Probable Developments in Eastern Germany Through 1952
Central Intelligence Agency · 1952
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Introduction
CIA analysts looked ahead at Eastern Germany's likely course through 1952 in an estimate dated January 2, 1952. East Germany was then a new state, built in the Soviet zone of the defeated country. Forecast papers like this one show planners trying to read a satellite's politics month by month. Most such guesses were soon tested by events.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Central Intelligence Agency |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 1952 |
| COLLECTION | DECLASSIFIED |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 31630 |
| VERSION | 1.0 |
| LICENSE | Public Domain |
| RIGHTS | PUBLIC DOMAIN |
| SOURCE | Internet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror |
Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000046768
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ap ror RABete, DISSEMINATION NOTICE 1. This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient designated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of the recipient's office who require the information for the performance of their official duties.: Fur- ther dissemination elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the in- formation for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following: e. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence, for the Depart- ment of State _ Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy . Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force Assistant to the Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission . Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff _ Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other De- partment or Agency 2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by ar- rangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA. rQ sf Aa S DISTRIBUTION: Office of the President National Security Council _ National Security Resources Board Department of State Office of Secretary of Defense Department of the Army Department of the Navy Department of the Air Force Atomic Energy Commission Joint Chiefs of Staff Federal Bureau of Investigation Research and Development Board Munitions Board wrt ARTs oem pen te NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN GERMANY THROUGH 1952 NIE~59 The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff par- ticipated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the prep- aration of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 7 Feb- ruary 1952. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN GERMANY THROUGH 1952 THE PROBLEM To estimate the current situation and probable political, economic, scientific, and military developments in East Germany through 1952. ASSUMPTION That there will not be general war within the period of this estimate. CONCLUSIONS 1. In East Germany*, the USSR is de- veloping a Communist-controlled state which is being made an integral part of the Soviet Bloc and which is being de- veloped industrially to provide a maxi- mum contribution to the Soviet military and economic potential. 2. The reorganization of the political and economic structure of East Germany along Soviet lines and the incorporation of East Germany into the Soviet Bloc are almost certainly not regarded by the Kremlin as a permanent substitute for the ultimate formation of a unified Com- munist Germany under Soviet control. 3. We do not believe that the Kremlin will give up or weaken its control over East Germany either as part of its strat- egy for attaining control over a unified Germany or as part of its effort to pre- vent the integration of West Germany *East Germany includes the Soviet Zone of Ger- many and the Soviet Sector of Berlin. The German Democratic Republic (GDR) does not include the Soviet Sector of Berlin. vith the West and West German rearm- ament. 4. As a tactical manoeuvre, the Kremlin might remove some of its more overt con- trol mechanisms including some of its military forces. We do not believe, how- ever, that the Kremlin would so relax its control over East Germany as to affect the foundations of Soviet authority. - 5. The vast majority of the East German population are opposed to the present regime. There is, however, no evidence of organized opposition. Further con- solidation of the Communist position, more complete incorporation of East Ger- many into the Soviet Bloc, and continued progress in increasing industrial produc- tion, particularly of heavy industry, will probably be the principal developments in 1952. 6. East Germany will continue to Strengthen the Soviet military potential through serving as a channel for obtain- ing critical materials and equipment from the West, through providing scientific sae. 2 manpower and research facilities, and particularly through the flow of its pro- ducts to the USSR. Uncompensated de- liveries* to the USSR in 1952 are expected to amount to approximately $1.7 billion. 7. The capabilities of the East German Alert Police, which now number approx- imately 52,000 men, are limited by inade- quate equipment, insufficient training, and low morale. The East German Air Force will probably not progress beyond the planning stage, and the capabilities of the naval force will remain minor. 8. Soviet occupation forces in East Ger- many constitute a poised threat to all of Western Europe and the Scandinavian peninsula. These forces include an esti- mated 1,340 Soviet-manned aircraft and ground forces numbering about 384,000 men, organized into 22 line divisions, which form 4 mechanized and 2 rifle armies.* DISCUSSION THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE 9. In East Germany, the USSR is developing a Communist-controlled state which is being made an integral part of the Soviet Bloc and which is being developed industrially to pro- vide a maximum contribution to the Soviet military and economic potential. The reor- ganization of the political and economic structure of East Germany along Soviet lines and the incorporation of East Germany into the Soviet Bloc are almost certainly not re- garded by the Kremlin as a permanent sub- stitute for the ultimate formation of a uni- fied Communist Germany under Soviet con- trol. 10. We do not believe that the Kremlin will give up or weaken its control over East Ger- many either as part of its strategy for attain- ing control over a unified Germany or as part of its effort to prevent the integration of West Germany with the West and West Ger- man rearmament. As a tactical manoeuvre, the Kremlin might remove some of its more overt control mechanisms, including some of its military forces. We do not believe, however, that the Kremlin would so relax its control over East Germany as to affect the founda- tions of Soviet authority. *Uncompensated deliveries include a large portion of the output of the Soviet-owned factories (SAG's), reparations, occupation costs, and other services. PROBABLE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS Current Situation 11. After the establishment of the German [Tyamocratic Republic (GDR) in October 1949, the Soviet Military Administration was suc- ceeded by the smaller and more centralized Soviet Control Commission, which governs the Soviet Sector of Berlin and maintains general supervision over the East German regime. The Socialist Unity Party (SED)— which is the Communist Party of East Ger- many — has been given all key positions in the GDR and has become the subservient executor of Soviet policy. : 12. To maintain the fiction that East Ger- many is a democratic multi-party state, the Communists have permitted the existence of purged “bourgeois” political parties, the * The Director of Intelligence, USAF, comments on conclusions 3, 4 and 8, and the supporting discus- sion as follows: “Conclusions 8, 4 and 8 give high assurance that Soviet forces in East Germany will not be reduced materially even for the purpose of preventing West German rearmament. Although there is a logical basis for such a belief,