detong Frequently are used in ambushes to kill or maim government personnel and to damage military vehicles. Pressure-detonated Mines are concealed around guerrilla encampments to Prevent or impede government attacks or infiltration. When in retreat, guerrillas may place either type along likely avenues of approach to slow or disru advancing government I ae insurgen re Making greater use of “bouncing betty” mines, which are propelled upward about waist high before exploding, thereby increasing their | Approved for Releas@. NOV 1993 destructive potential. One version appareatly has a blast range of 40 to $0 meters and may prove effective even against low-flying helicopters. High Casualties The guerrillas’ expansion of mine warfare has taken an increasingly heavy toll on both military personnel and civilians: indicates that mines accounted for nearly two-thirds of all military casualties in 1986—1,753 out of 2,846—compared to about one-third in 1985 and a mere 65 cut of 2,508 killed and wounded in 1984. indicates that government casua first two weeks of “Operation Monterrosa”—initiated on 20 May—were high and that at least one elite battalion was withdrawn from the field because of losses. Medics! care required for those wounded by mines is expensive and further strains the government's dwindling economic resources. In addition, guerrilla mines—often placed indiscriminately near populated arcas—killed at least 45 civilians and wounded 162 in 1986 Last March, employees of the International Red Cross were injured by a guerrilla mine planted in the main street of 3 small village in Morazan Depa Sa: the Army, for its part, mines sparingly and, as a matter af policy, avoids use of unrecoverable devices. Army mines accounted for only one civilian death in all of 1986, E! Salvador: Total Military Casualties, 1981-86 Qa Thousand ‘ 4 Mine related @im et a aye Aye e 0 1981 82 83 84 85 86 A Data for losses due to mines available 1984-86 only. nr? 167 Sources of Supply sources. Moreover, the guerrillas apparently are The insurgents obtain explosives and othey some to detect and steal the Army's mines. components from a variety of sources. Many , landmines are homemade, using commonplace, bocally available ingredients, such as chemical fertilizer for Government Countermeasures the explosive agent and plastic irrigation piping for The high casualty figures suggest that government the casing/shrapnel. countermeasures are-eshieving only modest success. however, that they a and = The receipt Tt mine detectors in May other ingredients from Nicaragua and other outside — 2 Cave ements priiler shims tame es siti af PALIN eee VICTIMA INOCENTE DE MINAS DEL FMLN ie Rg 2Y SUS DERECHOS HUMA 1986 boosted Army morale, but the guerrillas have been able to thwart them either by constructing smaller devices, reducing the number of metal components, or burying the mines deepe Seca seasoned Salvadoran troops er andmines through visual observation than with the detectors. Tactical developments—moving away from predictable deployment patterns and toward greater use of small-unit tactics and irregular maneuver and advancement routes on the part of larger units—make the Army somewhat less vulnerable to established minefields. Weather also can be uted to the government's advantage, as heavy rains—commen in the region from June until September—often cause the mines to short-circui Ga The government also has taken the propaganda functioning as insurgent front groups—are increasingly vocal in condemning civilian casualties from guerrilla mines Prospects The guerrillas’ offer to forgo mine warfare—a vital, low-cost element of their “protracted popular war" strategy—suggests they recognize the damage to their interests and are being hurt badly by the Army's superior firepower. The government is unlikely to reconsider its rejection of the propossl in the near term, however, and the rebels almost certainly will continue to rely heavily on mining, resulting in mounting casualties among civilians as well as military personnel initiative, with considerable success. Posters depicting | a young girl who lost a leg to a guerrilla mine greet travelers arriving at San Salvador's international’ airport. Recent international press items have” publicized the situation, and the Catholic Church and