Report on Cristiani Plan in Jesuits Case

Central Intelligence Agency · 1990

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Introduction

A report on President Cristiani's plan in the Jesuits case fills a CIA record dated January 1, 1990. The plan concerned how his government would handle the murder investigation. Few cases have pressed a president harder from so many sides at once.

Inside, the outlines of Cristiani's approach to the case are set down. He had to answer the church, the courts, and Washington at once. He also had to face an army that held the suspects in its ranks. The file shows a civilian president planning his way through a case in which every step risked a break with the men who held the guns.

Catalog record

CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1990
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE6649
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000042907

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Document 1
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PA1401034190C
900114
(Clandestine) Radio Venceremos in Spanish to El Salvador 0027 GMT 14 Jan
90
PA1301231490 and add San Salvador Domestic Spanish 132100 -- Cristiani
Names Suspects in Jesuit Case
TAKE ALL~-— Report on Cristiani ‘Plan’ in Jesuits Case
Text Superzone of Message
[Text] Attention, local and international press, we will now present a
report revealing Cristiani’s plan to try to cover up the assassination of
the Jesuit priests. 2 ae
At noon on 11 January, we carried a report on this plan, and 3 hours
before [words indistinct] appeared on a national radio-and television
network. We will now present a report, which -- we repeat -- reveals
Cristiani‘s plan to let go unpunished the assassination of the Jesuit
priests. This is a report we presented 3 hours before Cristiani appeared
on a radio and television network. ee ee ee a ee ee i
The 72-hour deadline set by Alfredo Cristiani to reveal the names of ‘the
military personnel who assassinated the Jesuit priests and their two maids
has passed, and extensive information has been circulating among ..~-.
diplomatic, political, and journalistic circles on the version the ~*’ 3
government wants to present. Cristiani will not reveal the truth... Along
with La Tandona [reference to the 1966 graduating class of the Captain
General Gerardo Barrios Military Academy -- FBIS], he has drafted a
version to try to clear the Armed Forces General Staff command of all
responsibility and to place the blame for this at the level of executive
command.
Cristiani will try to present the assassination of the priests as being
the result of a circumstancial operational error. According to the
version drafted by the Armed Forces General Staff and by Cristiani, on the
night of 16 November, Atlacatl Battalion troops had been sent to the UCA
{Central American University -- FBIS] to conduct a routine search. During
the operation, a soldier incidentally became involved in a heated argument
with Salvadoran Priest Joaquin Lopez Lopez, during which he shot the
priest, killing him instantly.
According to the story the Army General Staff and Cristiani are preparing,
this unforesable action would have complicated the routine search.
Therefore, the leader of the patrol decided to eliminate all the priests
and their two maids so as not to leave witnesses.
This is what President Cristiani and the Army’s General Staff are
preparing as their defense. To [words indistinct] this version, Cristiani
{words indistinct] guessed the declarations made by the witness who
testified about the last words of the late Father Martin Baro at the time
of the crime. Baro was heard shouting: This is unjust!
According to the version Cristiani is preparing, Atlacatl Battalion
soldiers reported the incident to General Guillermo Benavides, director of
the military academy; and to Lieutenant Colonel Camilo Hernandez of the
military academy, who in turn notified other officers, including Colonel
Armando Aviles, chief of the G-5 of the General Staff. For reasons of
personal self-interest, Col Armando Aviles passed this information
confidentially to U.S. Ambassador William Walker.
The facts, their implications, and the drafting of this version of the
story generated heated arguments between the members of the General Staff,
the U.S. Embassy, and Cristiani. Ultimately, the media learned about
these arguments, and in view of the imminent publication of this situation
in the media, Alfredo Cristiani was forced to admit in a hurry and to
openly acknowledge the involvement of the military in @ assassination of
the Jesuits. Aparepso: Re RS
PA1401034190TAKE1 - Date MAY IS74
{[Text] The main reason for coming up with this version was to {words
indistinct] masterminds of the crime [words indistinct] to find out who
the perpetrators were. With this version, Cristiani and the High Command
are trying to come up with extenuating circumstances for the trial ane

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place the responsibility:..for~the assassination of the Jesuits on mid-level
military officers. The colonels who were involved in the crime could be
set free and their responsibility would only be related to the fact that
the crime was committed within an area under their command.

This version of the crime is aimed at leaving the Armed Forces High
Command free from any responsibility and to only slightly touch the
members of La Tandona, especially Col Orlando Cepeda, who was the one who
Signed the order to assassinate the Jesuits, and Col Rene Emilio Ponce,
chief of staff. Col Guillermo Benavides, who is a member of little
importance within La Tandona, was indirectly involved in the crime.
However, the [word indistinct] is self-evident. The decision to carry out
an operation to kill popular and religious democratic leaders was made by
the general staff of the Armed Forces [words indistinct] 4 days after the
FMLN offensive began. . This operation was part of a complete
counteroffensive plan of the Armed Forces, which included the massive use
of all the firepower of the Air Force against poor neighborhoods and the
killing of democratic people’s movement and church leaders.

Alfredo Cristiani, who was taken to the headquarters of the general staff
for security reasons and assumed control of the defense plan, was fully
aware of the genocide plan. U.S.-officers and advisers were also at the
general staff headquarters at the time to discuss and approve this -
genocide plan. «00> SRI EER Bee zs Fs
The plan was implemented on the evening of 16 November. All’ labor union
offices in San Salvador were looted. The offices of humanitarian ©
organizations, political parties, and religious centers were also looted.
The plan was implemented at the installations of the UCA. The days that
followed saw a continuation of the arrests, persecutions, and
assassinations. The offices of all the [words indistinct] were attacked.
Its leaders were forced to seek refuge or to leave the country to escape
this manhunt. This is a policy for which the High Command and Alfredo
Cristiani are directly responsible. [Words indistinct] The U.S.
Ambassador and U.S. Embassy personnel are fully aware of this.

The need to come up with this version comes from the precarious
predicament that the government and the Armed Forces have found themselves
in in view of the debates taking place in the U.S. Congress to decide the
fate of aid to El Salvador, which is linked to the results of the
investigation of the assassination of the Jesuit priests on 16 November.
(Endall) 140027 MEP 291.20 14/0347z jan

PA1401034690TAK

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