Cristiani Names Army Suspects in Jesuit Murders FarabundoO Marti National Liber

Central Intelligence Agency · 1990

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Introduction

President Cristiani named army suspects in the Jesuit murders, in a CIA record dated January 4, 1990. The title ties the naming to the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front. A president naming his own army's men was a grave public act.

Inside, the suspects are identified as the president announced them. Naming soldiers broke the army's long shield of silence. It also bound Cristiani's own standing to the case's outcome. The file preserves the moment the accusation became official. The accused were no longer a rumor in the press. They were names spoken aloud by their own commander in chief.

Catalog record

CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1990
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE4411
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000042810

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The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:

Page: 15 of 78
UNCLASSIFIED

FBIS Concatenated Daily Reports, 1990

Document 10 of 40 Page 1
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED Status: [STAT]

Document Date: 11 Jan 90 Category: [CAT]

Report Type: Daily Report Report Date:

Report Number: FBIS-LAT-90-010 UDC Number:
Author(s): Alessandro Oppes; date and place not given]
Headline: Cristiani Names Army Suspects in Jesuit Murders

Source Line: PM1601104690 Rome LA REPUBLICA in Italian 11 Jan 90 p
17

Subslug: [Interview with Democratic Convergence leader Ruben Zamora
by Alessandro Oppes; date and place not given] .

FULL TEXT OF ARTICLE:
1. [Interview with Democratic Convergence leader Ruben Zamora by
Alessandro Oppes; date and place not given]

2. [Excerpt] Rome--[passage omitted] [Oppes] The Farabundo Marti
National Liberation Front [FMLN] has described the arrest of five
soldiers accused of committing the massacre [of six Jesuit priest] as
*‘‘a manipulated cover operation.’’ Basically, Cristiani is alleged to
have decided to punish a number of low-ranking officers to close the
case as quickly as possible and to end international pressures. What
is your opinion in this regard?

3. [Zamora] The fact that President Cristiani acknowledges that
members of the Army were responsible for the massacre is a first step
and definitely a good thing, but it is entirely insufficient unless
the subsequent steps are also taken. First, to identify who the
responsible parties were: This is the first important point, because
nobody can feel satisfied if only low-ranking officers are
identified. Such an act can only have been ordered by high-ranking
officers. We must not forget the murder of Monsignor Romero, for
which there were no sentences and no trials.

4. [Oppes] However, the Armed Forces High Command immediately denied
involvement in the operation, stating that it was an isolated action
‘‘divorced from any institutional policy.’'

5. [Zamora] I believe this is entirely wrong: The murder of the
Jesuit fathers cannot be considered an isolated action. Over 7,000
people have died in El Salvador during 10 years of civil war, and 90
percent of them were civilians. Political assassination by the
government forces is a constant practice. Furthermore, torture is
regularly practised in El Salvador. The Army High Command cannot fail
to know this. They cannot claim to be innocent, because they have the

Aoproved for Releese
Date Foomt 1804

UNCLASSIFIED

~

Page: 16 of 78
UNCLASSIFIED

FBIS Concatenated Daily Reports, 1990
Document 10 of 40 Page 2

greatest responsibilities for human rights violations.

6. [Oppes] Yet last month the summit of Central American heads of
state in San Jose ended with a success for President Cristiani, who
secured an explicit condemnation of the offensive launched by the
guerrillas in November, whereas no specific charges were leveled at
the government for human rights violations.

7. [Zamora] There is a positive factor that should be borne in mind,
namely, the call from the five presidents for a resumption of the
dialogue in El Salvador and the appeal to the UN secretary general to
carry out mediation to this end. But in the summit’s final document,
it is the FMLN and the Nicaraguan contras who pay the price for the
agreement among the presidents: These are diplomatic games that do -
not facilitate the restoration of peace in Central America.

~

8. [Oppes] What paths can be taken now to advance the negotiations?

9. [Zamora] Negotiations are becoming increasingly necessary. The
guerrilla offensive shows that the FMLN is a strong military force,
but also that a revolutionary attitude does not exist among the
masses. It also shows that the government army, after 10 years of
U.S. training, is an army whose military stance is defensive, not
offensive (which is the key to U.S. military strategy.) While this
all shows that there can only be a negotiated solution to the crisis,
it is also true that precisely following the guerrilla offensive (and
this is the paradox) the Army stiffened its stance against
negotiations. I believe that sooner or later common sense will
prevail and it will sit down at the negotiating table. At the end of
November the U.S. secretary of state’s assistant for Latin America
spoke officially for the first time about the need for negotiations
to resolve the crisis in El Salvador: This is an important sign of a
changing situation.

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