The Situation and Prospects in Cuba (NIE-85-2-62)

Central Intelligence Agency · 1962

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Introduction

The situation and prospects in Cuba are judged in National Intelligence Estimate 85-2-62, dated in 1962. An NIE spoke for the whole intelligence community at the highest level. Cuba in 1962 meant Castro's state, Soviet ties, and, by autumn, the missile crisis. An estimate with that number is a landmark paper, read then by the men who faced the crisis.

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CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1962
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE22342
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000028764

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SECRET NIE 85--2-62 1 August 1962 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 85-2-62 _* m{Supplements NIE 85-62) The Situation and Prospects in Cuba ne en a at ce nee whup YD oS Submitted by the RECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Concerred in by the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD As indicated overleaf T AUGUST 1962 APPROVED FOR RELEASE : 1966 SECRET NY 422 ‘ re ee é ba ' i CERO EE GY let ree err Ee ea Peers ce ale A ln a Oe * Mie use he ae okie ee meddle WARNING @ Nationol Def 10, USC, Secs. 793 ond? unevthorized perzon is ane of the United States 94, the trans- contains information offecting th prohibited. the espionoge tows, Title t which in any MOANT fo oh This material within the meaning of mission oF aevetation © erour i Eechded From wtomotic do wngroad: 9 and selasifcotion NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 85-2-62 . The Situation and Prospects in Cuba eA Me ye mms TnL Tee INS A TTT ae eer RRIF e) PRT SAR rap ETE IEG I 5 TTS I re SA Ee (eee ee eee erat ‘ E : : : ' 7 q = TABLE OF CONTENTS THE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA’ + THE PROBLEM o To analyze the situation in Cuba and io estimate the pros- ts over the next year or 50 CONCLUSIONS A. Fidel Castro has asserted his primacy in Cuban commu- nism; the “old” Communists have had to eccommodate them- selves to this fact, as has the USSR. B. By force of circumstances, the USSR is becoming ever more deeply commitied to preserve and strengthen the Castro _regime. C. The Cuban armed forces are loyal to the personal lead- ership of the Castro brothers. Their capabilities have been . and are being greatly enhanced by the Soviet Bloc’s provi 5 sion of military equipment and instruction 5 D. The Cuban armed forces are well able to intimidate the general population and to suppress any popular insur- rection likely to develop in present circumstances. They are ; pable of containing and controlling any threat h feat cee 2 in part because of agricultural and indus- trial mismanagement, Despite remedia) measures, it is un- . likely that agricultural and industrial production can be sig- a gear ana he, andl aA a ohn ah abl ata a) adhd min od me a “ . i H. The Castro regime atill seeks to lead the “inevitable” F revolution throughout Latin America, but its preoccupation i, with domestic problems tends to limit its activity in this i 2 : EGRET - : (a i af ee : Pina a = Aus a” . ate ete { .2%7 : SEGRE respect. In Latin America there is widespread disillusion- ment regarding the Cuban revolution. Nevertheless, mili- tant pro-Castro groups exist in several countries, and Cuban subversive activity could prove effective in certain unstable situations: DISCUSSION 1. Developments in 1962 have tended to define more clearly the relationships between Castro end Lhe leaders of the prerevolutionary Cuban Communist Partly (PSP) and between Castro and the USSR. For the time being, at least, Castro has established his primacy in Cuban communism, and the PSP and USSR have been constrained to accommodate them- selves to that situation. 2. Differences between Castro and the “old” Communists of the PSP devcloped in 1961 and seached @ climax in carly 1962. Castro had accepted “old” Communists in every branch of his government and had relied heavily on them for their expertise, However, he was anxious to preserve his own authority as leader of the Cuban revolution and wanted the “new" Communists—his followers of the 26th of July Movcment—-19 play a role at Jeast equal to that of the veteran PSP members. Castro was also anxious to have Cuba ac- cepted as a member of the “Socialist camp" and resented the appellation of “national democracy” (as opposed to “socialist democ- racy") which was invented for Cuba In 1960 et a world congress of Communist Party Jeaxders li Moscow. The Soviets were rejuc- tant tu make these concessions to a regime that they did not consider to be Communist and that was not urder their arm control. 3. Castro kept up the pressure for full rec- ognition, procialming Cuba a socialist state and himself a Macxist-Leninist. Meantime elements of the PSP pushed ahead as rapidly as possible to estabtish “oud” Communist con- trol of Cuba through the machinery of the In- tegrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI), an interim party set up t bring together che various political forces behind the regime and create a single dominant political party. Vet- eran Communist Anibcl Escalante, the organ- lzing secretary of ORI, was the key figure in this effort. 4. The result was a head-on clash between the “old" Communists and Castro, who real- ized that they were threatening his position and that of his loyal followers of the 26th of July Movement. After careful maneuversng a new National Directorate for the ORI was agreed upon, in which power was shifted from “old" to “new” Communists. Then on 26 March Castro denounced Anibal Escalante and by implication ell “old" Communists for seeking to dominate the Cuban revolution. §. Further reorganization of the OR! and of other elements of the regime's political ma- chinery followed, with the general effect of -strengthening the position of the “new” Com: munists. These changes, however, can by no means be described as a wholtsale purge of the veleran Communists. Many, including Bles Roca, the PSP chairman, have remained in Lmportant positions and Castro has made it clear that the differences between “old” and “new Communists are not over the goal of ¢communizing Cuba. The overall effe-t of the “Pscalante affair,” and of the changes in the regime which followed, was tne assertion of Castro’s personal Jeadership of Cuban ¢om- munis. @. Nelther the PSP nor the Soviets proved willing to contest the issue with Castro. Both moved quickly to acknowledge his authority and to reaf_irm their close ties with him. Bias Roca gave his approval to Castro’s move agalnst Escalante. & ’ SCERE4 Moscow then proceeded to ele vate Cuba in the "socialist" hierarchy by plac- ing it next afier the Bloc states and ahead of Yugostavia on the list of May Day grectings and by such minor but significant moves as referring to the Cuban premier as "Comrade Fidei.” 7. In ylelding to Castro’s desire to have Cuba brought into a closer relationship with the Bloc, the Soviet leaders have made a sig- nificant concession. That they should have done so, fully aware of Castro's undisciplined — -—~pature, Is a measure not only of the impor-— ___ tance they attach to Cuba, but also of the narrow field of choice open to them. 8. The Soviet Union has also made a con- sideralle concession in its agreement to sup ply a@ line of credit for the purchase of con- sumer goods. It has, in effect, reaffirmed its willingness to pay the increasing costs of keep ing Cuda afloat, despite the Cubans’ failures in the field of_economie reorganization and develop.nent. whole, an asset for sore tinie to come. they recognize that he will remain, on the tion now

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