Probable Political Developments in the West German Situation During 1952
Central Intelligence Agency · 1952
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Introduction
Probable political developments in West Germany during 1952 are forecast in a CIA paper dated in 1952. West Germany was three years old, led by Chancellor Adenauer, and still occupied in part. Its politics pointed toward joining the West in trade and defense. A forecast for 1952 judged whether that young state would hold its course or swing toward neutral ground.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Central Intelligence Agency |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 1952 |
| COLLECTION | DECLASSIFIED |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 23837 |
| VERSION | 1.0 |
| LICENSE | Public Domain |
| RIGHTS | PUBLIC DOMAIN |
| SOURCE | Internet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror |
Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000027631
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Full text
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ah Dee RG baths aaa eR a SR sy | Se i ia lie A aii si gttcctemcite oe 8 Sasipilt ey Sek Sa ea ed AL aga eRe Aube tte lt ES ge cory no. -~~ SECURITY INFORMATION. - 7 TRPART Cory . NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. ESTIMATE PROBABLE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WEST GERMAN SITUATION DURING 1952 nC << a € € <f oO STaiEs oF AY NIE-57- Published 12 February 1952 al one ee enews See mean EOE ee ear se ee er eee 8. ae Er DISSEMINATION NOTICE 1. This copy cf this publication is for the information and use of the recipient designated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of the recipient's office who require the information for the performance of their official duties. Fur- ther dissemination elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the in- formation for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following: a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence, for the Depart ment of State ros 8S As oS partment or Agency . Assistant Chief of Stafl, G-2, for the Department of the Army . Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy . Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Depa. ‘ment of the Air Force Assistant to the Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission . Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff . Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other De- 2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by ar- rangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA. DISTRIBUTION: Office of the President National Security Council Nationa] Security Resources Board Department of State Office of Secretary of Defense Department of the Army Department of the Navy Department of the Air Force Atomic Energy Commission Joint Chiefs of Staff Federa! Bureau of Investigation Research and Development Board Munitions Board NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ‘ | ‘ ’ | i : PROBABLE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WEST GERMAN SITUATION DURING 1952 NIE-57 The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff par- ‘ticipated with the Centra) Intelligence Agency in the prep- aration of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 11 Feb- ruary 1952. See, however, footnotes of the Departments of _ State and the Air Force to paragraphs 8, 23-24, and 33. ‘ ge A PT PE LET PL ES St AA Ne i PROBABLE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WEST GERMAN SITUATION DURING 1952 THE PROBLEM To estimate probable political developments in the West German situation during 1952, with particular reference to the likelihood of the conclusion, ratification, and putting into effect of agreements to rearm West Germany and integrate it with the West. ASSUMPTION That there is no general war in this period. CONCLUSIONS 1. The Adenauer Government will prob- ably remain in power during 1952. 2. The gravity of the issues which remain to be settled, together with the disturbed state of opinion in France as well as in West Germany, make the outcome of the present negotiations between West Ger- many and the West uncertain. 3. However, while the Adenauer Govern- ment will continue to demand virtually complete equality and sovereignty as the price of completing the “contractual” agreement with the Western occupying powers and the agreement to enter a European Defense Community (EDC), we believe it highly unlikely that Aden- auer will permit the negotiations to lapse. 4. We believe that, if the Saar issue can be deferred by some formula which will save face for both France and West Ger- many, the Adenauer Government will sign the contractual and EDC agree- ments, provided: a. that any restrictions on West Ger- man military production are to be seli- imposed or, if contained in the EDC agreement, are applicable, at Jeast in form, to other EDC members; bd. that West Germany is not explicitly charged with the costs of maintaining US and UK forces in West Germany (hither- to charged to West Germany as occupa- tion costs). 5. In signing the agreements, Adenauer will undoubtedly expect that West Ger- many will be immediately linked with NATO through EDC and will be ultimate- ly admitted to membership in NATO, and that West Germany will receive substan- tial US economic aid. 6. On balance, we believe the West Ger- man government will ratify the EDC and contractual agreements. 7. In the unlikely event that the Bun- destag failed to ratify these agreements, or in the event that the Constitutional ee 1 : | soecey 2 Court rendered an adverse decision on the constitutionahity of rearmament leg- islation and the Bundestag failed to pass the necessary amendments to the Con- stitution, the West German government would almost certainly be politically un- able to reopen negotiations with the West on integration and rearmament during 1952. 8. New Soviet and/or East German over- tures for the unification of Germany might delay completion and ratification of agreements for integration and re- armament, but probably not beyond the end of 1952.* 9. It is unlikely that the present tactics of the USSR with regard to Berlin can seriously affect the integration of West Germany with the West. Stronger Soviet action against the Western position in Berlin, or Soviet threats to take action against West Germany, would be unlike- ly to have an adverse effect on the West German attitude toward rearmament and integration with the West. 10. Under any circumstances it is ex- tremely unlikely that rearmament can get under way in 1952 on any substantial scale. DISCUSSION The Present Situation 11. The integration of West Germany with the West is dependent upon the solution to three interrelated problems, now in various Stages of progress as follows: a. The Schuman Plan for coal and steel, The Treaty implementing this Plan was signed in April 1951. Jt has been ratified by West Germany and approved by the Neth- erlands Jower house, the Belgian Senate, and the French Assembly. Italy and Luxembourg have as yet taken no steps toward ratification. b. The European Defense Community (EDC), the out-growth of the Pleven Plan. Discussion of a draft treaty to create this Community is proceeding, with the objective of agreement on the main lines of the treaty by the time of the NAT Council meeting at Lisbon in February 1952. * The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, does not concur in this conclusion, but in- Stead believes that It is unlikely that any Soviet or East German unity propaganda moves could ma- lerialy delay the West German rearmament pro- gram or the integration of West Germany with the West. It is the view of the Director of Intelligence, USAF, that a Soviet withdrawal from East Germany could delay West German rearmament for an ex- tended period. c¢. A “contractual” relationship between West Germany and the Western occupying powers. Preliminary agreement was an- nounced on 24 November 1951, but difficult issues remain to be settled. 12.