El Salvador: Guerrilla Use of Mine Warfare - TruthH Commission I)

Central Intelligence Agency · 1987

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Introduction

Guerrilla use of mine warfare in El Salvador is the subject of declassified CIA document 0000049319, dated May 5, 1987. The paper, noted for the Truth Commission, focuses on one tactic rather than the war as a whole. It survives as a short declassified record that names its topic plainly, useful for tracing what subjects the agency tracked during the conflict.

Catalog record

CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1987
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE5656
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000049319

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Full text

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Latin America
Review

Articles

E! Salvador: Guerrilla Use
of Mine Warfar

The insurgents’ recent propasal to halt mine warfare
if the Army will halt its use of artillery and acrial
bombing highlights a guerrilla tactic that has inflicted
heavy casualties on both military persone] and
civilians. Hard hit by declining manpower and facing
an increasingly effective Army, the rebels over the
past two years have come to rely less on pitched
battles and more on landmines to prolong the war and
make it costly to the government. Army
countermeasures have had only limited success,
although a government propaganda campaign has
generated criticism of the guerrillas. Since San
Salvador has rejected the proposal, the ingorgents
almost certainly will continue to use mining, and both
government and noncombet civilian casustties are
likely to moun

As Army capabilities have grown and their own
fortunes have ebbed, the Salvadoran guerrillas have
resorted increasingly to the use of landmines. These
weapons offer a relatively Cheap, low-risk, and
efficient way to inflict Casualties on the armed forces.

The guerrillas deploy landmines both offensively and
defensively with devastating effect.

indicates command-detong
Frequently are used in ambushes to kill or maim
government personnel and to damage military
vehicles. Pressure-detonated Mines are concealed
around guerrilla encampments to Prevent or impede
government attacks or infiltration. When in retreat,
guerrillas may place either type along likely avenues

of approach to slow or disru advancing government
I ae
insurgen re Making greater use of “bouncing

betty” mines, which are propelled upward about waist
high before exploding, thereby increasing their

| Approved for Releas@.
NOV 1993

destructive potential. One version appareatly has a
blast range of 40 to $0 meters and may prove effective
even against low-flying helicopters.

High Casualties
The guerrillas’ expansion of mine warfare has taken
an increasingly heavy toll on both military personnel
and civilians: indicates that
mines accounted for nearly two-thirds of all military
casualties in 1986—1,753 out of 2,846—compared to
about one-third in 1985 and a mere 65 cut of 2,508
killed and wounded in 1984.
indicates that government casua
first two weeks of “Operation Monterrosa”—initiated
on 20 May—were high and that at least one elite
battalion was withdrawn from the field because of
losses. Medics! care required for those wounded by
mines is expensive and further strains the
government's dwindling economic resources. In
addition, guerrilla mines—often placed
indiscriminately near populated arcas—killed at least
45 civilians and wounded 162 in 1986

Last March,
employees of the International Red Cross were
injured by a guerrilla mine planted in the main street
of 3 small village in Morazan Depa

Sa: the Army, for its part,
mines sparingly and, as a matter af policy,
avoids use of unrecoverable devices. Army mines
accounted for only one civilian death in all of 1986,

E! Salvador: Total Military Casualties, 1981-86 Qa

Thousand ‘
4

Mine related @im

et a aye Aye e
0 1981 82 83 84 85 86

A Data for losses due to mines available 1984-86 only.
nr? 167

Sources of Supply sources. Moreover, the guerrillas apparently are

The insurgents obtain explosives and othey some to detect and steal the Army's mines.
components from a variety of sources. Many ,
landmines are homemade, using commonplace, bocally
available ingredients, such as chemical fertilizer for Government Countermeasures

the explosive agent and plastic irrigation piping for The high casualty figures suggest that government
the casing/shrapnel. countermeasures are-eshieving only modest success.

however, that they a and = The receipt Tt mine detectors in May
other ingredients from Nicaragua and other outside

— 2

Cave ements priiler shims

tame es siti af PALIN

eee VICTIMA INOCENTE
DE MINAS DEL FMLN

ie Rg

2Y SUS DERECHOS HUMA

1986 boosted Army morale, but the guerrillas have
been able to thwart them either by constructing
smaller devices, reducing the number of metal
components, or burying the mines deepe
Seca
seasoned Salvadoran troops er andmines
through visual observation than with the detectors.
Tactical developments—moving away from
predictable deployment patterns and toward greater
use of small-unit tactics and irregular maneuver and
advancement routes on the part of larger units—make
the Army somewhat less vulnerable to established
minefields. Weather also can be uted to the

government's advantage, as heavy rains—commen in
the region from June until September—often cause

the mines to short-circui Ga

The government also has taken the propaganda

functioning as insurgent front groups—are
increasingly vocal in condemning civilian casualties
from guerrilla mines

Prospects
The guerrillas’ offer to forgo mine warfare—a vital,

low-cost element of their “protracted popular war"
strategy—suggests they recognize the damage to their
interests and are being hurt badly by the Army's
superior firepower. The government is unlikely to
reconsider its rejection of the propossl in the near
term, however, and the rebels almost certainly will
continue to rely heavily on mining, resulting in
mounting casualties among civilians as well as
military personnel

initiative, with considerable success. Posters depicting |

a young girl who lost a leg to a guerrilla mine greet
travelers arriving at San Salvador's international’
airport. Recent international press items have”
publicized the situation, and the Catholic Church and

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