Stability of East Germany in the Berlin Crisis
Central Intelligence Agency · 1961
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Introduction
CIA analysts weighed how stable East Germany was at the height of the Berlin Crisis, in a paper dated July 2, 1961. Berlin, split between East and West, was then the most dangerous spot in the Cold War. Weeks after this paper, the East sealed the border with the Berlin Wall. The estimate catches the regime just before that shock.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Central Intelligence Agency |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 1961 |
| COLLECTION | DECLASSIFIED |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 14873 |
| VERSION | 1.0 |
| LICENSE | Public Domain |
| RIGHTS | PUBLIC DOMAIN |
| SOURCE | Internet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror |
Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000046770
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Full text
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3 irs es ET nae risa Bh ais es DEBT r Pippa, pee BE § ice pee a i wand s Bees i d hae hina tr 2 Approved for Release Cale DEG 1993 ieee wi Bima al Line Socdieace hun ata ate 5 me a pee: peters STABILITY OF EAST GERMANY IN THE BERLIN CRISIS THE PROBLEM To estimate the ability of the East German regime: (a) to maintain domestic order and stability in the period of tension, and possible later very much sharpened crisis, arising out of the Berlin problem, and (b) to employ its military forces against Western forces under the same circumstances. SCOPE NOTE The Berlin crisis is clearly imposing heavy strain on the East German political sys- tem. Our purpose in this paper is to examine the political effect on that sys- tem of an intensification of circumstances already present in the situation. These are: (a) the East Germans have, with the decree of 13 August, set up tight controls along the borders of West Berlin; (b) the USSR appears to be moving definitely toward unilateral action on the Berlin problem; (c) the US is continuing to dis- play firmness, is taking preparatory mili- tary measures, and is engaging in a vig- orous political campaign against Soviet and East German contentions regarding Germany; and (d) in consequence an atmosphere of sharp crisis is developing which is understood to carry serious risk of war. THE ESTIMATE Elements of Stability and Instability in East Germany 1. After more than a decade of existence, the “German Democratic Republic” has serious continuing problems of popular support. It has failed to overcome anti-Soviet and anti- Communist sentiments and to engage the national feelings of the population. It has had to suffer constant comparison with an- other, more attractive and successful Ger- man state and to combat the Western influ- ence which radiates from West Berlin. Al- though subsistence has long ceased to be a problem, the East German consumer still en- counters numerous spot shortages and exas- perating inefficiencies. The East German must endure encroachments upon his per- sonal liberties and his privacy as the regime proceeds with its campaign to politicize all aspects of social life. The ruling Socialist ae : PN be eR Yi eae eee meer 2 Unity Party (SED) and its leader, Walter Ulbricht, continue to be viewed with con- tempt by the vast majority of the people. 2. Despite these formidable obstacles, the re- gime has—except for the single episode of 16-17 June 1953—succeeded in maintaining essential stability. Chief among the sources of stability is the political and military he- gemony of the USSR, which is given sub- stance by the presence of about 350,000 So- viet troops in East Germany. Memory of the Soviet readiness to use its military power to suppress the popular uprising in East Germany itself in 1953, and in Hungary in 1956—and the inability of the West to pre- vent this suppression—is a powerful damper on any inclination to express disaffection by open action. The East German security ap- paratus has increased in effectiveness since 1953 and is a further deterrent. Moreover, there are many who either have built up a vested interest in the present order or have such roots in the soil and ties to home that they are willing to accommodate themselves. For those who could not make this accom- modation, flight to the West has provided a substitute for antiregime activity and was, until 13 August, relatively easy. 3. Open expressions of discontent by the peas- antry recently have become more frequent. Last year’s sudden collectivization was deeply resented, and continuing pressure to consolidate the new collective farm system is provoking many expressions of outspoken hostility in the countryside. Restlessness now approaches unrest. But despite ma- lingering, threats to leave collectives, and some incendiarism and slaughtering of live- stock, the regime shows no sign of reversing its agricultural policies. In general, we be- lieve that while the peasantry will remain Sullen, its reactions will probably not exceed the bounds of disconnected local incidents, in part because the rural environment does not favor mass actions of resistance. 4. The regime has accorded the industrial workers a favored role because they are a semiorganized force concentrated in urban areas and therefore are the group which could most easily generate general unrest in the population. By combining coercion and incentives the regime has over the years gained some degree of cooperation from the workers. In recent months, the introduc- tion of highly unpopular labor regulations has aroused the open expression of griev- ances. But by and large we believe that dis- Satisfaction of the workers has not reached a@ point at which a direct challenge to the regime is imminent. 5. Discontent among the intellectuals, stu- dents, and professionals is widespread, but leads mainly to the individual solutions of careerism, flight, or accommodation. In the case of doctors and dentists, engineers, teachers, and others with key skills much needed by the regime, special dispensations given to offset dissatisfaction have met with little success. Regime efforts to capture the lovalty of youth have been almost entirely fruitless, and young people, including many with professional training, have constituted a relatively high proportion of the refugee flow. 6. Over recent weeks the situation in East Germany has been marked by a gradual in- crease of tension in the population. A Shortage of consumer goods has been aggra- vated by the effects of last year’s sudden agricultural collectivization; economic plans have had to be scaled down; and regime pro- nouncements on economic matters have dampened popular expectations that living conditions would soon improve. Even more Significant have been the political uncer- tainties aroused by the Berlin crisis, and by increasing concern that the escape hatch provided by West Berlin would be closed. The outflow of refugees again rose rapidly in July 1961, reaching over 30,000, one of the highest months on record. Finally, with the decree of 13 August, the possibility of flight has been drastically curtailed. On the whole, we still believe that at the pres- ent moment a major eruption is unlikely. However, the chances of local disturbances are rising, and under certain circumstances these could develop into general manifesta- tions. ea. 3 Future Possibilities for Antiregime Action 7. In circumstances of greatly heightened tension, the people of East Germany will be subjected to still greater strains. On the one hand, the appearance of an imminent East-West showdown might have the effect of persuading the East Germans that, with the outcome soon to be determined by the great powers, their best course was to await this result and meanwhile to avoid exposing themselves by overt antiregime actions. Against this consideration, it must be re- called that in previous circumstances—East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956—the buildup of hopes and fears led to popular actions which, by sober calculation, could only be regarded as irrational. 8. It will always be possible that sponta- neous incidents of violence, arising perhaps out of some very minor and local dispute, may spread into an outbreak of consider- able extent and magnitude. Such develop- ments are essentially unpredictable. They would become more likely if there were