Outlook for the Syrian Situation
Central Intelligence Agency · 1956
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Introduction
The Syrian situation has its outlook assessed in a CIA paper dated in 1956. Syria in the fifties changed governments often, and leaned ever closer to Egypt and the Soviet bloc. An outlook paper had to judge a capital where today's rulers might fall by spring. The entry keeps one turn of that restless decade in the agency's own forecast form.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Central Intelligence Agency |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 1956 |
| COLLECTION | DECLASSIFIED |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 7107 |
| VERSION | 1.0 |
| LICENSE | Public Domain |
| RIGHTS | PUBLIC DOMAIN |
| SOURCE | Internet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror |
Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000026760
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Full text
The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:
chal a 65398 November 3956 “ys Pi ~ a akin" “NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FETA ee ee NUMBER 96.7-56 2 : os pnRECTOR OF OENTRAL INTELLIGENCE eee ae ees " The following tntelligence organisations ‘cactictsated in the * ate + o wy ‘preparation of this estimate: The Central InteMigence Agency - 8 pees ' and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of ; Bote ae ae - oe D1 Bate, pe Areeu NaN OCNs ee Bind ore) Sam Fhe tort Sta, ory. —_ i Sens Dee Concurred in by the. — a BO sunt oes So teks 9)” EN PRLLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE gee SS on 16 November 1956. Concurring were the Special Assistant, .2 00 6S : “Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant CAlef of ~ : ee a : Biag, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of bea : Haval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and 2 Yt ee woe "> She Deputy Director for Intelligence, Fhe Joint Staff. The os) | ; ~ " gtomic Energy Commission Representative to the TAC, and the ~ 5). 7° Pa ba : Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, 6.95 7+ * i . : an : ae ten ene Ce em em Be a 4A 1 2 7 ; proved £ mee AS aw vee \ te , ‘st ae . . OUTLOOK FOR THE SYRIAN SITUATION THE PROBLEM To assess the situation in Syria with particular reference to possible moves by: (a) the USSR; or (bd) one or a combination of the following powers: the UK, France, Israel, Iraq, Turkey. DISCUSSION Syria’s Present Position 1. The highly unstable but strategically lo- cated state of Syria has long been both a major target and an active arena in the power struggles in the Middle East. While previous- ly Soviet influence in the area was exerted chiefly through Egypt, the USSR is now focus- | ing direct attention on Syria as well. Soviet efforts are enjoying a large measure of suc- cess, primarily because the USSR is able to cater to the desire of key elements in the army and government, backed by widespread popu- lar opinion, for support against Israel, Iraq, and the West. Sentiment in Syria in this re- spect has become even more intense as @ result of the attacks on Egypt by Israel, the UK, and France. 2. The latter three powers, in turn, have long been troubled — not altogether for the saine reasons —~ over Syrian trends, and the frus- trations they have recently experienced in the Middle Ecst, taken with the USSR’s cur- ent forward policy in Syria, have added sub- stantially to their concern. Their fears STe.. shared by Turkey and Iraq in particular The Present Internal Situation 3. Those Syrian groups which Jean toward the West were on the defensive even before the British-French-Israeli sction in Egypt, and are now increasingly overshadowed by leftist- oriented, extreme nationalist, anti-Western politicians and theix counterparts in the Syrian army. The action in Egypt appears to be solidifying control of the army -~ the locus of power —in the hands of the pro- Egyptian “little RCC” officer group led by Lt. Colonel Sazraj, head of Syrian intelligence, and the army followers of the leftist-oriented Arab Socialist Resurrection Party (ASRP) and the Communist Party. Despite dissen- sion within the ASRP, the pro-Soviet elements 1 are still in the ascendant and appear to be ce, Stronger Soviet influence in Syria would moving toward consolidation of their control open up greater political and subversive op- over the government, The latter are now portunities in the Arab world. using their power to maintain a strict censor- og. Further Soviet influence over Syria would ship of news media and to exclude all but ex- provide additional means of exacerbating treme nationalist and pro-Soviet propaganda. ‘Arab-Israeli tensions which the USSR can A purge of antileftists from positions of in- — exploit in pursuing its pro-Arab anti-Israeli, fluence may be in the making. and anti-Western policy. : 4. The relatively pro-Western parties —no- tably the Porulists and Nationalists — are givided, not well-organized, and plagued by weak leadership, Although nominal conserva- tives hold major offices in the government, some of them, including the president and prime minister, are currently riding the left- ist wave. Others are intimidated by the ever present threat of an army coup, of antigov- ernment demcnstrations and strikes by the leftist-controtled “street” and labor’:unions, and by the dangers of appearing to be agents of the West or traitors to “Arabism.” Right- ist army elements are not well-organized and their ranks have been weakened by dismissals, imprisonment, and transfers from positions of influence. However, a number have re- cently been recalled to service in the face of the Isracli threat. There are also certain re- gional groups that are dissatisfied with the present policies of the Syria government 5. Syria represents an extremely promising target for Soviet efforts — military, political, and economic——in the Arab world. A con- tinuation of the present trend would give the USSR a number of advantages, é. g.: a. It would be in a position to encourage and sid Syrian blackmail and boycott tactics and further physical sabotage against West- ern-owned of] pipelines transiting Syria from Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Especially as long as the Western Powers are denied passage through the Sucz Canal, this would be of critical importance to the USSR us & strate- gic and econcmic weapon against the West. b. A more pro-Soviet government in Syria would further weaken the military position of the Baghdad Pact countries and raise the pros- pect of Turkey’s being encircled. Probable Action of Other Interested Parties 1}, There is a greater likelihood of drastic overt moves to influence the Syrian situation by one or more of the directly interested powers other than the USSR. For varying reasons, the UK, France, Turkey, Israel, and Irag all have strong incentives to intervene to retrieve the situation in Syria. While all of them would welcome US participation and support in strong measures to check or coun- ter the leftward trends in Syria, they migat, individually or in some combination, seek to dea] with the problem by themselves if US support for a solution does not appear to be in prospect. Im such an event, there might again be efforts to conceal essential prepara- tions from the US and other nonparticipants. eve 'These include an estimated 20-25 MIG-15 fight- ers — delivered in Egypt; 130 T 34 tanks; and more than 200 armored personnel carriers. 12. Whether or not one or more of these states intervenes in Syrla will depend in part on: (a) the shifting Judgment and moods of the various national leaders (and of thelr respec- tive public opinions) in a still highly fluid situation; (b) the feasibility of Iess drastic courses of action; (c) their estimates of the probable reaction of the US and the USSR; and (d) the degree of success obtained In organizing and holding together the disparate Syrian elements whose support would be needed. In general, we see the following es the principal possibilities of major non-Soviet