Short Term Outlook for Iran
Central Intelligence Agency · 1961
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Introduction
The short term outlook for Iran is given in a CIA paper dated in 1961. Short term papers judged the coming months, the span where forecasts stand the best chance. Iran under the Shah was then a firm American ally on the Soviet Union's southern border. Nothing in the title hints at trouble, and this account claims none beyond the paper's own scope.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Central Intelligence Agency |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 1961 |
| COLLECTION | DECLASSIFIED |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 9338 |
| VERSION | 1.0 |
| LICENSE | Public Domain |
| RIGHTS | PUBLIC DOMAIN |
| SOURCE | Internet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror |
Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000028300
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Full text
The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:
were aa Fe add ail ape yp Rye rg ET ere Sy er ad a a. ee So es SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 34-2-61 (Supplements NiE 34-41) ehrutted ty the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTFIRIGENCE fhe follan ing Intelligence arqunise cvs serine pated tf the preparation oF hts eauimate, Tae Center. fereccraence AGtAcy ond the wntectigence urgan cafiong of the Beperiments of State, (ae Aria, the Narw. (he Air Force, Oo renee, and The dom SieF Coneurred in by the ENITEN STATES INTFLLIGHSCE MPARD on 22 May Poel. Concwering were fhe Dvectes of fe tellt> gence aud Rrseares, Department of siate, the aarstant chic! of See for fagelligence, Department af the ate, CAG Ast. ant Chief at Naval fiperalicns ajafeileoence’. fiepertment of the Navy, Che auprant Calet of Staf, suteligence, uSaF: the Perector for guredi:gente, dorm Stag. the Asaatan’ to (he Secretary of Velenie Spetval Operations. eng the Duvecior of the National Secwrtly Agency The Alomir Fee gy Cam mise won Representative fe rae USLA, and the teenstend Meector, Federal Anreut ap iacesdigaiton, abstained, Re re speck Drang ousede of ther poredictarn. Approved for Release Date cag Se MRED Sp Scape tre ine eas Bt ‘ ; a ie a Age lS 3 = ff ein woe Oe a name re ee ere ae © , R “ r nN SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK FOR IRAN THE PROBLEM Ty estate the short-fer vutluok for stabuity in Tran in the light of recent political changes. THE ESTIMATE 1 The estimates of the iundumental forces and trends i fran contained in NYE 34-51. “The Quifvak fat Iran," dated 28 Februaty led}. remain valid However, tiny unrest In the geuntry, &5 fost recently tuunifeated 10 dornatatrations an Tehran, the targest since wi gadey's May, and by the cufisegural £a¥- serine stad chances, mcicades That pressures vtilwd pont, 2 fn this satuatiaa, the Aan government. acuch came to power on & My. intraduces 3 new ek ment, | Prime sinister Ali Amim is 3 artieknownecriiie af the Shah and recent gave eriments, and a propancnt uf evolutionary referin for iran, He awes his present positiaa te the faet ehat the Shah ws convinced thal in the crisis AMINE WAS the only man accept able to the mubtory, the nationalists, and the conservatives, and Uherefore able to prevent the situation from dererieraling furihet.: Amuni's announced program includes & strung CAMPAIED CATS. carruption, and fut political, admuinustmive, fiscal, and judicial reforms. and implementation of the fand distrbuten law. g. Amini’s most UrRent problem will be is manta Vas aceeptabiily while achieving euficient authority as Pame Minister to cope with the financial aod administrative mess he “bat fhe SMAYS Eeghte ITAY fe revehing 3 has inbented and ine touchy political and ingal provlems areated by dissolution of the Mayits, +Parliament) and pressures for early rections. He ‘wetil also be confronted with greater public ex pressious of aycontent made ragsibie BY Certain conecssions toward freedom bf the pres ared assembey “& hich he has made! AMINE iS aM viicet ins aamaimstiraior and has a owide range of personal ecntacss amen po eal and mlary braders, though Ay ur gated poliistal amiowing., fis character suceeris Gat he wilt make & more Serious, esfort thas hus predecessors tO avaid subservi- chee 2 the Shah and to carry out his program. $. Thess. SE was apparently Inghtened by Une recent crs inte delegating considerable aue thority lo Anam, although he bas sought ta retain elese cuntrot of the armed forces. The Sha pecbubly reqards this delegation as only temporary. since he strongly believes if the necessity ef concentrating power an his oan hands He asextremely skilitul at manip: wlating fachens and feadcrs, and nu Prime Shinister ginee Mossadegh has bec: able to stand up to Rem. Shcula4 Aminy Se Able Lo stauihze the situation sufficantiy to enable the Shah to tecover from his present ifigie. the Eatter wil move to resume the dominant positioa, 2. he concluded that He could no longer cxercise *such dominatien, he might abdicate and leave the country rather than pecame a mere fig archead. £S- bakene yt . aan pe nnee me oe eemeee Pree ee tol en Se ie ee Toa sé eee peers oe SE pe me OO % Derma a muhtary ce which mht aust einer the Shab or Amini 6 both, ian batiey prnbabhe thet sumer eb daker Uscer present tei: rand Cola baron wldevelop inte a struncele for pearer between Ubem, Tt gs amajassible at present to estimate the duratbon ar outcome of suena struggle, 6. The Pramian nutitary will be a crucial Git. tor im Tuture develupments. tains a number of rontictieg fachons and ideologies, Many of the punior and middle fevel officers, ata peobably a few af the top ranks, are sympathetic lo the kind of reforms included in Amuina’s program. On the othet hand, dhe upper echelons of the officer corps hase a vested interest iA the stafus quo, which is Reeessatily Uareatened by such refarms. Althouga they acquiesced oA Amati's appoint: ment, they are already apprehensive regard ing the trend of evetils. * The nalonaliscs, who have become increase ingly active poliicalty during ihe fast year, we! alae be a Key factes, sithoush they feo Gooreent a variety of pants of view. Tie more racial ef them will al.nost qeftainiy eu pose Amun: from the weinning.. Some of the nadecutes May Work with him as fone as they retain, hope that he will move toward there ab- preuves. Cae of Arunis major problems wilt be to acqinre enougit support among urban hruonahsts to weaken ther capabuity lo aye ply pressure againsd the eegime as they have dane un the past cight months. A major source of friction in Amina’s celations wih the Nalionahsts Wil be the timing and conduct of the ciections. B The franian Communist Party ithe Tudefil is het now a major political factor. It has been hurd hit by SAVAK and almost all of its leiters are in jad oc exile. For the next year ar si. at feast, it as not tikety to try tu rome out in the open as it did in 1953, but pol» abty wif become more active in trying to pene: trate nauanalist groups. In Lhe even? of Sus+ ted political disturbances, would pcb ably be atte to reconstitute itself and might emerge 34a majur force. However, it Cutt: & PMternab tarters coubl iw have a syrife fant edfeet ery Tine Eainiaee seer’. Us sth port will by an aportant daoet tos Amon but vnly hits given in auch a Way ty avoid ins bong “iiely taeled ba symerely on Amette van took” Morst oo military elements would probably aetkK te amund out US reaction wes takeover bs them before acting. 10. Communist propagsiida already attack- leige that Adnan government, chnine that i is merely & OS crewhod tesigmied ta store up the corrupt resume vt the Shan. Pne Saviet Une ioteprobsably teebs €hat, Wothe dena renime is quickly disyreciivd ead falls, (he trend toe aard 2 revolutionary upset in fran wou'd by accelerated Huwevet, should th? Amini Zev ernment show sirenait and staying power, the USSit mi,ht experment with 4 sotter line, offering econumic aid and posstbly some polite