The Shah's Increasing Assurance
Central Intelligence Agency · 1968
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Introduction
The Shah's increasing assurance is the subject of a CIA paper dated in 1968. Assurance here means self confidence, and the Shah of Iran had much to feed it: oil wealth, a strong army, and American backing. Judging a ruler's mood was real intelligence work, since his choices steered a whole state. The paper catches that confidence near its high water mark.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Central Intelligence Agency |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 1968 |
| COLLECTION | DECLASSIFIED |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 11908 |
| VERSION | 1.0 |
| LICENSE | Public Domain |
| RIGHTS | PUBLIC DOMAIN |
| SOURCE | Internet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror |
Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000028305
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Full text
The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:
Oy me, 7 CeiA) \a SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NATIONAL ESTIMATES The Shah’s Increasing Assurance Approval a Release Nar ae Date = ; Ne, 9-48 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGERCY OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES * ~ 7 May 1968 SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NC. 9-68 SUBJECT: The Shah's Increasing Assurance*® SUMMARY During the past decade the Shah has energed as a selfs confident potentate, determined to assert his and Tran'a pre- rogatives agninst all comers. In the economic field be will continue to press the consortium of Western of1 companies vigorously for vast amounts of revemue to fund Iran's economic advance, but eventually mutual doterest in maintaining o11 production will probably lead beth parties to an acceptable cuspromise. Abroad, his determination to extend bis fofluence in the Persian Gulf as the British depart is likely to maintsia continuing tension in bis relations with Scudi Arabia. As in the past, the Shah will seek arms support from the US, and his increasing feeling of independence will make for occusional friction between the two countries, though the Shah will continue to value his association with the US. ae 7 Cay 3) GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification + nat CMS ee ae come gee, Pee ee Ee Sc ae Be re FR te cMie aera MS a eee ‘E ietecee 1. During the past decade the Shah bas dramatically strengthened the position of the monarchy in Tran. Top governe ment figures sho had, or who espired to, am independent power base have been cut down. Parliasent, too, has been trensformed from a body representing the interests of landlords to one whose members mre nonentities owing thelr position exclusively to his favor. At the same time, the Shah has undercut the already fragmented opposition by carrying out econcemic and social reforns -4t bas favored. Moreover, his economic and military desis with the USSR bave won bim recognition at home as the foremost defender of Iran's national interest and as the personification of Tranian independence in the international sphere. 2. In scoring these achievements, the Shah has often acted against US advice. As a result, be attributes his considerable success largely to the correctoess of his policies and to hia own skili in political maneuver, This belief has transformed the Shab from 4 timorous, titular mooarch into a selfconfident potentate, determined to assert his and Iran’s prerogatives against all comers. This was symbolized by the elaborate coronation which the Shab staged in October 1967. 3. Th Shah's design for Iran is based on economic rather than political development. The original empnrasis placed oo rural uplift by the so-called "White Revolution"# in 19€2 has lately been supplanted by a fccus on industry as well as dofrastructure projects »+ especially dams and transportation facilities. The distribution of land called for in the Shah's reform program has been essentially completed; he 4s now content ° to leave the more difficult task of dacreasing egricultural productivity to the technicians who have come iocreasingly to staff the important positions in the bureaucracy. The Shah sees rapid industrialization as essential sot only to increase pros- perity and national well-being, but also to provide en outlet for the energies of educated Iranians whe might otherwise prove troublesome for the regime. Over the long term this will probably not provide a satisfactory substitute for greater political partici- pation, but for some time to come the unrest of earlier days seems under control. 3 fhe nace given to the Shah's six-point program of land reform, profit sharing for workers, eradication of illiteracy, electoral reform, natiocalization of forests, and the sale of government enterprises. It was subsequently broadened to include the Health Corps, the Develooment Corps, the village court system, nationsli~ zation cf water resources, regional development, end a program to increase administrative efficiency in government. ~ 36 nai fe adicaphed wags ek Spee nS eels Ring lala doe tas . - . ee te. oe. ea ee ee ag h. Te carry out these economic projects the Stah has sought, and is receiving, some help from foreign quarters for these pro= jects. But as many of these endeavors will not yield early returns, Iranian industry will require continuing large dnputs of foreign capital for some time to come. Tran’s rapidly rising oil revenue 4s the mcst procising source for this capital, and the Shah is determined that Iran get as much as possible. Indeed, the doubling of ofl revenues in the past five years has been largely responsible for reinvigorating the non-petroleum sectors of Iran's economy. The Iranian government has pledged to devote about 80 percent of its oll income to economic development. The Shah is now demanding that the consortium of Western o11 companies increase their liftings to guarantee Iran a Abed Theone of $5.9 billion ever the next five years -- @ gun which would mean an average irerease in reveoue of 15-20 percent a year, The companies have resisted his demands, refusing to promise a total income of more than about $4.5 billion over the five year pericd, After pressing the companies vigorously to meet his terms, the Shah recently accepted procuction levels for the year 1966 which would produce revenues of about $40 nillios less than the $865 million he originally sought. ee me eee cee 5. Although the Shah bas backed down somewhet in his innediate demands, the desue is far from settled. Negotiations are scheduled to resume in October 1958 regarding production for 1369. At this - time the gap between the Shah's desires and the companies’ offers will be far greater than in the mast. The Shab’s prestige is visibly engaged in this bargainicg process «« the announcement of the 1968 settlement was couched in ambiguous terms to conceal the Shah's retreat -- and he will no doubt press the companies even more than in the past. The companies would prefer to expand pro- duction of cheaper oi] in other countries and they too, are reluctant to give in. But both parties find oi1 production in Iran profitable and at bottom neither side wishes to precipitate a break. Thus, after ong caravs out negotiations and growing acrimony the parties are in the end likely to find an acceptable compromise. & The Shah's foreign policy is dased on assertion of Iranian independence; he wants to appear less publicly lined up with the West, although he has no interest ion abandoning bis basic Western orientation. On the other band, he is no longer greatly worried about the Soviet threat and he recognizes the political and economic benefits of improving relations with the USSR. He has, therefore, concluded economic deals with the Soviets, principelly an exchange of over $1 billion of natural gas for a steel mill and other dtens, He has even purchased military equipment, including some weapors though not of advanced types, from the USSR under a $110 million agreement and might buy more if be cannot get what he wants fron the Weet on favorable terns. Nevertheless, dt will be difficult for the USSR to translate this into political influence, aad the Sheh is likely to react strongly if the Soviets appear to be interfering in Iran's domestic affairs or otherwise threatening his interests. 7. As his fear of the