The Fmln in Salvador: Insurgent Negotiations Strategy and Human Rights Abuses

Central Intelligence Agency · 1988

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Introduction

A CIA study from 1988 examines the FMLN, the guerrilla front fighting El Salvador's government. Its subject is double: the front's strategy in negotiations, and its human rights abuses. By 1988 the war was a stalemate, and both sides were testing whether talks could do what battles had not. The study belongs to the war's analytic record.

Inside, the front's bargaining is weighed beside its conduct: how it talked, what it demanded, and how its forces treated the people under their guns. Pairing the two subjects was the analysts' point, since a movement's record at the table and in the field shaped each other. The study shows Washington reading the rebels as a government in waiting, flaws counted.

Catalog record

CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1988
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE14942
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000049246

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Full text

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Contd laieflawnes Apricy ua Paahees ry, Wihenin 10 ATS DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE 22 November 1988 The L ] Calvador: Insurgent Negotiations Strategy and Human Rights Abuses ‘ Sunpary Recent efforts by the Salvadoran insurgency to bring international pressare on the Duarte administration to reopen peace negotiations are part of - an effort to appear moderate and accommodating while portraying the government as inflexible. In our judgment, however, the insurgents would not negotiate in good faith, but would use talks instead to improve their strategic position and undermine confidence in the Duarte government. Meanwhile, we believe the insurgency’s support among Salvadorans is waning in the wake of increased guerrilla intimidation, terrorisn, and often indiscrininate atta on civilians, especially in the capital. aa t t * This typescript was prepared by ha cae eaaaee aa Sues Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It generally reflects the views of the Intelligence Community. Approved tor Release war--probably are involved. Increased political tensions related to the scheduled presidential election next year and the continuing insurgency will likely result in a relatively high rate of political violence in coming months. We believe the guerrillas, who are frustrated by their dim prospects for a political or military victory, probably will continue to account for the majority of political killings. Positive Trend Stalls Political and suspicious killings of civilians in El Salvador--which had been declining sharply until last year--have increased slightly in the last 18 months. S cicetieas fp aractiumeicetitet came eves 280 civilians died in 1987 in incidents of political violence, a small increase over the previous year.! (See Fig. 1) Nevertheless, the overall level of deaths remains far below that of the early 1980s. Dwarfing the small increase in political killings last year was a doubling of “suspicious” murders, in which there are no clearly established political or criminal motives. (See Fig. 2). In the first seven months of 1988, the rate of killings with confirmed political motives was about the same as last year, while the number of suspicious killings has fluctuated wildly but generally remained higher than in 1987. As during the early 1980s, the increase in civilian killings has coincided with greater political and military activity by the Marxist insurgents. The querrillas' political allies are preparing to participate in the March 1989 presidential elections, while rebel front groups continue trying to atage violent anti-government demonstrations in the capital. At the same time,. querrilla military actions--most notably economic sabotage and terrorist attackasa--also have increased during the past year (see Fig. 3). Many Salvadorans--civilian and military--probably view these rebel activities as an attempt to exploit the country's more open political environment while simultaneously continuing the war.- Although government T Statistical dat typescript waa obtained are e reflect trends in political violence. ues operations since 1987 have disrupted some guerrilla activity, they have failed to make deep, permanent reductions in the insurgency. (S NF) The Guerrillas’ Record pe a car eet that the Marxist insurgents, no doubt frustrated by their inability to make dramatic military gains or attract significant popular aupport, are responsible for the majority of confirmed political killings. Guerrillas have killed Civilians for--among other reasons~--aiding the government, registering to vote, having relatives in the armed forces, or defying the rebels' frequent campaigns to blockade transportation. The rebelsa' indiscriminate use of landmines--a weapon adopted to compensate for tactical weakness--also has contributed to increased civilian casualties. Finally, the insurgents have kidnaped and murdered mayors, judges, local officials, political candidates, and civilians suspected of being government informers. For example, a guerrilla commander in Usulutan Department recently killed two civilians suspected of collaborating with the Army and put their bodies on display to ee in the area to avoid involvement with the military. A major element of the insurgents' overall atrategy is to foment unrest and violence in the cities. This includes using terrorist attacks to “bleed" government forces. Although we do not believe the guerrillas are deliberately and indiscriminately targeting civilians, their urban terrorist campaign has resulted in some civilian casualties. t- t Circumstantial similarities to death squad murders committed during the early 1980s suggest that right-wing extremists are responsible Yor at least some of the recent suspicious killings, although no one has claimed credit for them. oe ecstsceasr ee bs rs arr some characteristica of death squad activity--the use of orture, execution-style murders, assassination by groups of armed assailants, and bodies being dumped some distance from the scene of the crime--increased last year. If rightists are indeed involved, we believe they have been acting primarily out of frustration with the slow rate of progress againat the insurgents on the battlefield and out of fear “that the insurgents are participating in the political process solely to expand their urban support networks for terrorism and subversion. Despite its past association with deathaquad activity, we believe that the right-wing ARENA party currently does not sanction human rights abuses. Such actions would wreck the party's recent efforts to present a more moderate public image Fe ee and seriously jeopardize its prospects for winning the presidency next March. Indeed, we believe that, for the time being at least, even many ARENA extremists probably are cooperating with party moderates in an effort to strengthen their position and expand the party's popular appeal. Most ARENA leaders probably also are unwilling to riak the reduction or curtailment of US economic an litary assistance that might result from unchecked violence. om Nonetheless, some party hardliners may be involved in the crimes, although we lack definitive proof. Roberto D'Aubuisson, ARENA's founder an onorary president, continues to maintain close ties with Dr. Rector Antonio Regalado, the former chief of a notorious death squad active in the early 1980s, though the two avoid appearing together in public. ARENA's recent electoral triumph and resulting control of the legislature may have inspired lower-ranking party members or independent rightists to act without - official knowledge or sanction of the party. 4 e ed Forces 4 I +: -.+- that the number of politically-motivate ngs committed by Salvadoran soldiers ia on the rise. The armed forces have committed 12 of the 106 confirmed political killings so far this year--or 11.3 percent-- compared to only about two percent in 1987. While we do not believe the killings ara officially sanctioned, they may be the result of concern within the military about increased political activities by insurgent front groups. However, many of those soldiers and policemen most provoked by leftist activity probably are biding their time, calculating that an ARENA victory in the March 1989 presidential election could result in_a sterner stance against the guerrillas and their supporters. ee Members of the Salvadoran armed forces, moreover, probably have carried out at least a few of the suspicious killings. believes that frustration over the end of "state of exception” legislation in January 1987 has prompted some soldiers to kill suspected leftiats. Without the special legislation-- which suspended some civil liberties for suspected querrillas-- the Constitution permits the authorities to detain suspected guerrillas for only 72 hours before being turned over to the civilian courts. Most Salvadoran officera believe 72 hours is insufficient time to conduct a thorough intelligence interrogation and they are frustrated by the-~eourts, which jin” release suspected querrillas for lack of avidence.

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