Stability of the Present Regime in Iran
Central Intelligence Agency · 1958
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Introduction
Stability of the present regime in Iran is weighed in a CIA paper dated in 1958. The present regime meant the Shah's government, five years after the coup that secured it. Stability papers asked how deep a ruler's support ran and where the cracks might open. For Iran the question would return with far greater force twenty years later.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Central Intelligence Agency |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 1958 |
| COLLECTION | DECLASSIFIED |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 11487 |
| VERSION | 1.0 |
| LICENSE | Public Domain |
| RIGHTS | PUBLIC DOMAIN |
| SOURCE | Internet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror |
Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000028304
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Full text
The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:
HATICHAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 0 MUMBER 34-5300 °° 7D Superzeces NUE 34-57) edge a 2 : ~ ne oe Seemed | * betel. 2 ve ot, ay cf ey ors, “oh, wes A ee me Fier ar ile a ‘ i - 4 “aap os a . te! Ve aa “ re ee * Gopal nis See ed weer 4 wt lc? WG Fay Soe Seg | ed eee fatuties Ov the CURECTGT OF CLNTRAL INTELLIGENCE ok ag “eee: Thi jolivcing mystcerce ersanizaiions particinat:d in sho : a Brewardcton of at estimate: Tie Central Iniedigence Agen y one she indigenes organizations of ine Desarimiay of : Shave, the Anay, he Novy, the air Porce, und The Joint Sie ae a Concurred tn By the - oe sie QiISLLIGENCE Acvisony COMMITTES Be ER AE BE or. £6 August 1958. Concurring were The Director oj Intew- aaa gerce and Rescarca, Devarinent of Stata: the Assistant Cheep 7 Y 2 ais of Saf for inteltipence, Cepcrrmert of the Army: she Liree- > : vate tor of Nuval inteliizewe,; ihe Acsstant Chcef of $ia4, iateil- d wee gence, UVEAF; and the Cevaty Director for Inteliigesve, Tie . Teint ofa ute Atom Bucroy Commission Revresen{ tire 5 7 “9 wie LAC and tia Assigtuné Osrestor, Federal Bureau of in. . tes ecliyctlon, ebsaived, the autvect beirg cutstde of thar - a ere? ade. : ed Approv d for Rel ase Date B3 JA i : se CHT ARQOAD Brest pe yc piey PO a . ee | SPE SC eVES, BLA atid eD A oy . : ' ae: Ee STABILITY OF THE PRESENT REGIME IN IRAN THE PROSLEM abet i fe crespects for stability of the present regime in Iran. SUMMARY i. tay iwult cna vrutal ovesthrow of the mnenarchy in traq shocked and frightened the Shah of Iran and almost certainly caused him to reappraise the future of his personal position and his program in Iran. There is basic and widespread dis- satisfaction with his regime, both in the a.my and in the urban population gen- erally. If he were to take dramatic and effective steps to reform the corrupt So- cial, political, and economic system, he might be atle to maintain his position for some time to coime. We believe, how- eves, that his character and situation are such that he is unlikely to take such drastic actions. 2. We believe that the present political situation in Ivan is unlikely to Jast very lon. The most probacle development is een ph uv certain eulitees elements, poss ty in collaboration with civilian ele- ments desiring liberal reforms, to force the Shah back into the role of 2 constitu- tional monarch. In its initial stages at SE least, such a movement would almost cer- tainly not aim at the overthrow of the monarchy, nor would it te ultra-nation- alist in character. Although this move- ” ment would probably effect significant po- litical reforms, it is doubtful whether it would be much more effective than the Shah in satisfying the expectations of the people for broader economic and social reforms. Its leaders would probably con- template no basic changes in Iranian for- eign policy. It might cause the Shah to flee the country, even though it was not ~ intended to have that effect. 3. The possibility of a coup to overthrow the monarchy cannot be disregarded. On the whole, wa think such a coup unlikely in the immediate future, because we be- lieve that the army does not now desire it. But if in the reasonably near future there are no substantial reforms of the Tranian political, economic, and social structure, we think that the overthrow of the monarchy is likely. a ae 3 4. During the rast two tears the Ghat oi Iran nas succeeded in consolidcting all power un- der ais norsonal authority, and today he con- trols even the day-toniay iunctions of govern- meni. «At the same time, his personal prestige has provressive-y declined. He is criticized for the continuance of near-Jeudal economic and social conditions in the country. In spite of his well-intentioned public pronouncements concerning social and economic rerorms, there is today little beller in the country that his ule will bring such refornss. &. Although a facade of representative gov- ernment has been pressived it is regarded by the vast majority of politically conscious Traniangs as 2 inrce. Etecticns are strictly comroited, debate in the Maitis is united, and hous senositie elegtents are suppresicd aimed divests and ecsasership. Osnortuni- dea Jog colitical chpressien and responsibilty have dvcvecsed over the past wo 'ears. g. At the same time basic eecnomje and politi- cal dissentent hus mounted as the total wealth ef che country bes increased. It is the pop- cher > bef, Ircn that the country's growing Jbavsehues dave gone muuuy to enricn tne ruling class. Actuclly « sizeable proportion ur these revenues has gone into the Plan Or- ganization, but the results, although not in- significant, have fallen so far short or the optimisiic expecLlations of the pecple that the ne? political impact has been adverse. Wealth is concentrated in the hands of a smal! group. Tine growing exnectations of the urban musses for an improverment in their standard of Hv- ing, which are not being met, constitute an Increasing source of discontent. Flagrant corruption and nepotism continues through- our the government, and the predatory eco- nemic activities of the rovai family and of the cvurt vircle evoke widespread resentment and disgust, 7, In tais situation & majority of the politi- cully articulate population of Tran has little faith in the regime. Many, including some conservative military Jeade:rs oad memvers of the ruling tings. feel that the Shah has been inconsistent and Indecisiva, and has shown himseif Incangole of running tie couniry em. cicsntly. Some feel that the institution of the Tonarchy is cutmeded and that a diderant form of government is needed to make Ivan a dynamic and pregvessive country. $. Although itis clear that there is widespread disafiection, we have only limited knowledge of the organization, membership, and military suppecst of existing oppcsition grouss, Former Prime Minister Mossedeq remains a sjmool of nationalist opposition, although he is not new politically active and is unlikely again to as- sume a position of reel leadership. Several diferent nationalist croups are known to est and to Have been in Loison from time to time. We do not know of any group of any political complexion which is now capable of effecting a successful coup. Yet it is entirely pessibie that such @ group exists, especially in the military. 9. The egal Tudeh (Communist) Party, and the Arab and Kurdish minorities will probably remain potential sources of trouble for any Tranian government. The Tudeh, though greatly weakened since the fall of Mossedea, remains covertly active. It could probabiy disrupt ol] operations in the Abadan arca if it was Supperted by radical Arab nationalist pressures. Pan-Arab sentiments In tha Aba- dan area and 3 revived Kurdish independence movement in the northwest could contribute substantially to chaos in Tran if the central government icst contre] of the situation. 10. Role of the Military. The stability of the Shah’s government depends, in particular, upon