Current Developments in Iran

Central Intelligence Agency · 1951

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Introduction

Current developments in Iran fill a CIA paper dated in 1951. That spring Iran nationalized its oil industry under Prime Minister Mossadegh, setting off a crisis with Britain. Current developments was the right title for a country moving week by week. The paper dates from the opening of a struggle that ended in the 1953 coup. Oil, pride, and foreign pressure all drove the story that year.

Catalog record

CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1951
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE14855
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000028298

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Full text

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Apis * WD naciae y, SE-6 Published 22 May 195% CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY a I f I i i { ‘ ' 1 j Approved for Howse | i Date 2.9 s1AN 19G game { iL f : ‘ -: _ Se eS nares aa rer ey a 8 ‘ cS is fe peek Ne RE A Se ge mere, Bitar are 0s Se ee Se 5° reer or % - Eee ' 4p" ae Gey “ Pa sce - ez wo 4 5 - ee a wate) Be te ad ene ee hae ee a A at te eh mm a ae a Capt Z ot cae Poa apt idles gel Caled atte, Maal, SAINT SOOPER soe a ae a ao E | } YE i : * id Fi Zi SPECIAL ESTIMATE 5 q CURRENT DEVELOPMFNTS IN IRAN : Number 6 ] Published 22 May 1951 a ' The Intelligence organizaticns of the Departments of Sate, ihe Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Stalf pare ticipated in the preparation of this est{inale, All members of the intelifgcence Advisory Committee concurred in this ‘@ailmate on 18 May £951, except as noted by the Director ef Intelligence, USAF, on page 2, 4 Si eee be iit ar PE OS ee er SO Arak eS Seren ¥ a: Ree peae a ee a ST eee ‘ge Vad earns 2 bet a ata alee a ae an a le . PS oe oe oe ee + CURRENT DEVELOPMENT IN LRAW CONCLUSIONS 1. The clash of interests hetween fran and the UK over Tran’s ofl resources has reached a tritical stage with the elevatior. of Muhammad Mossadeq, ihe Jeader of the ullra-nativnalist National Front group, to ihe premiership. Although @ real effort will undoubtedly be made fo reach a compromise satilement, 2 solution will be achleved only with great difficulty, In any event, there ts little indicakion that Mossadeq and the Anglo-Jrarian Ol] Company (AIOC) will modily their respective stands In sufficient time to permit an early Rettiement Gf the .ssue. 2, Although there are important elements opposed to Mossadeq, It is untikely that he can be removed from power so long #5 the oil question remains a burning issue, exsept by violence OF by the establishment of a semi-dictatorial regime under the aegis of the Shah. In the present highly inflammatory state of franian public opinion, an attempt to fet up a non-parligmentary regime would involve grave risks which the Shah has thus far shown ho willingness to take. 5, Asa result of the present tmpasse, tLe following eritical develop- ments may occur before & getiiement is reached, a. Mossadeq might take physical possession af the of! instal- lations now onerated by the AIOC. He may =is0 require the British employees of AIOC to Jeave the country. Derdibeime auasls mach sett enki tap akee come &. There is a Serious possibility that the tanding of British troops in southera Iran, for whatever reason, would be taken by the USSR as a pretext for sending its troops into northern Ira, d. Inthe event of further de monstrations and violence, which may well occur at any time, the Tuden Party might be able to seriously undermine internal security, This danger would be increased if, as | {5 possible, Moss2deq legalizes the status of the Tudeh Pa:ty or is unwilling to use iranian armed forces to maintain order. e. The Mow of Iranian oil to Western markels, which was recently curtailed for avout two weeks, might be again interrupted by an recurrence of strikes in the oll field area or by a, b,c, OF d above. 4. Any intensification of the current crisis would give the USER added opportunities for exploiting the local unrest and might eventuatly enable the USSR to deny a large part or the whole of Bhe Iranian ou supply to the Westerh Powers.* a * it is the view of the Director of Intelligence, USAF, that this para- graph should read as follows: “4, A continuation of the current crisis would greatly erhance the capability of the Soviet Union to deny mere and possibly ail the Iranian of] to the West through exploitation of the activities ot non-Soviet elemen's. whether or not the British attetnpt to resolve the current issue by the use of armed force, possible realization of an important Soviet objective -- acquisition of more oll -- will have Seen greath faciiltated.” = Ps ee ek a * TE NT TT of ae ae Pe oe arte ma Ae 4 ae pei RSINORAT EET TG Sy WEA eee ee Ter Se B 7 pune | ath ae Pea a ei eg ae Ne re pee seem cara ee ee ee a ce DISCUSSION 1. Mohammad Mossadeq, Iran's new Price Minister, Is an extreme nationalist. He will attempt to curtail severeiy fureign influence in iran and lo adopt a neutralist policy toward she East-Wresi struggle. As he is also an impractical Visionary an? s poor eda-inistrator, it is unlikely that he will do very inuch to sotve ihe country’s critical economic and sociz! problems. Nevertheless, because he i5 an astute . politician and has strong popular Support on the olf issu» at least, he will probably not be easily displaced while that issue is still un- Settled. In internal affairs Mossadeg has ¢riticized former Iranian governments for their failure lo achisve social benefits for the people and has cpposed measures designed to restrict freedom of speech, assembly, and the press, Politically, he has urged that the Shah be Stripped pf power and that the Majlis become the dominant factor in the government, However, he does not believe that the present members of the Majlis truly represent the interests of the Iranian people and advocates electoral reform, 2. Mossadeq Is at present Ina strong political position, despite the dacts that he has few personal followers fn wie BRiajtis or in the traditional ruling class as a whole and that he Is disliked and dis trusted by the Shah. Untike his predecessors, he is not dependent on the Shah's favor or on factional politics in the Majlis, He his come fo power as the leader of a national movement which has aroused intense popwar support. This circumstance has caused the Majlis to nominate him lo the Shah and compelled the Shah to appoint hin te office. Fundamentally his strength derives from, and is in direct Proportion to. the intensity of feeling against the Brilisa over (he oll issue. Although other critical problems wilt Piague his adm:nistration, they are not likely to cause his downlal! so forg as the oil crisis remains a burning issue, Mossadeq'’s camprizn against the AlOC has had ite support not only of his National Front group but also of the FedayanIsiam (the Smailterroristgroup of religious fanatics who were tesponsihle for Razmara's assassination), the ihe cal Tudeh Communist) Party, and probably the great majority of Iran's laborers, trades» men, and students, who can Significantly affect political developments eee a ee het ceo

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